information disorder

  • Institutional-Behavioural Contradictions: the bane of Information Disorder in the Nigerian Public Sector

    The terms of reference of most Nigerian public sector institutions often run counter to the operational field behaviours of their personnel which consequently misinform and confuse the general public as to what really constitute the exact constitutional duties of these institutions. The segment of the populace with no luxury of resources, skillful knowledge, and time to contest these contradictions absorbs these erroneous acts as normal institutional duties, thus leaving a platform for an acute information disorder to thrive, i.e. Issues of Vehicle Inspection Officers (VIO) being on the road impounding cars with no road worthiness certificate was assumed to be part of the VIO duties until challenged in court.

    Aworinde (2021) recounts how a public-interest litigant, Kunle Edun, was unlawfully delayed by operatives of Vehicle Inspection Office over lack of possession of vehicle road worthiness certificate. Unknown to the VIO operatives their victim was a lawyer who has the means and knowledge to go the long haul with them. The victim, Mr Kunle Edun subsequently dragged the VIO to court to contest and clarify that the vehicle roadworthiness certificate demanded by the VIO on the road was not part of their lawful responsibility. The Appeal Court heard the case and halted the VIO from demanding private vehicles’ roadworthiness certificate from private vehicle owners (Aworinde 2021). 

    Mr Kunle in an interactive interview with the Punch Newspaper expressed further:

    ‘‘I know that whenever the VIOs demand such documents from private vehicle owners, they have a way of settling the matter. I wouldn’t know if money exchanges hands, but they have a way of settling it and that has emboldened them (VIOs) to continue in the act.’’ Aworinde (2019)

    Prior to Kunle’s eye-opening case with the VIO, most private motorists who are unaware of their rights had got their vehicles impounded and ignorantly submitted to payment of exorbitant fees before the release of their cars for issues relating to roadworthiness certificates.

    In 2019 alone, the Nigerian NewsDirect (2019) reported that in a space of seven days, the VIO operatives impounded 105 unroadworthy vehicles in Abuja. This sort of news demonstrates how a wrongful knowledge of responsibility can misinform and misdirect the actions of the operatives of public institutions. The case of the VIO shows how the incidence of a wrongful sense of duty accruing from wrong knowledge impacts on the ignorant public which often gets published for offences outside the jurisdiction of Vehicle Inspection Officers. Another case in point is the popular Nigerian Police slogan often written in front of their offices across Nigeria which reiterates that ‘‘Police is your friend’’ and another that publicises that ‘‘bail is free’’.

    Unfortunately, the operational behaviours of the Nigerian Police have left reversive impressions that challenge the authenticity of these informative slogans, thus instituting unsureness whether the Nigerian Police is obligated by law to conduct themselves in a friendly manner and if bail is actually free. Orunbon (2019) argued that ‘‘Police are especially not your friend in an environment that does not hold the police accountable for the actions and expression of unreasonable force.’’

    Orunbon’s (2019) assertion is proven by the recent End-Sars protest where the youths relying on the friendliness slogan of the Nigerian police went on a peaceful demonstration but were battered with about twelve people killed and hundreds severely injured (Amnesty International 2020). This outcome no doubt demonstrates the incongruity and information disorder between the set constitutional duties of the Nigerian police, a public institution charged with the responsibility of protecting lives, and the contravening operations of their personnel who misrepresent their legitimate duty. 

    Another like it is the emphasis that bail is free. The Open Society Initiative (2021) highlighted the case of one Alade who was detained beyond the constitutional limit. Open Society Initiative (2021) remarked that: 

    Section 35 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution states that the police may not detain any suspect for longer than 48 hours without a court order. The initial detention of Alade from March 9 until May 15, 2003 was not authorized by any court of law, and was thus unlawful.

    The case of Alade is one out of multiple contravening cases where the operatives of the Nigerian Police appear to have redefined their legitimate routines and procedures, making their illegitimate action seem like they are performing their constitutional duty.

    Busari (2017) reported that the relaunch of ‘‘bail is free’ campaign by the Nigerian Police was aimed at providing a panacea to protect the citizens from misguided information that bail is not free. The campaign managers advice the public to report to the nearest Police Station the conduct of any Police Officer, Investigative Police Officer (IPO) or any other Officer that asks for money or pecuniary benefit before, during or after bail is granted by the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs), Area Commanders, The Command Public Relations Officers, Commissioner of Police or to the Force Public Relations Officer (Busari 2017). Notwithstanding the “bail is free” campaign, a large section of the public seems to have adopted the experiential reality that bail is not free. The behaviours of the operative of the Nigerian Police cannot absolve them completely from the guilt of instilling this erroneous and disorderly perception in the mind of the populace who believes that bail is not free.

    Another institution that highlights institutional-behavioural contradiction is the Federal Character Commission (FCC). The Chapter VI Part 1 Section 153 (1)(C) of the Nigerian constitution which established the Federal Character Commission saddled the commission with the responsibilities of ensuring equitable distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service, the states, the armed forces, the Nigerian police and other government agencies and government owned companies and parastatals. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Also, the commission is duty bound to promote, monitor, and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government. 

    Vanguard (2021) reported that, contrary to the promotion of equity in the distribution of national and material resources expected from the FCC, one part of the country is disproportionately favoured with vast majority of important federal appointments and distribution of projects, continuing that such act is totally against the Federal Character provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian. The inability of the FCC to leave up to her responsibilities has both instilled a perception of inferiority and superiority among Nigerians depending on one’s ethnic identity. This unchecked unfairness reflects today in the multiplicity of insurgency and secessionist agitations in Nigeria. (Nnochiri, 2021).

    The panacea to institutional-behavioural discrepancies is not far-fetched. First, the public institutions and their civil service personnel have to be insulated from partisan politics. Rules and regulations guiding the public institutions should be regularly reviewed and updated to close newfound loopholes of abuses. There must be willingness to identify and punish violators of public trust. Personnel of various public sector institutions have to be reoriented to be proactive and professional in the performance of their duties. Importantly, the general public has to be inundated with procedures for laying hitch free complaints without consequences or exposure to retributions. The electoral system that churns out leaders of the country ought to be streamlined to reflect the current realities and made to be rigging proof. Clear processes have to be in place to streamline the selection of ethnically oriented leaders. The leadership must be willing at all times to listen to pockets of agitations and make an effort to respond positively to legitimate requests before it snowballs into uncontrollable movement. 

    References

    Aworinde, T., 2021. Why Appeal Court barred VIO from demanding private vehicles’ roadworthiness certificate Lawyer. [Online] https://punchng.com/why-appeal-court-barred-vio-from-demanding-private-vehicles-roadworthiness-certificate-lawyer/ 

    Orubon, A., 2019. Why the police are not our friends. [Online] Punch. https://guardian.ng/opinion/why-the-police-are-not-our-friends/ 

    Nigerian NewsDirect, (2019). In 7 days, VIO impounds 105 unroadworthy vehicles in Abuja. [Online]NewsDirect. https://nigeriannewsdirect.com/in-7-days-vio-impounds-105-unroadworthy-vehicles-in-abuja/ 

    Amnesty International, (2021). Nigeria: Killing of #EndSARS protesters by the military must be investigated. Press Release Amnesty International. [Online] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/10/killing-of-endsars-protesters-by-the-military-must-be-investigated/ 

    Open Society Initiative, (2021). Alade v. the Federal Republic of Nigeria. [Online] https://www.justiceinitiative.org/litigation/alade-v-federal-republic-nigeria#:~:text=Section%2035%20of%20Nigeria%E2%80%99s%201999%20Constitution%20states%20that,any%20court%20of%20law%2C%20and%20was%20thus%20unlawful. 

    Busari, K., (2017). Nigeria Police re-launch ‘bail is free’ campaign. [Online] Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/243166-nigeria-police-re-launch-bail-free-campaign.html

    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (1999). Part I. Federal Executive Bodies (Established by Section 153) [Online] https://www.jurist.ng/constitution/1026 

    Nnochiri, I., (2021) Igbo lawyers apply to join suit seeking exit of South-East from Nigeria. [Online] Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/10/igbo-lawyers-apply-to-join-suit-seeking-exit-of-south-east-from-nigeria/ 

    Asaju, K., (2019). Re: How does partisan politics and cross-carpeting affect governance and insecurity in Nigeria? [Online]. https://www.researchgate.net/post/How-does-partisan-politics-and-cross-carpeting-affect-governance-and-insecurity-in-Nigeria/5cf9157d979fdc9a7b0a0bc5/citation/download. 

    Emeka, I., (2003). The Prohibition of Nigerian Civil Servants from Political Activities: A Necessary Derogation from Freedom of Association. The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law Volume 6, Issue 1, September 2003. [Online] https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/the-prohibition-of-nigerian-civil-servants-from-political-activities-a-necessary-derogation-from-freedom-of-association 

  • Information Disorder in The Media: Implication For National Security In The Sub-Region Of West Africa: The Case of Ghana

    A Working Paper for the Kwame Karikari Fellowship for the 2021 Session

    Abstract

    The implication of ‘information disorder’ on national security is on the rise owing to the rapid spread of fake news both on the new and old media platforms. This disorder undermines the value of information as a core strategic instrument within the context of governance in a democracy, especially in national security governance. One of the key sources of intelligence gathering by the intelligence community such as “open source intelligence” which largely relies on information disseminated in the media is often affected. While national security depends, among other factors, on open-source intelligence in managing risks, fake news in the media does not only heightens this risk, it poses as a threat, thus complicating the tasks of the national security apparatus. Although the intentions of spreading fake news vary, one outstanding motive of terror groups or belligerents is to mislead the public, distract the government, and divert the attention on national security from their targets. Drawing on cases of fake news bordering on national security in the West African sub-region, this paper combines theories of media and communication with national security theories to interrogate the questions of information disorder and the implications for national security management in the region.  The significance of this approach is that a combination of theories of the media and national security allows us to look at the problems of information disorder from multiple lenses and to bring erstwhile distinct fields of study together in addressing important questions bordering each field.

    Introduction

    In every democratic dispensation, free flow of information is crucial for people to know what their government is doing (Roger; CBS, 1971). It also enables them to provide their perspectives on issues that affect them most (BBC World Service Trust, 2008) in the process of governance and to also aid in holding government and public officials accountable (Rhea, 2012; Roger, 1971). The media (old and new) serve as conduit for information flow and play crucial roles in the democratic process, more importantly serving as an important source for intelligence gathering for national security management (Rhea, 2012; Loch, 2007). However, information disorder-misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, and the manipulation(s) of the media– can disrupt the free flow of information, which can have adverse effects on how political actors perceive the world around them (Roger, 1971). Important actors impacted by information disorder include security institutions, such as the government and its agencies, particularly the national security apparatuses, the media, and the citizens at large. National Security (NS) connotes what states do both covertly and overtly to provide protection for their citizens, territorial boundaries, environment and national interests. Their operations are largely dependent on information flow. NS apparatuses, therefore, use media to access information for open-source intelligence (OSINT) gatherings.

    National security concerns itself with a multidisciplinary focus ranging from managing security challenges, protecting the core values of a nation-state, national/foreign policy, its economy, territorial boundaries, among others. It is aimed at protecting the state from both internal and external aggressions. It, therefore, has no single definition or concept about its operations. Huntington (1957), sees national security as a strategic policy designed to protect the interest and territorial boundaries of a nation-state. According to him (Huntington, 1957, p.1), national security concerns itself more in the provision of security to protect the state’s political, social and economic institutions. He postulates that, the success of national security policy largely depends upon how security operatives (military and state agencies) position themselves in managing security affairs of the state in security hybrid situations. In his analyses, the safety of the state is paramount and should be protected by state agencies with absolute loyalty to the state. Buzan (1983, 1991), sees the concept of national security to connote the promotion and protection of human and environmental security. In his postulate, national security is aimed at ensuring human safety, thereby ensuring that anything that could jeopardize that safety including the protection of the environment the referent object survives on. According to Loch (2007), national security is all about intelligence gathering and data assessment for the safety of state, its citizens and other national interests. Loch (2007) postulates further that, successful national security management depends upon security operatives’ dedication and their ability to timely counter any threat both internal and external that can jeopardize the safety of a referent of object such as a nation-state. According to him, NS is all about dictating (intelligence gathering), the activities of belligerence, and acting swiftly to thwart their efforts before they strike. Loch (2007) outlines open-source intelligence (OSINT) as one of the major means national security successfully operates. OSINT is gathering information for national security purposes through the news-media (old and new). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994, p. 22), perceives national security in relation to human security. This concept stresses on what state meant to do in order to maintain internal security to ensure human rights, human safety from violence and sustainable development. Thomas and Tow (2002, p. 179), agree to the UN concept of national security since it has an increased impact on national security.

    This research is limited to the geopolitical location of Ghana. The country will be divided into three blocks (Northern, Middle and Coastal belts, to measure the impact of information disorder on national security. The purpose of this paper is to identify the implications of information disorder for national security. It is also targeted at establishing the concrete relationships between information and the three other security actors such as the media, citizens, government/national security apparatus. It will enable proper policy formation to curb the current effects of information disorder on security governance and to also address its future challenges to democracies in the sub-region of West Africa. This research will establish the factors that determine how each element functions and contributes to the security management process in every democracy, particularly Ghana. It will also expose some of the underlying factors that affect the collective roles in the afore-stated elements (information, media, security institution, and citizens) in consolidating democracy, not only in Ghana, but in the sub-region as a whole. This research will employ the qualitative methodology based on the constructivist paradigm, using a case study method. The qualitative research method concerns itself with the assessment of a phenomenon based on the researcher’s subjectivity (Kothari, 2004; Karina et al., 2011; Yin, 1994). It is used to appreciate and explain a social phenomenon using qualitative data, such as interviews, documents, and observations (Kothari, 2004; Haradhan, 2018).

    Even though the case study approach is not only limited to qualitative research methodology, it also appears more suitable for this study. Using multiple case designs is appropriate for this research. I am keen to draw four cases from Ghana to gather data and draw up my conclusion based on the retrieved facts. Consequently, in this research work, we will use news reportage from 2017 to 2021 in the old media space (radio, television and the print media) and selected contents on the new or digital media platforms (social media) such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter and YouTube for analysis and conclusions.

    References

    Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch, 2000, Peace Journalism; What Is It? How to Do It? www.reportingtheworld.org.

    Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis

    Buzan, Barry. “Security, the State, the “New World Order,” and Beyond.”  On Security. Ed. Ronne D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia Universtiy Press, 1998. ch.7

    Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.  1st edition 1981, 2nd Edition.  Hertfordshire:  Harvester Wheat sheaf, 1991 and 2008 with a new preface from the author.

    Buzan,  Barry.  “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century.” International Affairs (Royal Institute  of  International  Affairs  1944-)  67.3  (1991): 431-451.

    C.R. Kothari, Research Methodology; Methods and Techniques, 2004. NEW AGE International (P) Limited, Publishers 4835/24, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi – 110002 Visit us atwww.newagepublishers.com

    Huntington, Samuel (1957), The Soldier and the State, New York: Vintage Books (p.1)

    Karina K. Fabian C. Janet S., Introduction to Qualitative Research Methodology. December 2011) www.write-arm.com.

    Loch K. Johnson, 2007, Intelligence and the quest for security, ISSN 1932-3492; Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com

    Roger Mudd; The Selling of The Pentagon, CBS, 1971

    Susanna Bearne, Olga Oliker, Kevin A. O’Brien, Andrew Rathmell, National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform, 2005 RAND Corporation

    Serena Giusti and Elisa Piras, Democracy and fake news: information manipulation and post-truth. Routledge 2021. LCCN 2020031088 (ebook)

    The BBC World Service Trust; The Kenyan 2007 elections and their aftermath: the role of media and communication; Policy Briefing #1 April 2008 (p. 3,4)

    Thomas, Nicholas; Tow, William, 2002: “The Utility of Human Security; Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention”, in: Security Dialog, p. 179.

    UNDP (2007), Towards a Pacific Human Security: report on consultation proceedings, Fiji: UNDP.

    UN General Assembly, 66th Session “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” (A/RES/66/290), 25 October 2012.

    UNDP, 1994: Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Waever,  Ole.  “Securitization  and  Desecuritization.”  On  Security.  Ed.  Ronnie  D.

    Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. ch. 3.

    Yin, Qualitative Research Methods, 1994.

  • Information Disorder and Actors of Chibok Girls’ Abduction Incidents

    Reactions accruing from Twitter’s decision to site her African headquarter in Ghana in place of Nigeria demonstrates that the wrongful presentation of Nigeria as a hostile business entity through disinformation and misinformation conveyed by the Nigerian media was the causative factor that hoodwinked Twitters decision (Elebeke and Ajayi 2021). According to Lai Mohammed, the Nigerian Minister of Information, the Nigerian media de-marketed Nigeria through excessive fault-findings and exaggerated rumors about the country’s challenges, citing the #EndSARS protest as an example where the country was painted as a place where no one can live (Elebeke and Ajayi 2021).

    While the argument of the information minister delineates the costly effect of information disorder on foreign investments, he inadvertently showcases the blame-game and intricacies that frustrates objective reportage. The government’s motives to be portrayed in good light even when they are obviously perpetuating wrongs is a dimension of information disorder that is imbued in corruption, to which the minister’s argument mildly insinuates.

    In the same vein, a survey result of the Nigeria coronavirus vaccine-rollout, reported by The Guardian news revealed that 1 in every 4 Nigerian do not trust the government to save their lives (Poopola 2021). This sort of distrust and apathy against actions of constituted authorities in Nigeria relates to the inconsistency, distrust, and disorder in the government information system. Chukwumeka (2021) explained that different administrations in Nigeria have struggled to build trust, but their antecedents has left their citizens to trust foreign organizations more than their government, adding that continued lack of trust for the government and media would result in resistance to government policies, flight of investors and economic crises. Unfortunately, the fears of Chukwuemeka (2021) are no longer at the realm of the future but are now visible in the flight of foreign investors from Nigeria to Ghana and other advantageous countries to which Twitter’s move of headquarters to Ghana is one among many.

    Aside from the civil impact of information disorder, the security dimension of information disorder appears more unsettling. A Nigerian journalist with links to the Boko Haran, the Islamist group responsible for the kidnap of 276 Chibok girls, claimed that only 15 out of the 112 missing Chibok girls were still alive (BBC 2018), but a government spokesperson at the same time countered the claim, sustaining that the government were still discussing the release of the remaining 112 girls, furthering that there was no reason to think some of the kidnapped girls may be dead (BBC 2018).

    The above highlights a typical contradicting and recurring milieu of information disorder in Nigeria that often elicits unsureness, controversies, frustration, and inadvertent violent demonstrations. The dilemma that precipitated from this sort of distorted perspective snowballed expectedly into asking insinuative questions such as the type posed by one of the victims’ sympathizers, Haruna Dauda who echoed: “We need to know if they are alive or dead. If they are alive, let them come back to us. If they are dead, let us know so we can at least pray for them and then overcome this grief.” (BBC 2018).

    The excerpt of John Pepper Clark’s poem which reads that the casualties are not only those who are dead and that we are all casualties (Clark 2021) implies that irrespective of having varying sides to a conflict or having a victor and a vanquished, that anybody impacted by the outcome of a conflict ought to be numbered among the casualties and this include persons who has been misinformed by the various actors involved in the rescue of the girls. The impact of Chibok girls’ abduction was upon the generality of Nigerians, including those whose children were not kidnapped but were misinformed about the effort of the government to bring back the kidnapped girls. Adepegba (2021) reported that at least twenty parents of the abducted Chibok students have lost their lives because of trauma. That they died trusting and waiting for the fulfilment of government promise is an understatement.

    Nonetheless, the Chibok girls’ abduction incident produced multiple characters and actors, which include both the perpetrators and the interventionists. The chief characters comprise all the kidnapped Chibok girls, their abductors, who are known as Boko Haram, the government, the media, and the nongovernmental organizations that pioneered the Bring Back Our Girls’ movement. Unfortunately, these actors, to an extent, either ignorantly or intentionally weaponized misinformation as a tool to intimidate or weep up sympathy which did not materialize in the full release of the chibok girls. A brief description of the peculiar role of each of these actors will usher-in a symmetrical clarity that will induce a better understanding of their contributions towards the exacerbation of the girls’ abduction, and its amelioration, as what connects these actors will be established in the context of exploring each of their peculiar roles (Obiezu 2021).

    Chibok town and the abduction of the schoolchildren.

    Chibok is one among the 27 Local Government Areas in Borno State (OCHA 2018). Chibok Local Government is in the southern part of Borno State, while Borno State is in the northeastern part of Nigeria (Smart Survey Report 2019). The city became remarkable when about 276 schoolchildren were kidnapped from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok local government area (Yuguda 2021). According to Allen Manasseh, who is the media and publicity head of the Chibok community, about 503 girls were at the school the night Boko Haram abducted 276 School girls. Allen Manasseh estimated that outside the schoolchildren released and those who managed to escape, about 112 of the Chibok girls are still unaccounted for till date (Obiezu 2021).

    Despite the avalanche of contradictory narrations of the Chibok girls kidnapping, the consistent data hold that the abduction of the girls happened around 11 p.m. on the 14th day of April in the year 2014. The perpetrators of the crime were said to be militants who identified themselves as Boko Haram in the local palace language, which translates as western education is forbidden (Granville 2020). According to narration, on that very day the Boko Haram forced about 276 girls who were in their dormitories into their trucks as captives and drove them towards Sambisa Forest (Diep 2019). Few of the girls managed to escape during the journey to Sambisa Forest. The Boko Haram who are the perpetrators of the crime claim that their action was aimed at eliminating western education from the Nigerian polity. Their leader Abubakar Shekau announced that he intends to sell the 276 girls into slavery.

    Aside from the reasons Shekau adduced for the kidnap, Diep (2019) analyzing Isha Sessey’s book on Chibok girls’ abduction, holds that Boko Haram had been abducting women and girls, in smaller numbers over the years. Diep (2019) continued that Boko Haram norm had been to kidnap girls and use them as sex slaves, use them as human bombs, brainwash them and radicalize them.

    Though, there are questions as to why all the students waited to be kidnapped without taking flight? Diep’s (2019) report held that the school rules advise the students that when anything happens that they should not leave until a teacher comes, or else they will get into trouble. The scenario upon which the school rule applied played out at the school, so the students heeded the rule which resulted in their mass abduction.

    So far, the government confirmed that on the 6th of May 2017, 82 of the Chibok girls were freed. Though those freed were presumed freed in exchange for five high-ranking Boko Haram prisoners, outside those freed and those that escaped from the abduction, the total estimate of the Chibok school girls still in captivity to date is 112. 

    About Boko Haram

    Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in northeastern Nigeria (Birchall, 2018). The group believes in a strict application of the version of Salafi and Wahabi Islam which forbids the taking part in anything associated with Western culture. Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which is the official name of Boko Haram in Arabic means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Birchall, 2018). Their doctrine bars voting in an election, receiving a western-like education, or even wearing shirts and trousers. Also, Boko Haram believes that infidels run Nigeria so long as it condones multilateral religious practices. Their beliefs and orientation resonate their quest to overthrow the Nigerian State and replace it with a full Islamic state.

    The Nigerian Government

    ‘‘The control of information is something the elite always does, particularly in a despotic form of government. Information, knowledge, is power. If you can control information, you can control the people.’’ (Clancy 2017)

    Unfortunately, the quote of Clancy (2017) ought not apply to Nigeria, having delineated herself as a democratic country with the constitutional provision for freedom of speech with the attendant free press (Nwankwo 2020). Nonetheless, the practice of democracy in Nigeria is where Clancy’s quote finds feat.

    The Federal Government of Nigeria is made up of the legislative, executive, and judicial, whose powers are vested by the Constitution of Nigeria (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Also, the Nigerian constitution provides a separation and balance of powers among the three branches. (Constitution of the Federal government of Nigeria 1999). Therefore, when government is mentioned in the text, without specifying which of the arms, we refer to both the legislators, the executive, and the judiciary.

    Nigeria’s Government is the major interventionist character in the whole Chibok abduction panorama. Nonetheless, the degree with which the government’s responses varies from her constitutional roles, either by action or inaction, is the point that will be used to determine its complicity in the Chibok kidnap incident. As highlighted by Clancy (2017), a despotic form of government often tries to malign information as a way of controlling the people. Could that be the case of Chibok girls? The provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is a ready tool for determining the facts.

    Chapter II Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution states that the security and welfare of the Nigerian people shall be the primary purpose of government (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). This excerpt of the Nigerian constitution is the milieu upon which the capacity of the government to fulfill her primary responsibilities is rated, especially in respect to her actions in the rescue of the Chibok girls. Beside the executive arm of government, other government actors in respect of the Chibok girls’ abduction include the legislators and members of the judiciary. The actions and inactions of these institutions tend to demonstrate unseriousness and elicit actions that elicits the #EndSars and #Bringback our girls. 

    Reference

    Elebeke. E., and Ajayi, O., (2021). Lai Mohammed blames Nigerians for Twitter’s decision to locate African hqtrs in Ghana. Vanguard. Available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/04/lai-mohammed-blames-nigerians-for-twitters-decision-to-locate-african-hqtrs-in-ghana/ [Accessed 27 September 2021]

    Adepegba, A., (2021). ‘20 Chibok schoolgirls’ parents died of heartbreak’ Punch. Available at

    https://punchng.com/20-chibok-schoolgirls-parents-died-of-heartbreak/ [Accessed 27 September 2021]

    Popoola, J., (2021). 1 in 4 Nigerians don’t trust the government to save their lives. And that’s a problem. The Guardian. Available at https://guardian.ng/opinion/1-in-4-nigerians-dont-trust-the-government-to-save-their-lives-and-thats-a-problem/ [Accessed 27 September 2021]

    Chukwuemka, C., (2021). Available at: Survey Shows Nigerians Don’t Trust Media, Government

    https://www.newsngr.com.ng/2021/03/survey-shows-nigerians-dont-trust-media-government/

    [Accessed 27 September 2021]

    BBC, (2018). Chibok girls: Many abductees’ dead, says journalist. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43767490 [Accessed 09 September 2021]

    Clark, J, P., (2021). All Poetry [online] Available at: https://allpoetry.com/poem/10602491-The-Casualties-by-John-Pepper-Clark  [Accessed 22 August 2021]

    Adepegba, A., (2021). ‘20 Chibok schoolgirls’ parents died of heartbreak’ Punch. Available at

    https://punchng.com/20-chibok-schoolgirls-parents-died-of-heartbreak/  [Accessed 27 September 2021]

    Clancy, T., (2017). Book Scene: Knowledge is power in Ash and Quill. [online] Available at: https://www.yakimaherald.com/scene/literature/book-scene-knowledge-is-power-in-ash-and-quill/article_d5b73296-6cc2-11e7-a5d2-e3a7b63f996a.html [Accessed 2 September, 2021]

    Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999) [online] Available at: https://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Nigeria_Constitution_1999_en.pdf [Accessed 29 August, 2021]

    OCHA. (2018). Nigeria – Borno State Reference Map. [online] Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/30082018_ocha_nga_borno_state_refmap.pdf [Accessed 26 August 2021]

    Obiezu, T., (2021). More Than 100 Chibok Girls Still Missing Seven Years Later. [online] Available at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/more-100-chibok-girls-still-missing-seven-years-later [Accessed 26 August 2021]

    Birchall, G., (2018). The SUN WHAT DO THEY WANT? Who are Boko Haram, who is their leader Abubakar Shekau and what do the Nigerian Islamist group want? [online] Available at: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1614327/boko-haram-leader-abubakar-shekau-nigeria-islamist/ [Accessed 26 August 2021]

    Awford, J., (2018). FINALLY FREE When were the Chibok schoolgirls released, why did Boko Haram kidnap them and what was the Bring Back Our Girls campaign? [online] Available at:

    https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3505953/chibok-schoolgirls-boko-haram-kidnap-release-free-bring-back-our-girls/ [Accessed 28 August 2021]

    Diep, F., (2019). TRUE STORY OF THE NIGERIAN SCHOOL GIRLS WHO SURVIVED BOKO HARAM [online] Available at:

    https://psmag.com/ideas/the-true-story-of-the-nigerian-schoolgirls-who-survived-boko-haram [Accessed 26th August 2021]

    Smart Survey Report., (2019). Conducted in Banki (Bama), Damboa, Dikwa and Ngala LGAs, Borno State, Nigeria (26th September to 9th October 2019). [online] Available at:  https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/smart-survey-report-conducted-bankibama-damboa-dikwa-and-ngala-lgas-borno-state [Accessed 26 August 2021]

    Granville, K., (2020). The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the People of Borno State: Walden University. [online] Available at:

    https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10168&context=dissertations [Accessed 26 August 2021]

    Nwankwo, P., (2020). Speech and Media Freedom in Nigeria: Some examples of abuses of press Freedom: The Sun.[online]Available at: https://www.sunnewsonline.com/speech-and-media-freedom-in-nigeria-some-examples-of-abuses-of-press-freedom/   [Accessed 26 August 2021]

  • The concept of Information Disorder: An examination of the KAP of Communication Students of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana (Preliminary Report I)

    This study is aimed at finding out the knowledge attitudes and practices of audiences, in this instance, tertiary education students about the phenomenon of information disorder. Research and strategies of combating Information Disorder have focused on how organisations are verifying the authenticity of news and stories and the public’s attitude to particular types of information disorder in a particular country as can be found in studies by Ahmed and Eldakar (2021); Pherson, Ranta and Cannon (2021). This study, however, tries to find answers to questions such as what selected audiences know about information disorder; will the audience be able to identify information disorder; does the audience have the capacity to independently verify whether a piece of information is authentic or not among others. This study is important because the individual or audiences who either create, share or consume mis/disinformation play a major role in the communication act that involves dis/misinformation.  According to Edson et al. (2018) the “fakeness” or otherwise of a news or information was dependent on what the audiences did with the news or whether the audience perceives the fake as real. Without the audience perceiving the information as news, fake news remains a work of fiction. However, when the audiences mistake it as real the fake news is able to play with journalism’s legitimacy. The audience is even more important particularly in the context of social media where information is exchanged and meanings are negotiated.  All these mean that even if someone created disinformation, it was only if this disinformation was shared by another person that it got into the public domain and became “fake news”. Without anyone sharing that information, there was no way the public would be deceived or misled by it.

    This article compares preliminary responses about knowledge, attitudes and practices from both undergraduate and postgraduate students of the University of Cape Coast and the University of Education, Winneba, Ghana.

    PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

    1. GENDER, INSTITUTION AND ACADEMIC LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS

    Eight responses have been received so far out of an estimated 200. Out of the eight responses there are two males and six females.  Five of the respondents were from the University of Cape Coast while the remaining three were from the University of Education, Winneba.. Seven out of the eight respondents were postgraduate students reading for a Master’s degree.

    1. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INFORMATION DISORDER 

    Knowledge

    The responses of respondents on questions about their level of knowledge on information disorder, revealed that  majority, that is, 7 (87.5%) out of the 8 respondents have heard of information disorder, and only half of all the respondents (50%) have a high level of confidence in their ability to identify mis/disinformation. The remaining half (50%) were neutral in their assessment of their level of confidence in identifying mis/disinformation. This suggests half of the respondents cannot tell, if they would be able to identify mis/disinformation or not. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

    Figure 1

    Meaning/Definition of Information Disorder

    Figure 2: Definition of Information Disorder

    In order to ascertain their knowledge about what constituted information disorder, respondents were asked to select among various options about the definition of information disorder.  As presented in Figure 2 above, six (75%) respondents identified information that is false, but which the person who disseminates it thinks it’s true, as what constituted information disorder and another six responses identified mis/disinformation to include photos, videos or quotes taken out of context. Information that is false and knowingly disseminated by an individual deliberately with the intention to deceive people, and information that contains claims without providing sources, were identified by 5 (62.5%) respondents each as what constitutes information disorder. Four (50%) respondents identified information that is referenced to ‘experts’ who lack valid credentials as information disorder and three (37.5%) respondents each identified information created to inspire emotions such as hate or fear with little evidence as what constituted information disorder. Three (37.5%) respondents also identified all the options as illustrations of information disorder. Lastly, two (25%) respondents each suggested that information designed to stun situations referred to in the stories, and information that is based on reality, but used to inflict harm on a person, organisation or country as definitions of misinformation. There was no respondent who indicated that they did not have an idea about what the meaning of information disorder was. 

    Indicators of Information Disorder

    Figure 3: Indicators of Information Disorder

    Respondents were asked to identify the indicators of information disorder, after having stated their definitions of the phenomenon. It was found that six out of the eight (75%) respondents indicated that the source or website of the information is the number one indicator of whether a piece of news is credible or not. The account from which the information is shared ranked second with 4 (50%) respondents stating it as an indicator of information disorder. The number of times a post is shared and whether a post contains a picture or not were also selected by two (25%) respondents each as indicators of information disorder. One person indicated that the number of comments a story has could be an indicator of information disorder. Only one respondent stated that none of the options given could be an indicator of information disorder. The findings are illustrated in Figure 3.

    Frequency of Disinformation

    Figure 4: Frequency of Disinformation

    Figure 4, providing results on frequency of disinformation shows that half (50%) of the respondents indicated that they encounter disinformation very frequently, while 3 (37.5%) encounter it frequently and only one rarely comes across it. This shows that disinformation is something that people have to deal with most of the time.

    Major Sources, Platforms and Content of Disinformation 

    Figure 5

    Politicians, Political parties and political parties (50%) have been identified as the major source of misinformation, followed by celebrities (25%), with journalists and religious personalities 12.5% each coming in third position. Figure 5, provides these results.

    Most of the disinformation is encountered on Facebook (62.5%), while the rest were on Twitter, WhatsApp and other media platforms.

    Figure 6

    The major subject of disinformation that respondents came across (in Figure 7) was on politics (87.5) and messages that promised people gifts and free items (12.5%). 

    Figure 7

    Knowledge About Fact-Checking Institutions and Criminality of sharing mis/disinformation

    Five (62.5%) out of the 8 respondents indicated that they were aware of the fact that some institutions were working on combating misinformation. 

    In identifying the institutions or organisations that were combating misinformation three responses (50%) identified Factcheck Ghana, two (33.3%) each for Dubawa, FactCheck.org and AFP fact checking, and one (16.7%) each for Media Foundation for West Africa, and Multimedia Group Limited. One respondent also stated that none of the listed institutions was involved in any activities in combating information disorder. The details are contained in Figure 8.

     Figure 8:Knowledge about Fact-Checking Institutions

    With the exception of one respondent, almost all respondents (87.5%) indicated that they were aware that it was criminal to share information that was not credible. This is presented in Figure 9.

    Figure 9

    Manipulation of Photos and Videos

    Figure 10

    Figure 10 shows that three- fourth, that is, 75% of the respondents know that it is possible to check whether a video or photo has been manipulated, while two (25%) respondents do not know.

    Respondents were asked to identify ways of checking a manipulated photo. This was a multiple response question which allowed respondents to select more than one answer. Findings, as presented in Figure 11, indicates that Four respondents (50%) were able to identify that checking if the information in the caption or article matches the photo, looking at the picture closely to see if there is anything odd about it (e.g. warped, blurred), running a reverse image search and checking the metadata of the picture all constituted ways of checking for manipulation of pictures. Similarly, four (50%) of respondents identified looking at the picture closely to see if there is anything odd about it (e.g. warped, blurred) as a way of scheming for manipulation. Checking if the information in the caption or article matches the photo and running a reverse image search both received 3 (37.5%) responses each and checking the metadata of the picture was selected by two (25%) respondents as the way of verifying if a picture was manipulated. Only one respondent indicated that none of the procedures mentioned could be used to check a picture’s authenticity.

    Figure 11

    Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 12, respondents identified ways of checking if a video was manipulated. Similar to the responses on manipulation of photos, half (50%) of respondents identified that all the options, that is, using specialist software such as InVID, reverse image search of a screenshot from the video using Google or TinEye, by checking the location of the video by using Google Earth or Wikimapia, checking out the video’s metadata using tools such as ExifTool, and checking the time the video was filmed using Suncalc are all ways of verifying if a video was manipulated.  Three respondents each stated that reverse image search of a screenshot from the video using Google or TinEye, by checking the location of the video by using Google Earth or Wikimapia, and checking the time the video was filmed using Suncalc constitute ways of authenticating videos. Using specialist software such as InVID, and checking out the video’s metadata using tools such as ExifTool were mentioned twice (25%) as the ways of verifying the authenticity of videos. Only two respondents indicated that they had no idea about the tools used to check if a video is manipulated.

    Figure 12: Ways of Checking Manipulated Videos

    1. ATTITUDE TOWARDS INFORMATION DISORDER

    Minimization of Information Disorder 

    With respect to the attitudes of respondents towards information disorder, respondents were asked to state whether they thought information disorder can be minimised or not. Figure 13 shows that the majority (75%) indicated that it could be minimised while two (25%) respondents indicated that it is likely that it could be minimised. 

    Figure 13

    Verification of Information Before Sharing

    Figure 14

    As to whether respondents verify or authenticate their information photos and videos before sharing, it was found that the majority (75%) do not always verify but only do so sometimes. Only 2 (25%) indicate that they consistently verify the information, photos and videos they share. Figure 14 provides these findings

    Sharing of Misinformation

    All the respondents (100%) have stated that they would not share information, videos or photos that are manipulated. This is a good indication that people are willing to deal positively with misinformation when they recognize it. The details can be seen in Figure 15.

    Figure 15

    PRACTICES OF INFORMATION DISORDER

    Dealing with False Information

    Figure 16

    As can be seen in Figure 16, a large number of respondents (n=5, 62.5%) stated that they would ignore any information that they suspect not to be credible while the remaining 37.5% (n=3) stated that they would proceed to verify the authenticity of any information they suspect not to be credible.

    Use of Tools and Techniques to Verify Photos and Videos

    Figure 17 shows that half of the respondents (n=4, 50%) are neutral about their ability to use tools and techniques to verify the authenticity of information, photographs and videos, while 25% each of the respondents indicated that they would agree and disagree respectively that they will be able to use tools and techniques to verify the authenticity of videos and photos. 

    Figure 17

    Action on False Information or Disinformation

    Figure 18: Action on Disinformation

    From Figure 18, seven out of the eight respondents (87.5%) stated that when they verify a suspicious information to be false, they would desist from sharing such information, while six respondents out of the eight (75%) stated that they would desist from sharing, but also alert their friends and those sharing the information that it was false. Three respondents (37.5%) say they would just alert their friends and people sharing the information that it is false while one respondent indicates that s/he would counter the misinformation with evidence that it is false.

    Use of Social Media Tools to Report Misinformation

    Figure 19

    Over one third (n=3, 37.5%) of the respondents stated that they used social media tools on social network sites to report misinformation as shown in Figure 19. Another 37.5% stated that they do not use the social media tools to report misinformation while the remaining 25% (n=2) were not aware of any social media tools.

    Following of Fact-Checking Pages on Social Networking Sites

    Results from Figure 19 show that close to two thirds (62.5%) of the 8 respondents have indicated that in order to prevent dissemination of mis/disinformation, they follow fact-checking credible news sources on social media while 37.5% stated that they do no such thing.

    Figure 20

    CONCLUSION

    The preliminary findings about the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices from respondents on Information Disorder show that people have knowledge about the phenomenon and generally have a positive attitude towards fighting it. Their practices have also shown that they are and will be willing to contribute to efforts aimed at eradicating or minimizing it. Considering the fact that the respondents are few, no major conclusions can be drawn from the findings so far. 

    The findings from the full study would bring to bear various dimensions such as how knowledge, attitudes and practices differ among genders and give a clearer understanding of the issues related to the phenomenon of Information Disorder.

    REFERENCES

    Ahmed Shehata & Metwaly Eldakar (2021): An Exploration of Egyptian Facebook Users’ Perceptions and Behavior of COVID-19 Misinformation, Science & Technology Libraries, DOI: 10.1080/0194262X.2021.1925203

    Randolph H. Pherson, Penelope Mort Ranta & Casey Cannon (2021) Strategies for Combating the Scourge of Digital Disinformation, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 34:2, 316-341, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2020.1789425

  • The Spread of Misinformation to Gain Votes and Acceptance is A Global Phenomenon

    Running a Research Fellowship Program with Dubawa on Misinformation/Disinformation and its influence on Voters’ Electoral Decision has been both interesting and revealing. In the course of the research, the literature review section unearthed that the spread of misinformation to gain votes, popularity, and acceptance is not peculiar to the Nigerian electoral process alone but a global phenomenon with each, a distinct narrative.

    In fact, the World 2019 electoral integrity report revealed that the quality of media campaigns is challenged by the influx of misinformation and disinformation. Further, emphasizing that Information disorder is now growing into a global phenomenon. Revealingly, the document cited an intelligence report of how misinformation from Russia meddled with the 2016 US elections and how foreign influenced-misinformation also interfered with the Brexit referendum campaign in Europe.

    While reviewing literature for this research,  I read several articles online, international observation reports, and fact check copies on elections conducted in Israel, Korea, Singapore, Myanmar, Ecuador, Dutch, Iran, Iraq, America, Nigeria, and Taiwan. In all, these countries had experienced one form of electoral Dis/misinformation or incident.

    DIS/MISINFORMATION: HIGHLIGHTING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

    Takashi Imamuna, the Washington DC General Manager of Marubeni Group Magazine, published in its January 2017 edition a shooting incident that occurred at a pizza shop on Sunday, December 4, 2016, in Northwest Washington DC. A month before the shooting incident, there were false tweets hashtag “#pizzagate” claiming that the pizza shop was a pedophile sex ring involving Democratic Presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s announcement to resume an investigation into the issue of the use of private e-mail by Hillary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State and the large volume of tweets that followed the announcement stating that newly discovered emails related to a pedophile sex ring linked to Mr. John Podesta, the head of the Clinton campaign, escalated the email controversy. And this culminated in the appearance of the 28-year-old man b

    This story by Marubeni Group Magazine is one of the nineteen real events caused by fake news in the United States of America. 

    The 2020 US election was the subject of hundreds of false and misleading claims in the build-up to the 2020 election. Samantha et al observed that “Misinformation centered on mail-in-voting: the destruction and discarding of real ballots and the discovery of fake ones. Such misinformation typically took the form of misleading photos or de-contextualized video clips of crumpled mail allegedly found in dumpsters or abandoned trucks” (2021, p. 49).

    Noteworthy of the American election experience is the process by which votes were cast in the 2020 election which was significantly influenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic, a situation also commented on by Samantha et al: “By September, nearly 200,000 Americans had already died from COVID-19. In order to prevent COVID-19 transmission at crowded polling places and to accommodate citizens who preferred not to come to the polls, a number of states opted to expand the qualifications for absentee ballots or to alter the vote-by-mail process. For example, dozens of states significantly increased the use of ballot drop boxes” (2021, p. 51).

    Additional US misinformation cases

    Dungan (2020) narrated how in early September, a salon worker in Glendale, California, found multiple bags of unopened mails in a dumpster and took video footage with her cell phone even though there was no evidence that any ballots were among the discarded mails. Samantha et al further remarked that: “Politically motivated actors began using the above techniques of falsely assigning intent, exaggerating impact, and strategic amplification to falsely frame this situation in such a way as to undermine trust in mail-in voting” (2021, p. 54). 

    In late September, another incident of discarded mail in Greenville, Wisconsin was used to sow doubt in mail-in voting. “However, as in Glendale, California, strategic partisan actors distorted the significance of this event, through selective amplification, exaggerating impact, and falsely assigning deliberate intent to purported Biden-supporting USPS workers” (Samantha et al., 2021, p. 56). 

    Also, on September 25, according to the same authors, it was tweeted that over 1,000 ballots had been discovered in a dumpster in Sonoma, California. The tweet further sowed distrust in mail-in voting citing: “Elijah Schaffer, a conservative influencer and verified Twitter user, allegedly received photos of the mail-dumping incident. He posted the photos on Twitter, and other influencers ensured its rapid spread across conservative social media” (2021, p. 57). 

    These experiences not only aroused controversies but also heated doubts and issues around the electoral process. 

    TAIWAN’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

    In Taiwan, another part of the world, Wang acknowledged and commented about election-related misinformation, saying: “Misinformation was rampant during Taiwan’s 2018 elections to the extent that Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau issued a report before the election, highlighting unequivocal evidence that the Chinese government was leveraging online content farms to stoke division in Taiwanese society. The Bureau cited data collected by a task force monitoring the spread of fake news and found several stories aiming to exacerbate hysteria and division in Taiwan. These stories included overblown accounts of live-fire People’s Liberation Army drills in the Taiwan Strait; a claim that China intended to reclaim Taiwan by 2020; and an article falsely suggesting that Taiwan’s bananas were riddled with pesticides” (2018, p. 68).

    The most influential misinformation news item before the Taiwan 2018 local election was President Tsai’s Rainstorm incident: “The false version of the news before the 2018 election claimed that President Tsai Ing-wen rode military armored vehicle to visit victims in a huge rainstorm in August, 2018 commanded the soldiers to be armored to protect her safety, stood smilingly on the vehicle and did not step into the water to visit the victims whereas the correct version of the news was that the military vehicle was not armed with any weapon, Tsai stepped into the water in rainboots to visit the victims, smiling to residents who waved to her” (Wang, 2018, p. 94).

    Another prominent misinformation news before the 2018 election was the Kansai International Airport evacuation incident during Typhoon Jebi in October 2018, about which Wang said Kansai narrative claimed Taiwanese travelers who identified themselves as Chinese were allowed to get on the evacuation bus when China’s consulate in Osaka was evacuating Chinese citizens from the airport while Taiwan’s representative office in Osaka did not provide any help to Taiwan’s traveling citizens:  “The truth was no evacuation buses were allowed to enter the airport pick-up area. The buses sent by the Chinese Consulate picked people up from Izumisano, which was 11.6 km from the airport.” (Wang, 2018, p. 94).

    Wang further stressed other misinformation incidents like the Weeping Northern Floating Youth, a cabbage farmer named Wax Brother who knelt and wailed in front of Han Gao Yu in a rally, and Li Ronggui’s account of the Taiping Island incidents which proved that spread of misinformation in that part of the world is a phenomenon.

    ISRAEL MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

    On misinformation narratives in Israeli national election, Barel, O. (2021) wrote, “The fierce political competition, which requires politicians to sharpen their positions and slander their rivals, inflames passion and makes the political discourse between supporters and opponents particularly contentious.” (Barel, 2021, p. 49).

    Israeli influential misinformation incident was the claim by right-wing Im Tirtzus’ organization that the oversight app used by election transparency observers is not functioning. This claim was debunked by the Israeli Central Election Working Committee. However, Landau in her article “How a Netanyahu-Likud is importing Trump’s ‘Stolen Election Campaign” revealed that Im Tirtzu has ties to the Likud Party.

    SOUTH KOREA MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

    In analyzing the South Korean 2017 Presidential Election experience, Seon–gyn Go of the Naseda University and Mi–ran Lee of the Global Research Network, in a research conducted for Asian Journal for Public Opinion (2020) wrote, “The writers of fake news during the Korean presidential Election often create and distribute fake news as a means to tie together people who are close.” Their research further revealed that Hong Joon-pyo, the candidate from Liberty Korea Party, lied the most among the presidential candidates because 31 of the 47 statements he made were rated false or almost false.

    IRAQ’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

     Aws al-Saadi, the founder of Tech 4Peace Collective, on France24 issued on 28/05/2021 at 04:30 GMT said, “Iraq has become  a virtual battleground for fake news both in politics and between major international players vying for influence in the tinderbox country.” His statement was further confirmed to be true by UN envoy, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, who said, “Media outlets and social networks in Iraq were spreading misinformation and even conspiracy theories that create false but accepted perceptions about October 10th parliamentary votes.”

    IRAN’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

    Iran, a neighboring country of Iraq, had its fair share of electoral misinformation campaigns. Reality Check and BBC Monitoring (16 June) explained in its article, “Iran’s presidential election: Four claims fact-checked include” that Abdolnaser Hemmati, a former Central Bank governor and Mohsen Mehralizadeh a former vice president claimed that Mr. Raisi had added to the extensive list of blocked websites and social media apps and still targets more newspapers and journalists. But Mr. Raisi debunked the claims stating that no website or newspaper had been blocked or shut down since he became judiciary chief, in March 2019.

    NIGERIA’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE

    The scramble for votes and acceptability by party presidential candidates in Nigeria’s 2019 election witnessed the use of online social platforms in a distorting way–campaigning without transparency, creating false impression of mass support. For instance, actors including those affiliated with the two major parties—Peoples Democratic Party and All Progressives Congress posted and distributed false information online which includes the use of paid advertising online to gain votes.

    The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute in its Nigeria International Election Observation Report of June 2019 observed that   social media profiles of legitimate Civil Society Organizations, observation groups, and media outlets were cloned or hacked and were used to spread misinformation to the public.

    In her article “Analysis: How Nigerian politicians, supporters use fake news as campaign strategy” published as a headline news by premiumtimesng.com on February 10, 2019. Queen Esther Iroanusi highlighted the underlisted misinformation instances.

    One influential misinformation incident she wrote about was a tweet before the 2019 election of a Campaign organization’s spokesman who tweeted a picture of a tree grown in a rail track to discredit past administrations. A fact check run later showed that the picture was from far away Middle East.

    To further prove misinformation incidents in the pre-2019 presidential election in Nigeria, she cited the story of a Special Adviser to a state official in her bid to gain popularity and votes for her party, tweeting a picture of food packs with N500 notes attached to each of them before the election, claiming that the picture is from campaign rally of an opposition presidential candidate. When a check was run, it was discovered that the picture was a foundation philanthropic gesture to the less privileged in Lagos which had been online since February 2017.

    Pictures were also manipulated to carry false impressions of international support in favour of political candidates. Queen Esther Iroanusi in her article also cited how the picture of US President Donald Trump was posted to suggest Trump’s  endorsement of an opposition candidate for the Nigeria 2019 election. A check on the picture shows that it was fabricated. The original picture was first used on September 3, 2015, when Trump was campaigning as Republican Presidential Candidate for the US presidential elections.

    Other misinformation tweets and publications were reports that the incumbent President was dead, and a clone was running his office; video clips accusing the opposition presidential candidate of brokering a deal with Boko Haram members in exchange for land and oil were also circulated and many other narratives.

    References

    Bandel, N. (2019) Israel Election Panel: Likud-linked  NGO Spreading Fake News About Poll Oversight. Retrieved August 27, 2021 from https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-israel-election-panel-right-wing-ngo-spreading-fake-news-about-poll-oversight-1.9646318

    Barel, O. (2021) Why Are Israeli Elections Extremely Sensitive to Fake News?

                Retrieved August 27, 2021 from

                www.cfr,org/blog/why-are-israeli-elections-extremely-sensitive-to-fake-   news                 

    Bradner, E. (2016, October 28) Hillary Clinton’s email Controversy, Explained.              Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/03/politics/hillary-clinton-email-controversy-explained-2016/index.html

    Comey, J. (2016, October28)Full Text: FBI Letter Announcing New Clinton Review. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-text-fbi-letter-announcing-new-clinton-review-230463

    Dungan, K. (2020) California Mail Dumb in a Salon Parking Lot Caught on Surveillance Video. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://www.kiro7.com/news/trending/california-mail-dump-salon-parking-lot-caught-surveillance-video/GBASQBJ3UFHDRAIMKZZSHTJYZM/

    European Commission. March 2018. Final report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation. Brussels: EC. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expertgroup-fake-news-and-online-disinformation

    Imamaru, T. (2017, January). A Tweeted lie Triggers an Incident (2017, January). Retrieved August 2, 2021, from https://www.marubeni.com/en/research/potomac/backnumber/19.html

    Iran’s Presidential Election: Four Claims Fact Checked (2021, June 16) https://www.bbc.com/news/57485108

    Iroanusi, Q. E. “ANALYSIS: How Nigerian politicians, supporters use fake news as campaign strategy” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/311532-analysis-how-nigerian-politicians-supporters-use-fake-news-as-campaign-strategy.html

    Mi-ran, (2020) & Seon-gyu, (2020) Analysis of Fake News in the 2017 Korean Presidential Election. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.koreanscience.or.kr/article/jako202022449681023.pdf

    Misinformation Thrives in Iraq’s Virtual Battlegrounds (28/05/2021-04:30)  Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210528-misinformation-thrives-in-iraq-s-virtual-battlegrounds

    Reinl, J. (2021, August 25) Fake News Problematic as Iraqis Prepare for Major Vote. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2021/08/25/fake-news-problematic-as-iraqis-prepare-for-major-vote/

     Samantha et al., (2021)  The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf

    Wang, T. (2018) Does Fake News Matter to Election Outcomes? Retrieved August 2, 2021, from https://www.ajpor.org/article/12985-does-fake-news-matter-to-election-outcomes-the-case-study-of-taiwan-s-2018-local-elections

  • Information Disorder and COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy in Ghana

    Introduction

    Ghana reported its first case of SARS COV 2 (Covid-19) on 12 March 2020, three months after the virus was first discovered in Wuhan, China. As of 25th August 2021, the country had recorded 116,441 cases, with 108,469 recoveries and 991 deaths (GHS, 2021). The government has adopted various strategies, including lockdown in major cities and nationwide vaccination, to curtail the spread of the virus. Vaccination is regarded by experts as one of the most effective and cost-efficient means of treating and preventing transmission of diseases in any country during a pandemic (Bloom, 2011). Among other things, vaccination helps achieve herd immunity, a situation where the majority (over two-thirds) of the population are immune to an infection.

    Ghana’s government intends to vaccinate 20 million people in 2021. In furtherance of this goal, the government is in the process of procuring 17 million doses of Johnson & Johnson vaccines. On 24 February 2021, Ghana became the first country in the world to receive Covid-19 vaccines under the Covax facility (United Nations, 2021). In all, 1,271,393 doses of the vaccines have been administered so far (GHS, 2021). The country also took delivery of 177,600 doses of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine on 7 August and immediately started administering to people in selected areas. Although official figures on the number of Johnson & Johnson administered doses are not available, media reports suggest that many people thronged vaccination centres for their shots (Ghana News Agency, 2021). 

    For the Covid-19 vaccination programmes to succeed in limiting transmission and mortality, a significant proportion of the population should be vaccinated (MacDonald, 2015). Concerns about Covid-19 vaccines being a means of government surveillance abound in some sub-Saharan African countries (Dzinamarira et al, 2021). This raises questions about the willingness of the general public to vaccinate and the role of information disorder or misinformation. As Ghana awaits the arrival of more vaccines and with the confirmation that the Delta variant of Covid-19 has been recorded in the country, there is the need for the government to step up campaigns to clear the scepticism among the populace. Accordingly, this multifaceted study is being conducted to examine the effect of misinformation on acceptance of Covid-19 vaccines, people’s susceptibility to misinformation, factors that influence the uptake or rejection of the vaccines, and audience motivation to share or consume Covid-19 vaccination misinformation.

    Exposure to Covid-19 Misinformation

    Different countries have been exposed to different types of Covid-19 misinformation (Roozenbeek et al, 2021). In Ghana, Covid-19 misconceptions initially were largely on causes and vulnerability. Speculations about black people having some immunity against Covid-19 and that severe cases of Covid-19 were recorded among the elderly were prominent (Tabong & Segtub, 2021). Misinformation, conspiracy theories, unsubstantiated rumours and speculations play a critical role in influencing vaccine hesitancy and refusal (Nuzhath et al, 2021; Salathé, 2013; Cohen, 2009). For instance, people were unwilling to vaccinate against the 2009 swine flu outbreak, owing to conspiracy theories about the efficacy and safety of the vaccine shots (Cohen, 2009). Vosoughi et al. (2018) aver that conspiracy theories about politics, terrorism, natural disasters and diseases diffuse significantly farther, faster, deeper, and wider than the truth in all categories of information. 

    Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, governments and institutions around the world had been working to address the menace of information disorder. Studies have shown that the pandemic has worsened the already volatile information disorder syndrome (WHO, 2019). Studies show that physical proximity and perceived severity of the pandemic tend to influence people to share unverified information about Covid-19 (Islam et al, 2020; Huang et al., 2015). The spread and acceptability of misinformation about Covid-19 vaccines is enabled by negative social media sentiments, inadequate information, and distrust in political authorities and the media (Nuzhath et al, 2021). Laato et al (2020) also identified information overload and undue trust in online sources as reasons for the avalanche of unverified and false Covid-19 information on social media. 

    For instance, when Ghana received the first batch of Covid-19 vaccines, speculations were rife that the shipment marked the commencement of the agenda to alter people’s DNAs and reduce the African race through vaccination (Agyekum et al, 2021). Information disorder poses a serious risk to vaccine acceptance. COVID-19 vaccination programmes rely heavily on the population’s willingness to accept the vaccine (Acheampong et al, 2021). The potential for misinformation to erode the gains made by the government and cause vaccine refusal is high (Cerda & Garcia, 2021). Information disorder can also brew mistrust, confusion, polarization and sociocultural tensions (Wardle, & Derakhshan, 2017).

    Covid-19 Vaccine Hesitancy

    Vaccine hesitancy occurs when many people in a population are reluctant to undergo vaccination against diseases and it is caused by mistrust, fears about unknown future side effects, conspiracy theories and religious beliefs, among others (Jennings et al, 2021; Razai et al, 2021; Roozenbeek et al, 2020). Research on Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy in Africa has produced varying findings. In Ghana, 51% of urban adults indicated that they were likely to take the Covid-19 vaccine if made generally available (Acheampong et al, 2021) whereas Zimbabwe and South Africa have Covid-19 vaccine acceptance rates of 52% and 50% respectively. Brackstone et al (2021) also established that the willingness to vaccinate among Ghanaians dropped from 82% in March to 71% in June 2021. Even among health workers in Ghana, only 39% had intentions to receive Covid-19 vaccine shots (Agyekum et al, 2021). A survey conducted in five West African countries (Benin, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) found that only 40% of the people expressed confidence and would likely take the vaccine jabs, if they had the opportunity (Seydou, 2021).  

    Generally, Covid-19 vaccine acceptance rate is higher in Europe and the United States than in Africa and the Middle East (Sallam, 2021). The rate of acceptability in sub-Saharan African countries is lower than the 70% minimum vaccine threshold required to achieve herd immunity. Extant literature indicates that the willingness to receive Covid-19 vaccines varies across countries and other demographic indicators, such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, income and education (Robertson et al, 2021; Acheampong et al, 2020). In the United Kingdom, minorities (Blacks and South Asians of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent) were found to have a much higher vaccine hesitancy than White British. Consequently, as of 11 March 2021, British of Black African and Black Caribbean heritage had 63.7% vaccination rate, compared with White British (91.3%) (Razai et al, 2021).

    Information Disorder and Vaccine Hesitancy

    Information disorder is a major threat to vaccine uptake. People who are exposed to conspiracy theories about Covid-19 vaccines tend to have lower acceptance rate than those who have not heard, seen, or read such misinformation (Roozenbeek et al, 2021). These rumours thrive in times of distress and great uncertainty to satisfy people’s longing for information, especially when there are gaps in knowledge (Roldan de Jong, 2021). Africa has had cases of unsuccessful vaccination initiatives. For instance, due to misinformation, underpinned by religion, polio immunization was largely unsuccessful in Northern Nigeria in 2003-2004 (Jegede, 2007). Social media provides the unfettered access to anti-vaccine campaigners to rapidly spread conspiracy theories and increase the information disorder syndrome around the vaccines. Robertson et al (2020) found that the majority of the people who received vaccine-related information on social media had a higher tendency to be misinformed and less receptive to the vaccines. 

    Even though these conspiracy theories have been fact-checked and debunked by experts and media agencies, their spread continues unabated through fake websites and social media accounts, trendy hashtags, videos, memes and social feeds (Kandel, 2020). A study by Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) indicates that fake news and lies spread faster than real news on social media. This trend is worrying because there are an increasingly high number of people who turn to social media and other online sources for health information. Studies in Ghana show that social media plays a role in misinforming people about Covid-19 vaccines (Acheampong et al, 2020; Agyekum et al, 2021). The low acceptance among people of colour and other minority groups ties in with the popular conspiracy theories that the vaccines can modify DNA, reduce the Black population, and track movement through the microchip implant (Tabong & Segtub, 2021). 

    Conclusion

    The studies cited in this research are consistent with the view that misinformation can prevent healthy behaviours and promote erroneous practices that can result in rapid spread of the virus and highlight the need for further research on Covid-19 vaccine and information disorder. The studies conducted in Ghana identified information disorder as one of the major causes of vaccine hesitancy (Acheampong et al, 2021; Agyekum et al, 2021; Tabong & Segtub, 2021). To this end, the present study will comprehensively explore how information disorder affects vaccine uptake and further examine people’s experiences with vaccine misinformation.

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    Jennings, W., Stoker, G., Bunting, H., Valgarðsson, V.O., Gaskell, J., Devine, D., McKay, L., Mills, M.C. (2021). Lack of trust, conspiracy beliefs, and social media use predict COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Vaccines, 9, 593.

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    Robertson, E., Reeve, K.S., Niedzwiedz, C.L. (2021). Predictors of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in the UK household longitudinal study. Brain Behaviour Immunization, 94, 41-50. doi: 10.1016/j.bbi.2021.03.008 pmid: 33713824

    Roozenbeek, J., Schneider, C.R., Dryhurst, S., Kerr, J., Freeman, A.L.J., Recchia, G., van der Bles A.M., van der Linden, S. (2020). Susceptibility to misinformation about COVID- 19 around the world. R. Soc. Open Science. 7: 201199. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.201199

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  • Traces of Misinformation in Nigeria’s Legacy Media Contents, Creeping Drivers, and Implication for Believability

    Since the rising notoriety of the current ‘genre’ of malicious content peddled as “fake news” (mostly over social media) in 2016 during the United States’ presidential election, barely three years before Nigeria’s 2019 general elections, fake news has made damaging impacts on the Nigerian society socially, politically, and economically, (Pate & Ibrahim, 2019).

    The cacophony of unsubstantiated stories forcing their way on the internet and other social media fora not only present the 21st-century news media with one of its greatest challenges, but also pose an existential threat to the entire media space which serves as a social arbiter in the society.

    The mass media has been a credible source of information for the people over the years. Conventional media—radio; television, newspapers and magazines– established themselves as drivers of public opinion which is believed to provide people with information that opens their minds and enables them to make rational and informed choices about issues.

    Media professionals serve as vanguards or guardians of public interest. In their quest to accomplish this arduous task, media experts developed ethics to guide and guard the operations of journalists and media content. This paper argues that over the years, the fundamental responsibility of the media to gather and disseminate reliable information is under attack—thanks to the influence of misinformation and availability of technological gadgets at people’s fingertips. The pace at which distorted information continues to spread over the fringes of the mainstream media and the internet raises questions over the depth, influence, and credibility of legacy media’s reports all over the world.

    Misinformation has never been more complicated and challenging than in the second part of 2016 following the aftermath of the US Presidential Elections. “Deliberate” circulation of mis/disinformation posed a great deal of challenges to credibility and believability of the content of legacy media, notably on hot subjects around which opinion is formed and expressed. While studies have established the roles of mass media in a democracy, the irony here is how “social or new media” presented itself as a more viable tool for “effective propaganda” within digital spaces with multiplier effects on journalism and the role of journalists in a civil society, especially in the current digital information age.

    Discourse tied around dis/misinformation converged on the idea that the source of “information pollution” is ‘fake news.’ The concept of ‘Fake news’ has an Egyptian origin traceable to the 13th century BC, when Rameses the Great, knowingly disseminated fake information about the “Battle of Kadesh, claiming a ‘false’ victory for the Egyptians.” The coinage: fake news was formed largely to be used against the “news industry” as a mechanism for discrediting reports that are critical of the actions or inactions of those in power (Wardle & Derakhsan, 2018). Hence, works of literature on the etymology of “fake news” recommended the use of misinformation and disinformation skills to checkmate the excess of the two-words phrase.

    In Nigeria, the vehicle of distorted information unfortunately is not only the new media or social media; its traces are visible in the mainstream legacy media too.

    Describing the depth of malicious information in Nigeria’s mainstream media which he describes as the “Nigerian rumor mill,” Journalist Sola Odunfa said “While the conventional, licensed media have to contend with laws and regulations and interests and finance, the Nigerian rumour mill is a wild industry which respects no conventions or authority or checks”, (Odunfa, 2009)

    The journalist argues that the rumour mill in Nigeria’s mainstream media “…is so powerful that it has permeated the conventional media. “Many newspapers and magazines”, he argues, “publish products of the rumour mill as authentic news.” 

    “The less dishonourable of them publish retractions in obscure corners several days later.”

    Novelist, Adaobi Tricia in an article for the BBC traces how Nigeria’s ThisDay newspaper published a fictitious story that purportedly signifies how a popular founder of Winners’ Chapel, Bishop David Oyedepo was denied US Visa.

    The ThisDay report as recollected by the novelist described “how David Oyedepo, founder of Winners’ Chapel, and one of Nigeria’s revered and influential religious leaders, allegedly threw a tantrum at the US consulate in Lagos after he was refused a visa.”

    In 2016, a story went viral on social media platforms and forced its way into the online contents of mainstream media in Nigeria, claiming that the Federal Government has merged all Federal Polytechnics with Federal Universities in their immediate vicinity. By implication, heads of these polytechnics are to leave their offices. Because under the new arrangement, the formerly known polytechnics are now extensions of their mother universities. Vice-Chancellors of these universities are mandated, under the fake arrangement, to oversee the affairs of the new attachments added to them. The story went ahead to add that, no more offering of Higher National Diploma (HND), only National Diplomas are to be run by these extensions. Students upon completion of their ND programmes will be enrolling into 200 levels in the mother universities. And these turned out to be fake.

    Similarly in 2019, a purported social media video showing the quasi wedding celebration of President Buhari and his Humanitarian Affairs Minister, Hajiya Sadiya Umar Farouk, is another recent example. The video claimed that the wedding solemnization was planned to be held at the National Mosque Abuja on Friday.

    The speed at which the fake presidential wedding spread in Nigeria’s social media sphere can only be compared with the speed of the light of thunder. It expectedly crept into the headlines of many legacy media in Nigeria, beginning with The Herald, a local print medium. Nairaland picked up the story to spur the circulation of a ducked invitation card stating time and venue of the “ghostly planned” wedding.

    Moreover, among the traditional media outlets that peddle fake news and hate speech, broadcast media (radio and Tv) are worse at it “because of the media’s strategic position and influential status in the lives of ordinary Nigerians. Broadcasting/publishing fake news can confer legitimacy, credibility and provide unquantifiable reach to such fakery” (Pate, 2018 September 7, p. 10).

    Disinformation champions transcend circulating entirely fake information to misrepresent genuine content out of context and meanings it communicates by use of masthead of global and national reputed media outlets to masquerade misinformation content to deceive the audience that the media whose logo is used actually produced the content in question. For instance, in 2017, BBC discovered that someone had produced a video with its photoshopped logo. The video trended, capturing beliefs of BBC’s online audience prior to Kenya’s presidential election.

    Misinformation Creeping Drivers

    Misinformation drivers vary based on region and context, but this article examines only three that are glaringly applicable in the context of Nigeria.

    Political Drivers: from the kinds of literature analysed thus far, it is evident that drivers for the production and broadcasting of misinformation on the internet and legacy media are most likely politically motivated. When President Buhari was likened to Janjaweed or Boko Haram sympathizer in the build-up to the 2015 presidential election, it connotatively implies how politics could drive misinformation.

    Pandemic Drivers: However, another driver that features prominently from analysed literature is the unrestrained flow of avalanche of misinformation messages designed around pandemic such as COVID and Ebola. This finding corroborates the circumstances surrounding the rebirth of fake news around the 2016 US presidential election and the neglected the war tune attached to misinformation as Rameses the Great demonstrated its effectiveness as a tool for warfare propaganda; frequent recurrence of misinformation and disinformation around COVID-19 pandemic. Salt-birth hype in Nigeria during the peak of the Ebola virus epidemic captures this point succinctly.

    Policy Drivers: proponents of a policy orchestrated production and dissemination of misinformation around the idea begging for the government to formulate a policy on. This is apparently done to woo support in favour of the policy and set an agenda on it for both policymakers and the generality of the populace. The spread of misinformation around the quasi directive of the Federal Government of Nigeria abolishing the award of Higher National Diploma, HND, by Nigerian polytechnics in 2016 is a classic example that buttresses this point.

    Implication on Believability

    Today, peoples’ belief in legacy media’s content falls into a serious ‘crisis’ day by day as the command legacy media held for being the sole disseminators of ‘facts’ is under siege by the Trojan Horses of misinformation at a time when the ‘watchdog’ function of the media is more pressing than ever before. Information circulated through interpersonal mediation channels tends to command more of people’s trust and confidence than opinionated media content because contacts hold a great deal of belief in people they consider as ‘authority,’ (Schapals, 2017).  This suggests the age-long credibility and believability of legacy media is increasingly being partitioned between authorities and fact-based media outlets owing to the culmination of the effects of misinformation on news media and journalism.

    The implication of misinformation on media credibility was examined using textual analysis of “drivers of the spread of misinformation” in which three major papers and the works of  Mirela, S et al (2020); Schapals, A (2018) were analysed. Examples of fake news that forced their ways into credible new media contents in Nigeria coupled with the tenacity of the experiences and established evidence in the foregoing posit serious ramification on media believability.

    Traces of Misinformation Exposes Professionals’ Weakness

    Several instances in Nigeria’s media landscape show that media professionals in the country are weak at detecting and possibly guarding scourge of misinformation flow in the country’s legacy and social media spaces from creeping into their contents. This continues to raise serious concerns over the quality, dexterity, and efficiency of the ‘gates’ in those establishments deciding what goes under the ink or over the lens or microphone as the case may be.

    The paucity of utmost lack of skills and techniques to filter misinformation out of legacy media contents by Nigerian media professionals played out in many instances in recent times as cited earlier.

    Therefore, it is in the interest of journalists and editors to realise that their duty as information mediators that set agenda for the public is under grave threat. This submission implies that journalists need not only understand the flow of dis/misinformation in the public sphere – both online and offline – but also develop skills and techniques to first, be able to detect polluted information made public through the use of computer technology and second, to guard their journalistic contents against the incursion of fake news, in order to retain the confidence and trust of the people patronizing legacy media services.

    To digest the flow of misinformation, Wardle and Derakhshan (2018, p.43) argue that media professionals need to individually analyse “elements of information disorder’ especially agents of misinformation to be able to project the rate at which each of the elements spread and begin to “address them” squarely to save their face in public eyes.

    Media professionals need to properly get the nexus of dis/misinformation flow by understanding first, who these agents are as well as their motives for fabricating messages to seduce people to believe what is not genuine and make them cast doubt on content of legacy media that they depended on for information for generations before the birth of chief conveyors of misinformation over the internet – the social or new media.         

    Secondly, the kinds of messages agents of misinformation published ought to be well understood at the level of the reporter to serve as a base to project the rates at which they travel and the likely effects on the minds of the people.  However, scientific discussion on the nature and kind of misinformation messages distributed as public-centred on fabricated text news sites through visual misinformation content receives a trajectory of circulation and it is extremely difficult to identify and debunk.

    Conclusion

    The traces of dis/misinformation in Nigeria’s legacy media point to the idea that journalists in those outlets have inadequate capacity, skills and competence to detect and filter distorted information. Several instances suggest the infiltration of “fake news” into mainstream media contents with debilitating effects on their integrity and credibility as information mediators. These practices have varying negative impact on believability of the legacy media owing perhaps to what many scholars describe as “mental laziness and attitude” of most media practitioners in the country.

    This paper argues that, to turn around this ugly situation, it is in the interest of individual and collective media organizations and professionals in the system to acquire skills that will enable them detect and filter misleading contents—if they must maintain the core of journalism and remain relevant in the system.

  • Fact-Checking Researchers’ Contributions to the Literature of Information Disorder Ecosystem in Nigeria: The Dubawa Example

    Abstract 

    Experts have decried the dearth of evidence-based research around the information disorder ecosystem in Nigeria. As fact-checking research is deemed to be a new area of research outside academia, fellowship programmes have been floated as parts of the initiatives to sharpen the expertise of local researchers to help stakeholders see infodemic in a way that encourages solution-based policies and initiatives to stem the tide of misinformation. This analysis reviews the contributions of fact-checking researchers to the literature of mis/disinformation through the lens of a selected research article published on Dubawa’s website between July and December, 2020. 

    The review serves as a compendium of studies that captured an array of thematic areas of misinformation ranging from politics and election, health,  civil matters to news media development. As this review shows, the researchers have provided evidence of growing relationship between fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and the newsrooms; evidence that collaborative efforts drive publications of fact-checks around issues of interest with high tracking of misinformation; and that misinformation around COVID-19 pandemic was rife in the early months of the outbreak in Nigeria. 

    The review also shows the researchers’ contribution to knowledge to include the provision of evidence-based information on the changes in Facebook policy on political claims and ads on its platform; frequently-shared misinformation on social media platforms in Nigeria about COVID-19, and the relationships between independent fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria. 

    While this analysis concludes that the capacity of Nigerian fact-checking researchers has been enhanced and widened the scope of the literature of misinformation in the country, it recommends more capacity-building initiatives like the Dubawa Fellowship Programme and further rigorous and evidence-based research around misinformation to help stakeholders promote policies and initiatives that stem the tide of information pollution in Nigeria.

    Introduction 

    Literature around fact-checking and information disorder in Nigeria has witnessed a tremendous boost in recent times, owing to the efforts of the fact-checking organisations that are developing the capacity of researchers through various training and fellowship programmes. One of these initiatives was a fellowship programme organised by Dubawa, Nigeria’s first indigenous fact-checking organisation. As reported by the Premium Times (2020), the Dubawa Fact-Checking Fellowship aims at providing an opportunity for analytic, dedicated, and innovative journalists to research and write truth-based and factual stories; and also to institute a culture of fact-checking in newsrooms across Nigeria and Ghana.

    Fact-checking researchers who were products of this capacity development effort were drawn from the realm of academics and media environment and have deployed their expertise to contribute to the literature of fact-checking and information disorder ecosystem in Nigeria.

    Jamiu Folarin (2020) had earlier given a poser as to whether fact-checking was relatively new as the body of knowledge that has just been created or popularised outside academia. The study had also reported experts’ worries over the dearth of data on information disorder in Nigeria and why experts challenged researchers in the country to take their time to interrogate the mis/disinformation ecosystem by exploring the dynamics of the work process of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. 

    However, Briony Swire-Thomson, a Northeastern University postdoctoral candidate, had earlier affirmed fact-checking research as a new area of interest. “Through time, the application (misinformation research) has become more and more glaringly obvious…This is a new area of research and we still don’t have a good handle on underlying mechanisms” (Funke, Daniel, 2018). This is where Dubawa intervention has come to fill the crack left by the misinformation research deficit in Nigeria. 

    The baseline assessment carried out from Dubawa’s website vis-a-vis recent fact-checking research studies shows that the literature has grown in the areas of information disorder around election, health, politics, civil unrest, media development, national security among others. While the narrative around the dearth of data and research-based literature about fact-checking is changing, there is a need to take a cursory look at various studies that have been conducted in recent times on fact-checking and information disorder that can serve as a compendium for new researchers in the field. The essence of this analysis is to have a template on major themes of existing studies, especially on how they were conducted, their findings, and their broad contributions to the body of knowledge.

    Research Objectives

    • Examine the thematic areas of the existing literature on fact-checking published on Dubawa website in recent time;
    • Examine the methods adopted for the studies;
    • Evaluate their findings and broad contributions to knowledge in the field.

    Overview of Existing Literature 

    Research around fact-checking and information disorder ecosystem in Nigeria is novel. As the issues about information pollution started gaining attention of different stakeholders including the government, technology companies, news media, and the citizens, it is natural that researchers brace up to study the phenomenon, help the stakeholders understand the problem better, and recommend policies that work. As observed by Leticia Bode, an assistant professor in the Communication, Culture and Technology program at Georgetown University, “Research can help us understand the mechanisms behind patterns we see, and understanding those mechanisms is key for being able to alter behaviours or outcomes… more information is always a good thing” (Funke Daniel, 2018) 

    Different research studies  in Nigeria have been deployed to x-ray key issues around fact-checking as a new area of research activity and provide reasonable contributions on different perspectives. Some of these perspectives include politics and election, health, news media and credibility issues, civil unrest, use of technology among others.

    Raji (2020a), while evaluating the scourge of fake news in Nigeria  situated the studies within the Nigerian milieu and assessed the positions of existing  authors, experts, readers (including offline and online audience) and other related texts to understand the scourge and finds that ‘fake news’ thrives in Nigeria in its different variants. These variants include misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information. The study finds out that the nation’s culture of ‘closed’ (as opposed to open) governance, which thrives on official secrecy and dearth of timely official information, is a recipe for the scourge to spread. 

    The outbreak and spread of Covid-19 in the world and of course in Nigeria in 2020 brought another dimension to the level and quality of information consumption. The volume of information pollution witnessed during the period posed a lot of challenges to fact-checkers in Nigeria who had to develop multi-pronged strategies to verify several claims and counter-claims around the pandemic. To assess the level of their success and otherwise, Adeniran (2020a) examines fact-checks on two leading fact-checking organisations in Nigeria, Dubawa and Africa Check to understand the nature of COVID-19 misinformation among Nigerians. The study leverages the partnership that existed between these organisations and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), with the mandate to continuously track and promptly debunk “coronavirus-related misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information to limit the spread to limit the the spread of false information around coronavirus in Nigeria”

    Raji (2020b)Investigates the attitude of the news audiences to viral misinformation, particularly one shared on social media platforms, as it relates to the nationwide protest, seeking to examine the audience’s ability to spot fake information relating to #EndSARS protest, the audience’s most reliable source of information during the protest, whether or not the audiences were ready to verify information to which they were exposed, particularly in the post-shooting protest.

    One of the major ways of combating information disorder in Nigeria is the commitment of fact-checking organisations to nip this menace in the bud. The community of fact checkers in Nigeria is ‘mutating’ and their efforts and challenges need to be brought to the front burner. It is against this background that Folarin (2020a) interrogates the “fact-checking ecosystem by providing a guide for all stakeholders.” To achieve this, the study “collates data, analyses, and discusses them briefly in relation to media organisations on the frontline of combating information disorder in Nigeria.”

    Aside Covid-19 and other health related misinformation, the election period in Nigeria is always another challenging period with viral misinformation being spread by political actors and their supporters. Despite that the governorship election conducted in Edo state in 2020 was an off-season election, the stake was high and this raised the tempo at which misinformation was weaponised. To track the efforts of fact-checkers in verifying viral false information during the election, Adeniran (2020b) compares and contrasts fact-checks on the recently concluded Edo elections across the active fact-checking organisations in Nigeria, with a view to providing insights on the activities of various fact-checking organisations in Nigeria.

    #EndSARS protest in Nigeria was another trying time when disinformation and misinformation got increasingly weaponised by different actors. Expectedly, fact-checkers were undaunted in their strategies to flag viral false information. As these were going on, fact-checking researchers too were not resting on their oars. In Folarin (2020b), efforts were made to examine the veracity of claims made during the protests as fact-checked by four fact-checking organisations in Nigeria (Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check), and tools used to verify the claims. 

    Part of the ways fact-checkers are achieving their goals is partnering with and training local news media and journalists for effecting mopping of false contents in the public space. To examine if these efforts are yielding results, Raji (2020c) did a mapping of local efforts at embracing fact-checking by investigating the impact of fact-checking training on the Nigerian journalists. This was also part of the efforts to examine the impact of collaboration with partners against information disorder by the technology companies, particularly facebook that Folarin (2020c) also undertook as “an assessment of Facebook policy on fact-checking politicians and reflected on whether this policy has influence on the editorial contents of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria” (Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP Hub) which are all signatories to the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).  

    The foregoing has been a review of a number of research articles selected for this analysis. There is a need to have an insight into the making of these articles. What are the thematic areas of the existing literature on fact-checking published on Dubawa website in recent time? What research methods were adopted for the studies? What were their findings and broad contributions to the body of knowledge?

    Methods adopted for this Review

    This analysis explored a qualitative method of research, using the content analysis of nine research articles authored by three fact-checking researchers and published on Dubawa’s website between August and December, 2020.  For the data collection, the study employed a direct observation of the published articles while secondary data were sourced from other related literature, reports and periodicals. Quoting Patton (1987, 184), Okoro et al (2019) affirmed that, in qualitative inquiry “[t]here are no rules for sample size; it only depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources.” Based on the above and since this study was aimed at summarising the articles authored by Nigeria Dubawa’s fact-checking researchers, samples were drawn from three articles per researcher, making a total of nine.

    Findings

    Thematic Areas 

    This study examined the contribution of fact-checking researchers on Dubawa’s platform to the literature of the information disorder ecosystem in Nigeria. It aimed at providing a mini compendium of existing research on misinformation with specific objectives to examine the thematic areas of the existing literature on fact-checking published on Dubawa website in recent time, examine the methods adopted for the studies, and evaluate their findings and broad contributions to the body of knowledge.

    The data gathered were analysed, taking into consideration their manifest and latent meanings, while secondary data were used to support the analysis.

    Politics and Election

    One of the articles, Fact-Checking the Edo Elections: A Review of the publications by Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria (Adeniran, 2020b), being reviewed in this analysis focused on misinformation around politics and election. It chronicled the claims that attracted multiple fact-checking that bordered on candidates’ achievement or allegations against them.  Some of the claims border on issues of unemployment figures, allegation of corruption against candidates, and peddling of false impressions about key actors in the election. These claims were treated differently by each of the organisations but they mostly returned similar verdicts on the claims.  The differences were noted in the sources of the claims, shared platform, intended targets of the claim, fact-checking tool, and specified fact-checking procedure.

    Civil Matters

    A couple of articles under this category have dealt with issues arising from civil unrest and misinformation arising from such issues. These articles include #EndSARS Protests: Fact Checkers rate at least 45 claims as False, Misleading (Folarin, 2020b); Understanding Audience Attitude Towards Trending Misinformation During #EndSARSProtest in Nigeria (Raji, 2020) and Analysis of Claims on #EndSARS Protest in Nigeria: Images most manipulated content, Twitter as major platform (Folarin, 2020b). 

    Fact-checking and the News Media

    The researchers under review show unalloyed passion towards news media development in relation to fact-checking journalism. 

    In Fact-Checking Ecosystem: Media Organisations on the Frontline of Combating Information Disorder in Nigeria (Folarin, 2020a), the researcher takes a chronicle of the efforts of the news media and fact-checking organisations fighting misinformation in Nigeria. The study brought international dimension of fact-checking to the debut of these organisations in Nigeria. 

    In the following studies:  A Six-year Mapping of Fact-Checks Shows Growing Partnership Between Newsrooms and Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria (Raji, 2020), Impact of Fact-Checking Training on the Nigerian Journalists to mitigate the spread of mis/disinformation (Raji, 2020), the researcher looks at credibility issues in the news media and how fact-checking journalism has come to fill the gap. It shows the growing relationship between newsrooms and fact-checking journalism in Nigeria, the prospect of the growth and why newsrooms must accept fact-checking, not just as part of journalistic practices in the newsrooms, but as a separate field of endeavour in amplifying the culture of truth which aims to restore content credibility in the news media. 

    Health Misinformation 

    Health misinformation, particularly the ones relating to COVID-19 gained the attention of researchers across the board. Nigeria is not an exception. One of the studies that helped the world see infodemic around health issues was Cure Myths and False Ratings Lead COVID-19 Fact-Checks in Nigeria, With Governments as Most Targeted Entities (Adeniran, 2020). 

    What Methods did the researchers Adopt in their Studies?

    These researchers adopted varied methods to answer their research questions. What has been observed is a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods.  On data collection method and analysis, survey and content analysis were mostly used in the studies such as: 

    • A Six-year Mapping of Fact-Checks Shows Growing Partnership Between Newsrooms and Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria (Raji, 2020)
    • Understanding Audience Attitude Towards Trending Misinformation During #EndSARS Protest in Nigeria”(Raji, 2020)
    • Impact of Fact-Checking Training on the Nigerian Journalists to mitigate the spread of mis/disinformation” (Raji, 2020)
    • Cure Myths and False Ratings Lead COVID-19 Fact-Checks in Nigeria, With Governments as Most Targeted Entities (Adeniran, 2020)
    • Fact-Checking the Edo Elections: A Review of the publications by Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria (Adeniran, 2020)
    • Facebook Fact-Checking Policy Framework and Nigerian Politicians: A Critical Reflection (Folarin, 2020)
    • Analysis of Claims on #EndSARS Protest in Nigeria: Images most manipulated content, Twitter as major platform (Folarin, 2020)

    Meanwhile,  in a study, Fact-Checking Guide: Brief on Media Organisations on the Frontline of Combating Information Disorder in Nigeria (Folarin, 2020), interviews, archival materials, and qualitative content analysis were used as methods of data collection and analysis.

    What did these Researchers find out in their Studies?

    There have been considerable findings generated from the studies under review. These findings range from policy change, evidence of virality of claims, impact of fact-checking partnership among others. For instance, one of the studies conducted on the growth of fact-checking in the Nigerian newsrooms found that there was “evidence of growing partnership between newsrooms and fact-checking organisations in Nigeria” (Raji, 2020).

    One of the articles, while examining the focus of fact-checks on coronavirus in Dubawa and Africa Check, found that “misinformation around the pandemic was rife in the early months of the outbreak, with high fact-checks published in March and April while experiencing gradual decline afterwards” (Adeniran, 2020). The same article also found that “collaborative efforts drive publication of fact-checks around the issues of interest with high tracking of misinformation on Facebook and debunking of a noticeably high number of claims.”

    Folarin (2020) unearthed the challenges faced by the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and found that these challenges include “exponential increase in the spread of dis and misinformation compared to fact-checking efforts; challenge of digital divides and technological infrastructure; low awareness and research on fact-checking; manpower and capacity building; complex multi-religious and multi-cultural diversity, government and political interference’’. 

    What were the Researchers’ Contributions to Knowledge?

    The fact-checking researchers in Nigeria understand the need to fill the gaps created by the dearth of credible data and evidence-based research around misinformation. Observation from the studies being reviewed shows that considerable contributions have been made to the body of knowledge. 

    Folarin (2020) observes, as a gap, the absence of any  research that addresses the implication of the “new Facebook policy framework on the editorials of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria’”. In a study: “Facebook Fact-Checking Policy Framework and Nigerian Politicians: A Critical Reflection”, the researcher concludes that “the changes in Facebook policy on fact-checking political claims and ads on its platform was an attempt to maintain a balance between entrenching free speech and bringing sanity to the digital public space often weaponised for political gains.”

    Adeniran (2020) had attempted to provide answers to the research question that bordered on the nature of COVID-19 misinformation popularly spread among Nigerians and concluded that misinformation on “potential cure, official policies and pronouncements, funding of COVID-19 and palliatives; and prevention, are frequently shared on social media platforms in Nigeria”.

    Raji (2020) also sought to provide evidence-based data on the relationships that existed between independent fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria as well as the growth prospects of such relationships. The researcher concludes that the steady growth in the uptake of fact-checking in the Nigerian newsrooms was occasioned by the relationship that existed and that this was in line with ‘’the theory of change embraced by Dubawa Nigeria which is about providing factual information and building capacity of newsrooms to fact-check.”

    Conclusion 

    Dubawa’s Fellowship Programme has developed the capacity of a select group of researchers drawn from academics and media environments to provide evidence-based research around information disorder in Nigeria. This analysis serves as a review of the contributions to knowledge of literature of misinformation made by these researchers in Nigeria through the lens of a selected research article published on the Dubawa website between July and December, 2020. The essence of this is to provide a compendium of studies that captured an array of thematic areas of misinformation ranging from politics and election, health,  civil matters to news media development. The analysis also reviewed the methods of research adopted for their studies, their findings, and what they have contributed to knowledge. 

    Findings show that these researchers focused on health misinformation, politics and election, policy change, civil matters and news media development. Many of the studies under review were conducted through surveys and content analysis as research methods of data collection and analysis, with only a few using interview and qualitative content analysis.  

    The researchers’ findings range from evidence of growing relationship between fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and the newsrooms, to the evidence showing the fact that “collaborative efforts drive publication of fact-checks around the issues of interest with high tracking of misinformation’ and that “misinformation around the pandemic was rife in the early months of the outbreak” in Nigeria.

    Lastly, review shows that these researchers’ contribution to knowledge includes the provision of evidence-based information on  ‘’the changes in Facebook policy on fact-checking political claims and ads on its platform,” frequently shared misinformation on social media platforms in Nigeria about COVID-19,” “relationships between independent fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria,” among others.

    It is the conclusion of this review analysis that the capacity of the Nigerian fact-checking researchers has been enhanced and they have widened the scope of the literature of misinformation in Nigeria.

    By way of recommendation, more capacity-building initiatives like the Dubawa Fellowship Programme  ought to be encouraged to further enrich the expertise of the Nigerian researchers toward providing valuable data around the information disorder ecosystem in Nigeria. While this is expected to happen, further rigorous and evidence-based research around misinformation is recommended to help stakeholders such as the government, news media, fact-checkers, and technology companies promote policies and initiatives that stem the tide of information pollution in Nigeria.

    *This study is conducted for the Dubawa Fellowship programme, and is supported by Heinrich Boll Stiftung Foundation Abuja office.

    References

    Adeniran R. (2020a). “WhatsApp, Facebook, and blogs lead as sources of covid-19 claims fact-checked on Dubawa”. Retrieved from https://dubawa.org/whatsapp-facebook-and-blogs-lead-as-sources-of-covid-19-claims-fact-checked-on-dubawa/

    Adeniran, R. (2020b). “Fact-Checking the Edo Elections: A Review of the publications by Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria”. https://dubawa.org/fact-checking-the-edo-elections-a-review-of-the-publications-by-fact-checking-organisations-in-nigeria/

    Adeniran, R. (2020c). Cure Myths and False Ratings Lead COVID-19 Fact-Checks in Nigeria, With Governments as Most Targeted Entities”.https://dubawa.org/cure-myths-and-false-ratings-lead-covid-19-fact-checks-in-nigeria-with-governments-as-most-targeted-entities-2/

    Danie, F. (2018). “These academics are on the frontlines of fake news research”.https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/these-academics-are-on-the-frontlines-of-fake-news-research/

    Folarin, J. (2020a). “Fact-Checking Guide: Brief on Media Organisations on the Frontline of Combating Information Disorder in Nigeria”.https://dubawa.org/fact-checking-guide-brief-on-media-organisations-on-the-frontline-of-combating-information-disorder-in-nigeria/

    Folarin, J. (2020b). “Analysis of Claims on #EndSARS Protest in Nigeria: Images most manipulated content, Twitter as major platform”. https://dubawa.org/analysis-of-claims-on-endsars-protest-in-nigeria-images-most-manipulated-content-twitter-as-major-platform/

    Folarin, J. (2020c) “Facebook Fact-Checking Policy Framework and Nigerian Politicians: A Critical Reflection”. https://dubawa.org/facebook-fact-checking-policy-framework-and-nigerian-politicians-a-critical-reflection/

    Okoro, N. & Emmanuel, N.O. (2019): Beyond Misinformation: Survival Alternatives for Nigerian Media in the “Post-Truth” Era, African Journalism Studies”. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330724366_Beyond_Misinformation_Survival_Alternatives_for_Nigerian_Media_in_the_Post-Truth_Era

    Raji, R. (2020a). “Fake News”: Understanding the Scourge in Nigeria. https://dubawa.org/fake-news-understanding-the-scourge-in-nigeria/

    Raji, R. (2020b). Understanding Audience Attitude Towards Trending Misinformation During #EndSARSProtest in Nigeria. Retrieved from https://dubawa.org/understanding-audience-attitude-towards-trending-misinformation-during-endsarsprotest-in-nigeria/

    Raji, R. (2020c). “A Six-year Mapping of Fact-Checks Shows Growing Partnership Between Newsrooms and Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria”.https://dubawa.org/a-six-year-mapping-of-fact-checks-shows-growing-partnership-between-newsrooms-and-fact-checking-organisations-in-nigeria/

    Raji, R. (2020d). “Impact of Fact-Checking Training on the Nigerian Journalists to mitigate the spread of mis/disinformation”. https://dubawa.org/impact-of-fact-checking-training-on-the-nigerian-journalists-to-mitigate-the-spread-of-mis-disinformation/

  • Examining National Orientation Agency’s Engagement with Its Digital Community in Combating “Fake News” Online

    Abstract

    Nigerian government has adopted a multi-pronged approach to the threat of misinformation and disinformation in recent times: Launching public campaigns against fake information, tightening its noose against mainstream media by ways of sanction and heavy fine, and also threatening stiffer social media regulation. In its public campaign approach, it has partnered with the National Orientation Agency (NOA). This study seeks to assess the level of efforts put up by the agency on its social media platform to educate its online public; evaluate how far the agency’s message on misinformation resonates with its online community; assess the level of engagement and partnership with other stakeholders in fighting information disorder in Nigeria. 

    Adopting content analysis and interview as research methods, study shows that while the agency created a considerable number of valuable contents on its platform,  little evidence shows sufficient readiness to up-take campaigns on information disorder on social media. Two, there is evidence of cooperation and deliberate partnership with other public and civil society stakeholders in the campaign against misinformation online as the agency retweeted valuable contents from its online partners, yet it relies more on them for its content creation on anti-fake campaigns. Lastly, the agency’s online public found the contents authored by it less valuable and less resonating than contents shared from its partners. As a result, its online public engaged more with posts retweeted from other partners.

    The study concludes that while the federal government is bent on regulating social media and sanctioning abuse of the media, it abrogates its duty by depending more on civil society and foreign agencies to educate and enlighten citizens on the danger of misinformation on democracy and national unity.

    By recommendation, more study is imperative to investigate what motivates online communities of users to engage with messages created and shared on anti- fake campaigns.

    Introduction:   

    In July 2018 and April 2020, the Nigerian government launched a “public campaign against fake news” (Premium Times, 2018) and also launched “campaigns to media houses and cooperation with Facebook and Google” (AllAfrica, 2020). The overall objective was to create media literacy among Nigerians, particularly young people who are highly active online and social media. According to the minister of information, Mr. Lai Mohammed, the campaign against fake news “was linked to the possible effects of rumours towards the escalation of related crisis across the country” and that the campaign would include active collaboration with digital as well as traditional media and the National Orientation Agency to educate Nigerians on the effect of fake news on Nigeria’s democracy and its corporate existence as a nation. 

    The foregoing was sequel to concerns being raised over the capacity of social media and technology companies to control the kind of contents being trafficked on their platforms (Ray Walsh, 2o20). This is in the face of several partnerships at the instance of technology companies, particularly Facebook and Twitter, with fact-checking organisations to help verify viral claims making the round in the public space and flag down anyone suspected to be deliberate purveyors of misleading information. 

    Stakeholders have concluded that disinformation and misinformation are very dangerous to the society and democracy, even though UNESCO has said “disinformation is particularly dangerous because it is frequently organised, well resourced, and reinforced by automated technology” (UNESCO 2018). Recent study shows government officials, politicians, and electoral candidates are more culpable  in spreading false information (Raheemat, 2020, Raji, 2020).

    It is quite commendable that some countries of the World are coming up with policies and legislation to tackle the spread of false information in the public space and, in some cases, exploring these measures to gag free speech (Funke Daniel, 2018).  Nigerian government, while it is also threatening policies and legislation to regulate the social media, has adopted media  public education, partnering with the National Orientation Agency (NOA). 

    Leveraging on the latter measure, this study seeks to understand how the agency has engaged its online community to achieve the desired goal as highlighted by the government. The study thereby tracked the content created on the agency’s twitter handle within a period of seven months (May-November, 2020) to assess the efforts of the Federal agency in up-taking the campaign to educate Nigerians on the effect of fake news and create media literacy campaigns for social media and online users. 

    The objectives of this study are:

    • To assess the level of efforts by the agency on its social media platform to educate its online users;
    • To evaluate how far the agency’s message on misinformation resonate with its online community;
    • To assess the level of engagement and partnership with other stakeholders fighting information disorder in Nigeria.  

    This study is justified for a number of reasons. First, it leverages the proposed involvement of the National Orientation Agency by the Ministry of Information and Culture to support its anti-misinformation campaign in Nigeria. 

    Second, the study chooses to interrogate the extent of the partnership between Nigeria’s ministry of education and technology giants in relation to mitigating the spread of disinformation and misinformation. Third, the period covered in this study (May -November, 2020) is chosen to assess how the agency has taken the campaign to its online public after a couple of months following the minister’s statement in April 2020.

    Third, the twitter handle of the agency is chosen in evaluating the National Orientation agency because its Director General stated in an interview with this researcher that it is one of the engagement platforms which it uses to reach Nigerians online.

    Information gathered from the agency’s website shows that:

    • The agency boasts of over 5000 staff spanning across 36 states of the federation including the FCT and the 774 local Government Offices.
    • It claims to have over 15 engagement platforms tailored to reach the highest number of Nigerians using its major segmentation approaches.
    • It claims it has reached over 64% of Nigerian citizens.
    • It also claims no other organ of government has this kind of spread and capacity for public enlightenment and sensitization campaigns. (https://www.noa.gov.ng)

    Lessons from Other Lands

    Issues around false information have become a hard nut to crack to many stakeholders, particularly when evidence abounds that online and social media platforms have become willing tools in the hands of perpetrators of false information. Very recently, a peaceful campaign, tagged #EndSARS, against police brutality and recklessness by a section of the Nigerian youths was hijacked by hoodlums and anti-#EndSARS protesters through the mercenary of false information. This, perhaps prompted the Nigerian government calling for a renewed process towards regulating the social media. The Nigerian government, through the Minister of Information, “lamented that celebrities used the social media to circulate fake news during the #EndSARS crisis” (The Punch, 2020) and has also threatened to take action against the issue. “What we have always advocated, and what we will do, is to regulate the social media. Nigeria is not alone in this regard.” (The Nation, 2020).     

    Truly, Nigerian is not alone in this regard. Library of Congress Law (2019) has reported some steps being taken by the UK government to tackle false information through a combination of legislation and policies. For instance, The Fusion Doctrine provides that the intelligence services are responsible for identifying social media platforms that distribute misinformation and disinformation. The Rapid Response Unit was established within the Cabinet office to help ensure debates are fact-based. The National Security Commissions Team’s purpose is to tackle communications elements of threats to national security, including (but not limited to) disinformation (Clare Feikert-Ahalt, 2019).

    In April, 2018, the government of Australia launched a campaign, tagged “Stop and Consider” to encourage “voters to pay attention to the sources of their information in light of the federal elections held in May”.(Funke Daniel, et al, 2018). 

    Even the French Constitutional Council had worked on a law drafted by President Emmanuel Macron’s government which aims at fighting the “manipulation of information” instead of “fake news” (Alexander Damiano Ricci, 2018).

    Meanwhile, as reported by the Education for Justice (E4J of the Doha Declaration and supported by the State of Qatar, 2019) that some scholars have advocated for a more-civil solution to tackling misinformation warfare, which they call “inoculation theory.” This seeks to inoculate individuals against misinformation and disinformation by providing them with the means to build resistance to messaging and propaganda, reducing their susceptibility to misinformation and disinformation, and leading them to question the veracity of the information being presented to them as well as the legitimacy of the source presenting the information. 

    Asides this and just as it has been in Nigeria, E4J (2019) also highlighted media literacy campaigns as part of the solutions to misinformation as it has been launched in other countries like Sweden and Denmark. Some countries have also introduced units dedicated to identifying, collecting and reviewing disinformation and fake news, and alerting the media and general public about it such as the EU East StratCom Task Force (E4J, 2019, making a reference to Morrelli and Archick, 2016). 

    In the light of the above, this study seeks to take a close look at how the strategies highlighted above play out in the campaign plans and strategies adopted by the National Orientation Agency in Nigeria to engage its online communities in the fight against mis/disinformation.

    Social Media Engagement Theory  

    Leveraging on the model of Social Media Engagement Theory (SME) developed by Di Gangi et al (2016), this study subscribes to the proposition that an organisation creates a chain of value, experience and benefits when it develops a User-Generated Content (UGC) that resonates with its audience on social media. As Di Gangi et al (2016) hypothesised, the central premise of SME theory is that higher user engagement leads to greater usage of the social media platform. Usage is defined as the frequency of a user’s contribution, retrieval, and/or exploration of content within a social media site. 

    The more frequently users take part in a variety of activities, the more valuable the social media platform becomes to the organization and fellow users, resulting in the co-creation of value. Organizations benefit when they leverage UGC to develop new insights, to realize cost savings, to grow brand awareness, and ultimately to generate innovations. Users benefit from the ability to socially interact within the social media platform to fulfill personal needs and interests. 

    The National Orientation Agency of Nigeria is the body tasked with communicating government policy, staying abreast of public opinion, and promoting patriotism, national unity, and development of Nigerian society. It is, therefore, expected that one of the strategies to uptake that campaign by the agency is to develop templates that can target online and social media users who are within the online community of the agency and make its message resonate with them. 

    Several researches have linked the spread of misinformation to the development of communication technology and the accompanying social media platforms (Ziga TURK, 2018). Di Gangi 2016 (quoting (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010) defines social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” Since the contents created and distributed on social media is susceptible to being pathological, considering the speed of the algorithm, it is the thesis of this study that when online and social media users are effectively engaged in the fight against misinformation, their understanding of how fake-content creators operate will reduce the spread.   

    Therefore, this study  provides answers to four basic questions:

    • To what extent did the National Orientation Agency (NOA) create valuable content on its social media platform to amplify anti-fake campaigns?
    • How far have the agency’s messages on misinformation resonated with its online community?
    • What is the level of NOA’s engagement with other stakeholders fighting information disorder in Nigeria? 
    • What is the level of engagement by NOA’s public with other stakeholders fighting information disorder in Nigeria?

    Methods

    This study employs both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. For the quantitative approach, the study developed a template for the tracking of contents posted on the agency’s social media handle, precisely Twitter. The agency boasts 863 followings and 115,000 followers on twitter till date. Based on this, we tracked: 

    •  The overall tweets posted by the agency between May and November,  2020;
    •  The frequency of relevant tweets directed at media literacy or fact-checking by the agency within the period;
    •  Number of “retweets”, “likes”, “comments” and video “viewing” by its online public on media literacy or fact-checking within the period;

    For the qualitative aspect, the study relies on the interview granted to the author by the Director General of the National Orientation Agency via email. The study also incorporates a YouTube interview granted by the DG to @Channel Television on #EndfakeNews which was retrieved from (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxgDTtJE8AU&feature=youtube)

    Results:

    Q1. To what extent did the National Orientation Agency (NOA) create valuable content on its social media platform to amplify  anti-fake campaigns?

    A total of 1,621 tweets were posted by the National Orientation Agency (NOA) on its twitter handle between May and November, 2020.

    Of these, 51 tweets (3.15%) were found to be relevant to media literacy and fact-checking on misinformation in Nigeria. In addition, 24 tweets (out of the 51 relevant items) representing 47.06% were authored by the agency while 27 (52.94%) were retweets from other partnering public and civil society sources.

    Table 1. Showing contents created on the agency’s platform

    Overall tweetsTotal relevant tweets on media literacy and fact-checkingTotal relevant tweets by the agencyTotal relevant tweets by others
    1621512427

    Q2. How far have the agency’s messages on misinformation resonated with its online community?

    Of the 24 relevant tweets authored by the agency, it enjoyed 954 retweets, 266 comments and 1,461 “likes”. While the video post (at https://twitter.com/i/status/1324344627281989633)  published on November 5, 2020 generated the highest number of 127 retweets and the highest number of 3.5million views; the one posted on October 31 had the highest number of 179 ‘likes and the highest number of 69 comments. 

    Table 2. Showing how the agency’s public engaged with its message

    Tweets by NOA“Retweets” by its online public“Likes” by its online public“Comments” by its online public
    249541,461266

    Q.3. What is the level of NOA’s engagement with other stakeholders fighting information disorder in Nigeria? 

    Apart from the posts authored by the agency, it retweeted 16 posts from the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), 2 Posts from National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), 3 from the World Health Organisation (WHO), 3 from Nigeria Health Watch (NHW), 1 from the Presidency, 1 from the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and 2 from other individuals.  

    Q.4. What is the level of engagement by NOA’s public with other stakeholders fighting information disorder in Nigeria? 

    While it is commendable that the agency retweeted relevant tweets from other partners, NOA’s online public engaged more with tweets from other partners than its own. For instance, despite that the agency retweeted only one post from the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (FMHA) on September 3rd, 2020, that same tweet generated the highest number of 1,500,000 retweets (99.8% of all retweets) by NOA’s online public, followed by the one from NOA with 997 “retweets” (0.7%) while the Presidential aide’s tweet came third with 545 “retweets” (at 0.04%).

    On relevant tweets, there were 2,006,125 “likes” within the period. Of these, tweet from presidential aide on new media posted on November 2nd, 2020, generated the highest number of 2 million “Likes” on NOA’s platform (at 99.7% of all ‘likes’), followed by the one from Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs with 3000 “Likes” (0.15%) while NOA’s tweet came third with 1,544 “Likes” (0.08%).

    While NOA’s tweets generated 267 comments (23.9% of all ‘comments’), the post from Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (FMHA) generated the highest number of 444 comments (at 39.7%), followed by the post from presidential aide with 350 comments (31.3%).

    (Message/Content Visualisation)

    Only 6 relevant videos used to educate online audiences and to create “fake alerts” were tracked during the period . These came from CDD, NOA, and WHO. The one from NOA had the highest of 3.5million views. The video retweeted from the WHO generated the second highest of 2.7million viewings, followed by 4 videos retweeted from CDD which generated 1,083 views. 

    Table 3. Showing how the agency’s online public engaged with posts by NOA and other sources 

    Other Stakeholders“Retweets” by NOA’s Public%Likes” by NOA’s Public%“Comments by NOA’s Public%No of VideoVideo viewing by NOA’s Public%
    CDD1860.01%2320.012%252.24%41,0830.02%
    NCDC4690.03%9650.05%
    NOA9970.7%1,5440.08%26723.7%13,700,00057.8%
    WHO1090.01%3290.02%322.9%12,700,00042%
    NHW350.002%550.003%
    Presidency5450.04%2,000,00099.5%35031.3%
    FMHA1,500,00099.2%30000.15%44439.7%– – 
    Total1502341100%2006125100%1118100%66,401,083100%

    Figure 1. One of the posts tweeted by NOA, July 11, 2020

    How NOA’s Public Engaged with other Posts 

    CDD’s Post

    16 posts (31.4% of all relevant tweets) were authored by the CDD and retweeted by the agency. These then generated 186 retweets by NOA’s online public, with 25 comments and 232 likes. Of these 16 posts from CDD, there were 4 videos which generated 1083 viewings.

    Figure 2. Post from CDD, retweeted by NOA

    Figure 3. Post from CDD on June 25, 2020

    Figure 4. post from CDD on June 29

    Posts from NCDC

    2 tweets (3.9%) authored by the NCDC were retweeted by NOA. This was retweeted in a frequency of 469 times, with 126 comments and 965 likes. No video. 

    Posts from WHO

    The only one relevant post retweeted from WHO was a video. It generated 109 retweets by NOA’s public with 32 comments and 329 likes. The video generated 2.7 million viewings. Extract from the video is in text below:

    “...As one who had coordinated #COVID-19 response in Lagos with @followlasg, it was easy to see what other people pass through…You can see it’s not a death sentence, listen to experts, stop fake news and #stigmatization– WHO tweet

          (Tweet from WHO and retweeted by NOA on June 6, 2020)

    Post from NHW

    3 tweets from NHW, representing 5.9% of relevant posts were also retweeted by NOA and generated 35 retweets by NOA’s public with 55 likes. No comment. No Video.

    Figure 5: Posts from NWH, retweeted by NOA (July 8, 2020)  

    Post from FMHA

    Only 1 tweet used as media literacy from FMHA, represented 3.7% of relevant posts. It was retweeted by NOA and generated the highest number of 1.5million retweets by NOA’s public with 3000 likes and 444 comments. No Video.

    Post from Presidential Aide

    Another tweet from a presidential aide, Bashir Ahmaad, representing 3.7% of relevant posts was retweeted by NOA and generated the highest number of 2 million ‘likes’ by NOA’s public with 545 ‘retweets’ with 350 comments. No Video.

    As tweeted by @BashirAhmaad:

    Do not let your social media posts be the reason for people to take arms against each other, stop spreading the fake news for a better Nigeria, message from the National Orientation Agency @NOA_Nigeria. 8:25 AM · Nov 2, 2020

    NOA’s Online Engagement: The Director General’s Responses

    As part of the methods of evaluating the Federal Government’s responses to the menace of false information, particularly on social media, this researcher made efforts in reaching the Director General of the National Orientation Agency via e-mail to speak on  the campaign plans of the agency and the methods of executing those campaigns in educating Nigerians on the evil of fake information in the public space. The responses are highlighted below in the form of questions and answers. Here, the researcher’s posers shall be referred to as “Q” while the DG’s responses shall be represented by “Ans”. 

    Q.The agency says (on its website) it has over 5 engagement platforms it uses to reach Nigerians. What are these platforms?

    Ans: The agency reaches Nigerians through a number of platforms. These include the agency’s website (www.noa.gov.ng), as well as through its e-mail (admin@noa.gov.ng). Asides these, the agency also reaches its community through its various social media platforms including Twitter (@NOA_Nigeria), Facebook (National Orientation Agency, Nigeria) and Instagram (noa_nigeria).

    Q. The agency also says it uses 3 major segmentation approaches to do its enlightenment campaigns. What are these approaches? 

    Ans: The agency carries out its enlightenment campaign in three segmental approaches using the National level, State level and the Local government levels which are often undertaken by the Community Orientation and Mobilisation Officers domiciled in all the 774 LGAs and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). 

    Q. “Fake news” has become endemic in Nigeria. What are the campaign plans the agency has or has been running to carry out enlightenment programmes for Nigerians on its danger and negative impact on our democracy?

    Ans: There are plans which the agency has been exploring to engage Nigerians on various platforms of interaction with a view to bringing to the fore, dangers inherent in the spread of fake news in our society.

    Q. What have been the approaches adopted to carry out these campaigns?

    Ans: We have been developing counter narratives using postcards for social media posts, jingles (both audio and video, community engagement, public enlightenment using the Agency’s Public Address Van, holding workshops/seminar with stakeholders, training of staff on how to identify and respond to fake news as well as preparing questionnaire to get feedback. Also, the Agency regularly organises press conferences to intimate news media on efforts of the Agency regarding fight against fake news and hate messages.

    Q. How does the agency create contents on the platforms earlier highlighted to engage Nigerians on anti-fake campaigns?

    Ans: The Agency generates contents on topical issues of national relevance with a special reference to the feedback mechanism of NOA.

    Q. Do citizens respond to/engage with these contents? What are the pieces of evidence that these campaigns or messages on these platforms resonate with citizens?

    Ans: Robust citizens’ engagement on our online platforms is an evidence that NOA gets responses from the public. We also conduct e-polling to gauge the pulse of people on topical issues. Feedback mechanism by the PRS department also indicates evidence of engagement with Nigerians.

    Q. Are there impacts of these campaigns? 

    Ans: The Agency has been able to effect a new set of values resulting in attitudinal change of citizens regarding fake news. Sustained campaign against fake news has recorded successes especially on social media.

    Q. What have been the noticeable impacts?

    Ans: Some of the noticeable impacts have been attitudinal change and instilled patriotism.

    Q. How does the Agency evaluate its impacts on the citizens?

    Ans: We do this through e-polling and feedback mechanisms of the Agency.

    Q. Does the agency collaborate with other government and non-government agencies to tackle the scourge of misinformation in Nigeria?

    Ans: Yes

    Q. What are these agencies?

    Ans: We collaborate with the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, FRCN, NTA, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Budgit, Open Government Partnership (OGP) and so on.

    Q. What strategies does the agency use for this collaboration? 

    Ans: Some of our strategies for collaboration include seminars, workshops, sensitisation, community engagement, online engagement and capacity building.

    Discussions 

    This study shows that while the agency created a considerable number of valuable contents on its platform, there was little evidence of sufficient readiness to up-take campaigns on information disorder on social media. This is evident from the fact that only 3.5% (n=1,461) of the total tweets for the period were relevant to fighting fake information online. 

    On the question of partnership, there was evidence of cooperation and  partnership with other public and civil society stakeholders in the campaign against misinformation online as the agency retweeted valuable contents from its online partners.

    Evidence shows that there was a considerable level of cooperation and partnership with other public and civil society stakeholders in the campaign against misinformation online as the agency retweeted valuable contents from its online partners. This corroborates the responses of the director-general of the agency that it has a robust partnership with other stakeholders, such as the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, FRCN, NTA, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Budgit and Open Government Partnership (OGP). 

    While evidence shows that only the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), World Health Organisation (WHO), Nigeria Health Watch (NHW), and the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (FMHA) were active on the agency’s online platform as stakeholders fighting misinformation, result from the tracking of the agency’s twitter handle shows that other key ministries and agencies such as Ministry of Information and Culture were either not working on information disorder online or not creating any contents that resonate with the agency’s effort in fighting misinformation on social media.

    While this study did not find out if the attitude of the agency’s online audience to its contents was  positive or negative, evidence shows that there was a considerable level of engagement with its content by its online community. Although , the director general of the agency observed that the “robust citizens’ engagement on our online platforms is an evidence that NOA gets responses from the public’, result of the tracking of its twitter handle shows that the agency’s online public found contents authored by the agency less valuable and less resonating than contents shared from its partners. As a result, its online public engaged more with posts retweeted from other partners with a range of activities such as “like,” “comment’ and “share”.

    To show that its online engagement with its audience was considerably low, there is more to be desired considering that the agency’s tweets for the seven-months period generated only 964 retweets despite being followed by 155,000 followers online.  Therefore, its claim that it reaches at least 64% Nigerians on its enlightenment campaigns is perhaps, more offline than online. 

    The fact that audience engagement was low also shows that the agency has not really subscribed to the proposition engendered by the Social Media Engagement Theory (SME, Theory) which suggests that “an organisation will be creating a chain of value, experience and benefits when it develops a User-Generated Content (UGC) that resonates with its audience on social media. While observation shows that the agency makes spirited efforts to cover many issues of national importance, its efforts at creating media literacy campaigns and publishing fact-checks on its platforms have been grossly inadequate.

    Similarly, it is not clear how the agency creates content on its social media platforms, although the director-general in an interview revealed that “the agency generates contents on topical issues of national relevance with a special reference to the feedback mechanism of NOA.” Some of these issues of national relevance, as revealed from the tracking exercise adopted for this study, include information disorder around COVID-19, #EndSARS protest, national unity among others. However, the fact that the agency created 24 relevant tweets on media literacy and fact-check (47%) out of the total 51 recorded during the period, shows that it largely depends on other relevant stakeholders to create relevant contents which it retweets for media literacy and fake alert systems.  

    Conclusion and Recommendations

    This study has investigated the level of preparedness and seriousness on the part of the Nigerian government through its ministries and agencies to take its campaign against “fake news” and misinformation to its online and social media community of followers. Deploying the method of social media content analysis of the National Orientation Agency’s twitter handle, the findings of this study show that the federal government, through its agencies has done less to create resonating messages to its online public on anti-fake campaigns. 

    It is also observed that the agency was more interested in media literacy than fact-checking. All the fact-checks tweeted within the period were posted by its other partners including CDD, WHO, NCDC, National Health Watch (NHW) among others. 

    Again, this study shows the federal government depends more on civil society and foreign agencies to wage war against misinformation, given that more of the content posted on the agency’s twitter platform on misinformation were authored by other partners operating within the misinformation ecosystem. 

    The merit in this circumstance is underscored by the evidence that federal agencies are open to cooperation and partnership. Yet it is more worrisome that while the Ministry of Information and Culture had identified National Orientation Agency (NOA) as its key partner in the campaign against fake content in Nigeria, no single relevant tweet was found on the agency’s platform as either created by the Information Ministry or tweeted by any of its officials.  

    This rather illustrates hypocrisy on the part of the Federal Ministry which has bent more towards social media regulations than education of its citizens against the threat of mis/disinformation.

    By recommendation, more study is imperative to investigate what motivates online community of users to engage with messages created and shared on anti- fake campaigns.

     *This study is conducted for the Dubawa Fellowship programme, and is supported by Heinrich Boll Stiftung Foundation Abuja office.

    References:

    Adeniran, R. (2020). “Cure Myths and False Ratings Lead COVID-19 Fact-Checks in Nigeria, With Governments as Most Targeted Entities”. https://dubawa.org/cure-myths-and-false-ratings-lead-covid-19-fact-checks-in-nigeria-with-governments-as-most-targeted-entities/

    Alexander, D.R. (2018). France moves to fight the ‘manipulation of information’ instead of ‘fake news’. https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/france-moves-to-fight-the-manipulation-of-information-instead-of-fake-news/

    AllAfrica (2020). “Nigeria: Coronavirus – How Nigerian Govt Is Fighting Fake News –   Lai Mohammed”. https://allafrica.com/stories/202004150698.html

    Di Gangi, P.M & Wasko, M. (2016). “Social Media Engagement Theory: Exploring the Influence of User Engagement on Social Media Usage”.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/Social_Media_Engagement_Theory

    Education for Justice (2019). “Information warfare, disinformation and electoral fraud”. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/information-warfare–disinformation-and-electoral-fraud.html

    Feikert-Ahalt, C. (2019). “Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: United Kingdom”. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-disinformation/uk.php

    Daniel, F., & flamini, D. (2018). “A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world”. https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/

    Okakwu, E. (2018). “Nigerian govt launches campaign against ‘fake news” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/275846-nigerian-govt- launches-campaign-against-fake-news.html  

    Raji, R. (2020). “A Six-year Mapping of Fact-Checks Shows Growing Partnership Between Newsrooms and Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria”.https://dubawa.org/a-six-year-mapping-of-fact-checks-shows-growing-partnership-between-newsrooms-and-fact-checking-organisations-in-nigeria/

    Being the video by CDD on June 30 and July 1 https://twitter.com/i/status/1278440221378576386

    Being the video of Interview granted to the @Channels Television by the DG of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) (·         https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxgDTtJE8AU&feature=youtu.be)

    Ziga, T. (2018). “Technology as Enabler of Fake News and a Potential Tool to Combat It”. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/619008/IPOL_IDA(2018)619008_EN.pdf

  • Fact-Checking Ecosystem: Media Organisations on the Frontline of Combating Information Disorder in Nigeria (PART 1)

    Abstract

    Could stakeholders address the challenges associated with information disorder in Nigeria without understanding the complexities of the fact-checking landscape? This is the question this research article answered by interrogating the fact-checking ecosystem through the prism of media organisations on the frontline of information disorder combat in Nigeria. This research article examines the fact-checking ecosystem by documenting the evolution, issues and activities about media organisations on the frontline of combating information disorder in Nigeria. The need to interrogate this phenomenon became more apparent in the way dis/misinformation is negatively impacting all strata of the society. Therefore, this research is designed to contribute to the body of knowledge on information disorder labels that are still evolving in Nigeria. This is the first of a two-part research dedicated to examine the information disorder and discuss whether the set up and activities of fact-checking organisations qualify them to be classified as media entities. The research also examines whether there should be preference in establishing fact-checking organisations over fact check desks. It thereafter revisited the Gate-Keeping theories and its relevance to fact checking.

    Introduction

    The term information disorder has evolved over the years, with researchers asserting that it was as old as the historical evolution of information itself. (Brandon, 2018). Technological development which gave birth to the internet, social media, and other digital tools has further enhanced the advocacy for Democratic Participant theory of the press. Caroline Anipah, Programme Officer/Editor Dubawa (Ghana), has observed that the disruptive innovation of technology is facilitating mass production and distribution of information (Anipah, 2020)

    This evolution of information disorder also witnessed attempts by professionals and researchers to understand and situate the issues surrounding information disorder in relation to attaching by experts of different nomenclatures to the phenomenon. Some of these nomenclatures include: Alternative Fact, Fake News, Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation, Hoaxes, Pranks, Deep Fake, Propaganda, Post Truth, Information Pollution, among others (Wardle & Derakhshan 2017 p. 4, Bannikov & Sokolova 2018, Ibraheem  & Garba 2019 p. 151, Wardle 2019 p. 7).

    The latest concept is that of Infodemic, a concept that depicts how “infected information” can cause a widespread of the “dis-misinformation virus” across the world. (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p .4) noted that information pollution at a global scale is spreading through what they called “contemporary social technology”. The COVID-19 pandemic presently ravaging the world has further popularized this concept. Ahinkorah, Ameyaw, Hagan, Seidu & Schack (2020) expressed worry that “socio-cultural climate in Africa has engineered the spread of the COVID-19 related misinformation through propagation of unsubstantiated news.”

    Fact-checking organisations in Nigeria such as Agence France Presse (AFP), Africa Check and Dubawa are partnering with Google and Facebook to combat the infodemic. (News Agency of Nigeria 2019, Stencel 2019). For instance, in April, 2020, Google committed “$6.5 million funding package to fact-checkers and non-profit media outlets” to combat coronavirus misinformation. (Alexander, 2020).

    Similarly, Facebook had in 2018 launched a Third-Party Fact-Checking Project in Nigeria and “partnered two organisations, part of a global network of fact-checking certified by the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network. They are Africa Check, Africa’s first independent fact-checking organisation, and AFP (Agence France Presse), a well-respected news organisation.” According to David Ajikobi, Africa Check’s Nigeria editor: “Nigeria has experienced a surge in misinformation on social media, particularly about health issues…. The partnership with Facebook presents us as fact checkers a unique opportunity to tackle misinformation on this key platform. We expect that as we move along, millions of Nigerians who get their news through Facebook will start seeing less content that may be socially harmful.”(Ochelle, 2018)

    Concerned by the adverse effects of the challenges posed by Information Disorder to socio-cultural, economic and political climates of the society, stakeholders have equated this to a war-like situation. Attempts had also been made to understand this phenomenon through the prism of communication theories (Bannikov and Sokolova 2018).

    Some researchers have also called for more concrete measures to address the challenges posed by the negative adoption of technology. (Bannikov and Sokolova 2018; Graves 2018; Ibraheem  & Garba 2019; Ahinkorah et al. 2020)

    It was argued that if the internet, social media and other digital tools are causing negative disruption in the information flow, stakeholders must device means to adopt it also as “Weapon of Mass Development” rather than “Weapon of Mass Destruction” to address the problems associated with the information war (Wardle, 2019 p. 6).

    In Nigeria, stakeholders have taken steps to address the challenges occasioned by information disorder in the digital age. Despite the challenge of Digital Divide, the media institution in the country has joined others across the world to use the same weapon of technology to address the issue of Infodemic and associated concepts.

    The issue of whether fact checking can be integrated in the work of journalists has also been interrogated by Bannikov and Sokolova (2018) with clarifications that the verification process or fact checking is not suitable for news reporting and opinion journalism. 

    They thereafter proposed the concept of “sense establishing journalism” which advocates “establishing the truth of events and claims and finding the real relationship between them.” This concept is based on the following formats: Fact-check and verification, Specifying the research subject, Forming signs of the Fact-check format, Forming signs of the debunking format, Forming signs of the promise tracking format, Forming signs of propaganda deconstruction format, and conclusion.

    But the Public Media Alliance (2020), believes that investigative journalism goes hand in hand with fact checking, especially when facts that can be key to public interest are often buried and inaccessible. (https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/tools/fact-checking-investigative-journalism/)

    While some argued that fact checking should be considered as an independent genre on its own; others argued that the verification process and efforts to ensure accuracy of contents, which is part of journalism, is also an integral part of the fact-checking process. The set-up of fact-checking organisations across the world tilted towards the two approaches. While some fact-checking organisations are not part of media organisations, others are. Stencel (2019) however in his study finds out that the experience in the United States indicated that establishment of independent and standalone fact-checking organisations are making waves than those affiliated to media organisations.

    These interventions, to certain extent, interrogated the issue of whether fact checking should be regarded as part of journalism practice. The question, however, is whether fact checking should be situated in the media landscape as an independent body or an entity within mainstream journalism? In Nigeria, there are few fact-checking organisations and some media organisations are already setting up fact-checking desks in their newsrooms. Meanwhile, the media organisations in Nigeria are bracing up to this challenge amidst concerns that media technology is advancing more than their ability to survive this disruptive innovation. This is what the British-American author, Andrew Keen, as cited by Udoka (2015), referred to as Digital Darwinism. As Digital Darwinism is taking its toll on the media ecosystem in Nigeria, some organisations are toeing the line of Digital Transformation to address the challenge of information disorder in the country.

    In the last five years, the media industry has witnessed the establishment of fact-checking organisations in some  African countries including Nigeria. They were established primarily to fight the war against media and digital illiteracy which is one of the factors that fuelled the spread of the infodemic. If the media practitioners including citizen journalists possess the skills to distinguish between facts and fiction in the process of production and dissemination of media contents, it will go a long way in frustrating the efforts of the purveyors of disinformation.

    Ebele Oputa, the project officer and deputy editor for Dubawa, one of the pioneers of fact-checking project in Nigeria, said:

    “The basic assumption, which is integral to our theory of change, is that factual information enables people to make more informed choices in a democratic society and on other public interest issues. Therefore, providing verified information will likely promote good governance and accountability in West and Sub-Saharan Africa,” (Egwu, 2019).

    Relatedly, it is imperative to document the efforts of the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria in providing the platform to fight the war against Information Disorder.

    It is with this background that this paper develops a fact-checking guide of the media organisations on the frontline of combating Information Disorder in Nigeria.

    Research Objectives

    The general objective of this paper is to interrogate the fact-checking ecosystem in Nigeria. The specific objectives are:

    · To document the historical evolution of selected fact-checking organisations in Nigeria,

    ·  To examine the organisational structures of the selected fact-checking groups in Nigeria,

    ·   To understand the production process of the selected fact-checking organisations in Nigeria,

    ·   To document the programmes and projects of the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria,

    · To examine strategies of fact-checking organisations towards sustainability.

    Statement of Research Problem

    Is it correct to assert that fact checking is relatively new as the body of knowledge has just been created or popularized outside the academy? The Deputy Programmes Director of Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ), Mr Adedeji Adekunle, has expressed worry over the dearth of data on information disorder in Nigeria. Mr Adekunle who identified this research gap during the virtual training for the 2020 Dubawa Fellows in Nigeria and Ghana, revealed that as one of the major fact-checking organisations in Nigeria, researchers in the country have not taken their time to interrogate the mis- and disinformation ecosystem by exploring the dynamics of work process of Dubawa and other fact-checking organisations in Nigeria (Adekunle, 2020). 

    This is coming at a time when the phenomenon called “Fake News” is getting the attention of all stakeholders in the media industry with its attendant implications on the Political, Economy, Social and Technological architectures of the country. The challenge posed by the phenomenon of information disorder is huge and thus indicates that there are no corresponding efforts to win the war.  In an attempt to win this war, especially in an era when digital tools such as blogs and other social media platforms are deployed as Weapons of Mass Destruction or Mass Development, fact-checking organisations were established.

    Bannikov and Sokolova, (2018) noted that due to the above reason, “This global challenge made it necessary for the professional journalistic community to appeal to the fact-check format. Although the format has been in existence for more than 20 years (FactCheck.org, the first fact-check resource in the world, launched in 2003), only in recent years has it acquired worldwide signification and implication.” To buttress the assertion of Bannikov and Sokolova, (2018), though the “first fact-check resource” was reportedly launched in 2003, it was not until over 10 years later that similar effort was attempted in Nigeria. 

    Relatedly, the database of global fact-checking sites is a project of the Reporters’ Lab at Duke University’s DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy. The fact-checking database tracks several hundred non-partisan organizations around the world (Adair and Stencel, 2016). According to the 2019 tally by the Duke Reporters’ Lab, the number of fact-checking outlets around the world has grown to 188 in more than 60 countries amid global concerns about the spread of misinformation,” (Stencel, 2019). According to the tally, Fact-Checkers in Africa increased from 4 to 9 from February, 2018 to June, 2019 when the database was updated. 

    With a population of over 200 million people in Nigeria and proliferation of blogs, and increased engagement of the citizens on social media platforms as the internet penetration increased year by year especially at a period of COVID-19 pandemic, do we have corresponding efforts for addressing the challenge of information disorder associated with these developments?

    For example, to what extent do stakeholders in the media industry understand the dynamics of these fact-checking organisations? As a novel research area, is there enough literature to understand the fact-checking landscape in Nigeria? These are questions to be answered through rigorous research and further interrogation of the Information Disorder in Nigeria.  It is in response to the above observations that this paper conducts critical exploration of the fact-checking ecosystem in Nigeria, in order to provide the basic understanding of one of the institutions working to address the challenges of information disorder in the country.

    Methodology

    Due to the nature of this research and its objectives, it has adopted interviews as research design and explores archival materials of selected fact-checking organisations in Nigeria to develop a guide for all stakeholders in the media industry. There are limited fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. Therefore, the selected fact-checking organisations include AfricaCheck, AFP, and Dubawa. The selection of these three fact-checking organisations was based on their consistency in the production of fact check contents compared to others. They are part of the global fact-checking network and are certified by the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). The existence of a database of global fact-checking sites, a project of the Reporters’ Lab at Duke University’s DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy, has also influenced this selection. Apart from aggregating information on the website and social media pages of the fact-checking organisations, the researcher will also interview representatives of the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. The data generated from the interviews and online contents of the fact-checking organisations will be qualitatively analysed through the thematic approach.

    Information Disorder Labels

    “Information disorder is complex. Some of it could be described as low-level information pollution — clickbait headlines, sloppy captions, or satire that fools — but some of it is sophisticated and deeply deceptive. In order to understand the complexity of information disorder, we need to pay special attention to definitions of terminologies associated with the phenomenon.” (Wardle, 2019  p. 57).

    The tools and terms used to negatively disrupt information flow in the society include fake news, propaganda, hoax, rumour, prank, dis-misinformation, deep fake, infodemic, among others. This research will attempt to define some of these terms in order to put them in proper context for interrogating the fact-checking ecosystem in Nigeria. This is because the categorisation of the terms associated with information disorder and the labels associated to such categories, according to Wardle (2019  p. 12) “helps people to understand the complexity of this ecosystem.” 

    Below are some of the labels of information disorder:

    Disinformation: This is false or misleading information that is spread deliberately to deceive. Disinformation according to Wardle is a “content that is intentionally false and designed to cause harm. It is motivated by three distinct factors: to make money; to have political influence, either foreign or domestic; or to cause trouble for the sake of it.” (2019 p. 8) Merriam Webster Dictionary also defines disinformation as “false information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.”

    Disinformation also means “false information, about a country’s military strength or plans, disseminated by a government or intelligence agency in a hostile act of tactical political subversion.” It is also used more generally to mean “deliberately misleading or biased information; manipulated narrative or facts; propaganda.” (Dictionary.com, 2020)

    Misinformation: This can be defined as “false information that is spread, without the intent to mislead.” Today, misinformation spreads very easily in response to changes in information technology. And in part because of such frequent incidents, it is a hot topic of debate if big tech companies like Facebook and Google should be responsible for stopping the spread of misinformation—or even if they even can without violating free speech. While Oxford Dictionary picked “post-truth” as the 2016 Word of the Year, the Dictionary.com named its own Word of the Year in 2018 as “misinformation.”

    Wardle (2019) pointed out the intersection of disinformation and misinformation with the explanation that “When disinformation is shared it often turns into misinformation,” adding that misinformation is “false content but the person sharing doesn’t realise that it is false or misleading. Often a piece of disinformation is picked up by someone who doesn’t realise it’s false, and shares it with their networks, believing that they are helping.” 

    Further, Wardle identified socio-psychological factors that influence the sharing of misinformation: “Online, people perform their identities. They want to feel connected to their “tribe”, whether that means members of the same political party, parents that don’t vaccinate their children, activists who are concerned about climate change, or those who belong to a certain religion, race or ethnic group”, (p. 8).

    Malinformation: The term, malinformation, according Wardle (2019), is used to describe “genuine information that is shared with an intent to cause harm. We are increasingly seeing the weaponization of context, the use of genuine content, but content that is warped and reframed.” Malinformation also includes private or revealing information that is spread to harm the reputation of a person or group (Wardle, 2018).

    While noting the efforts of tech companies, such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp to clamp down on cloned or fake accounts on their platforms, and amend their policies to flag fake contents, Wardle (2019) observed how the purveyors of disinformation now change strategy by promoting genuine contents and manipulating them so that they are “less likely to get picked up by AI systems.” He added that this strategy makes such malinformation to be “deemed ineligible for fact-checking”, defeating in a way, for example, the Third Party Fact-Checking Project of Facebook.

    Closely related to this is Satire or Parody, strategically adopted to “bypass fact-checkers and to distribute rumors and conspiracies, knowing that any push back can be dismissed by stating that it was never meant to be taken seriously. Increasingly, what is labelled as ‘satire’ may be hateful, polarising and divisive.” (Wardle 2019 p. 14) 

    Wardle (2018) also showed how disinformation is related to satire, whereby disinformation agents label content as satire to prevent it from being flagged by fact-checkers. In Nigeria for example, President Muhammadu Buhari was said to be the clone of Jubrin of Sudan, a narrative considered as satire but later picked up and used by conspiracy theorists. And as this spreads, the satire in the analogy of (Wardle 2019 p. 15), loses “connection to the original messenger very quickly as they get turned into screenshots or memes.”

    Propaganda: Propaganda is true or false information spread to persuade an audience, but it often has a political connotation and is often connected to information produced by governments. It is worth noting that the lines between advertising, publicity, and propaganda are often unclear (Jack, 2017 as cited by Wardle, 2018).

    Deep Fake: According to Wardle (2018), Deepfakes is the term currently being used to describe fabricated media produced by using artificial intelligence. By synthesizing different elements of existing video or audio files, AI enables relatively easy methods for creating ‘new’ content, in which individuals appear to speak words and perform actions, which are not based on reality. Although Deepfakes are still in their infancy, it is likely we will see the term ‘deepfakes’ used more frequently in disinformation campaigns, as these techniques become more sophisticated.

    Deepfakes according to Wikipedia are synthetic media devices in which a person in an existing image or video is replaced with someone else’s likeness. While the act of faking content is not new, creators of deepfakes leverage powerful techniques from machine learning and artificial intelligence to manipulate or generate visual and audio content with a high potential to deceive. The main machine learning methods used to create deepfakes are based on deep learning and involve training generative neural network architectures, such as autoencoders. (Brandon 2018; Kietzmann, McCarthy, Kietzmann, 2020) Related to this is Manipulated Media which Wardle (2019 p. 15) described as “when an aspect of genuine content is altered. This relates most often to photos or videos.”

    Post Truth: According to the article published by  Pavel Bannikov and Tasha Sokolova in 2018, post-truth was tagged the word of the year in 2016 by Oxford Dictionary, which  “characterises a new way of consuming information, in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” They traced the history of the concept of post-truth to the end of the 20th century when the usage appeared in 1992. The term got popularised during the 2015-2016 presidential election in the United States.

    Fake News: Bannikov and Sokolova (2018) define Fake news as false reports of events, written and read on websites related to the news agenda including visual narratives. They added that fake news can affect key issues of public importance and are spread with the intention to mislead in order to damage a public movement, public person, political campaign etc.

    Attention has also been drawn to the inappropriateness of the combination of “news” with “fake.” The nomenclature has come under debate among scholars and professionals, with Anipah (2020) saying for example that the combination of “news” with “fake” is problematic:

    “Problematic because ‘news’ means verifiable information in the public interest, and information that does not meet these standards does not deserve the label of news. In this sense then, ‘fake news’ is an oxymoron which lends itself to undermining the credibility of information which does indeed meet the threshold of verifiability and public interest – i.e. real news.”

    Ibraheem & Garba (2019, p.152) has also observed that the concept has “not only become much-used and much-hyped terms nowadays, it is also much-aligned: it is often blamed for having a disruptive impact on the outcomes of elections and referenda and for skewing democratic public debate.”

    Wardle (2019) expressed similar view when she exposed how websites and social media accounts of credible media organisations are cloned by impostor to promote “misleading hyper-partisan content”, manipulation of technological architecture, as well as  “conspiracy communities” in the digital public sphere “busy trying to fool reporters into covering rumors or hoaxes.”

    These authors further elaborate on the misuse, abuse and misinterpretation of Fake News: 

    “The term ‘fake news’ doesn’t begin to cover all of this. Most of this content isn’t even fake; it’s often genuine, used out of context and weaponized by people who know that falsehoods based on a kernel of truth are more likely to be believed and shared. And most of this can’t be described as ‘news’. It’s good old-fashioned rumors, it’s memes, it’s manipulated videos and hyper-targeted ‘dark ads’ and old photos re-shared as new…The failure of the term to capture our new reality is one reason not to use the term ‘fake news’. The other, more powerful reason, is because of the way it has been used by politicians around the world to discredit and attack professional journalism. The term is now almost meaningless with audiences increasingly connecting it with established news outlets such as CNN and the BBC. Words matter and for that reason, when journalists use ‘fake news’ in their reporting, they are giving legitimacy to an unhelpful and increasingly dangerous phrase.” (p. 6-7)

    These observations are also what Edgerly, Mourão, Thorson, & Tham (2020 p.53) mean when they observed that “Discussions about the rise of “fake news” after the 2016 presidential election exemplify one of the many manifestations of the fragmentation of informational ecosystems.”

    Fake news has also been flagged for fuelling propaganda, hate speech, violence, and even killing, especially in multi-cultural, multi-religious settings such as Nigeria.  (Ibraheem  & Garba 2019 p. 152).

    Information Disorder: Due to argument that the term “Fake News” is vague in its usage, First Draft, a global, non-profit, non-partisan organisation that exists to help those on the frontline of reporting, “advocates using the terms that are most appropriate for the type of content; whether that’s propaganda, lies, conspiracies, rumors, hoaxes, hyperpartisan content, falsehoods or manipulated media. We also prefer to use the terms disinformation, misinformation or malinformation. Collectively, we call it information disorder (Wardle 2019 p. 7).

    The definitions and explanations of the above information disorder labels are essential to enable stakeholders to understand the “different ways content can be used to frame, hoax and manipulate.” Wardle (2019 p. 57) added that “rather than seeing it all as one, breaking these techniques down can help your newsroom and give your audience a better understanding of the challenges we now face.”

    Anipah (2020) defines information disorder as the “ways in which the information environment is polluted. The term is a conflation of three main notions: Misinformation, Disinformation, and Mal-information”

    What is Fact-Checking?

    Fact-checking, according to Wardle (2018), emerged in the U.S. in the 1990s, as a way of authenticating claims made in political ads airing on television. As at 2018, there are around 150 fact-checking organisations in the world, and many now also debunk mis- and disinformation from unofficial sources circulating online (Funke, 2018 as cited by Wardle, 2018).

    According to Anipah (2020), fact-checking concentrates on claims that contain at least one fact or figure whose truthfulness can be objectively verified. Further, Anipah (2020) identified two moments that are significant to the growth of fact checking. These include: the launch of fact-checking projects, Snopes, Factcheck.org, and PolitiFact; as well as the global surge in so-called ‘fake news’ predominantly in 2016.

    Bannikov and Sokolova (2018) observed that as at 2018 there was no academic definition of fact-check in the world and what was close then was the one offered by the Oxford English Dictionary defining Fact-check as ‘the process of investigating the problem in order to verify the facts’. They, however, noted that the above definition is incomplete as it alienates fact-checking from the journalism system.

    Fact-checking (in the context of information disorder) is the process of determining the truthfulness and accuracy of official, published information, such as politicians’ statements and news reports (Mantzarlis, 2015 as cited by Wardle, 2018).

    Bannikov and Sokolova (2018) define fact-check as a format for establishing journalism that verifies factual claims in public statements and media. It is important to note that as a format, fact-check can deal only with factual information, not with common narratives in the society, as they may not be factual. For verifying narratives, there is a different format — debunking.

    The theorising of fact-checking by Bannikov and Sokolova 2018 will enable journalists, media organisations, and fact checkers not to lose track when they act as the vanguard of change in the information disorder.

    “The concept proposed in this work allows not only to identify the fact-check as a trend and separately existing and developing format of journalistic material, but also considers a fundamentally different species division within journalism.” (Bannikov and Sokolova, 2018).

    Do Fact-Checking Organisations qualify as Media Organisations?

    One of the labels earlier mentioned that emerged from information disorder is “Fake News” typology. Though it has been argued that if information is fake, it can never be news. This is because news is built on the foundation of factual presentation. This label points to the relevance of fact checking to the work process of media organisations. The question now is whether a fact-checking organisation qualifies as a media organisation.

    In their study titled: “Theoretical base of fact-check as a journalistic format”, Bannikov and Sokolova, 2018, argue:

    “Obviously, fact-check can not be placed inside the concept of opinion journalism, since it deals with the personal author’s view of the problem, as opposed to representing an objective and comprehensive analysis. But is it possible to consider fact-check as a part of news reporting? On the one hand, the basis for both of them is pure facts, but on the other hand, there is also a significant difference. The basis for news reporting is a fact (or event), which is investigated by a journalist guided by the above-mentioned principles of work — independence, accountability and verification. From this basis, journalistic materials are produced. As a result, the very product of news reporting journalism can become the basis for a fact-check. Thus, fact-check can not be placed in the concept of a standard journalistic dichotomy of news reporting and opinion journalism.” 

    Similar debate has been raised with social and digital platforms (tech companies) such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and others. The dominant position was that these technological based organisations remain as platforms and not media organisations. Though the contents produced by traditional and online media organisations are promoted through these platforms, they do not qualify as media organisations. 

    Olorunyomi (2020) went further to argue that there is a distinction between media forms and journalism: 

    “Not all media forms execute their practice with the methodologies of  journalism. So we say simply that whereas all journalism is media work, not all media work is journalism. Reviewing the content structure of the ever expanding media universe we encounter a wide diversity that does not necessarily all fit what we would technically call journalism.”

    Dapo Olorunyomi who is the publisher of Premium Times online newspaper, thereafter noted the complexities of the media landscape when it comes to deciding whether some media contents fit into the technical definition of journalism. He identified some of the media platforms to include: various online platforms/outlets, social media platforms, blogs and various formats of community media, data journalism platforms, fact checking platforms, and solution-based journalism platforms.

    Olorunyomi (2020) provided the criteria to be met for media content to qualify as journalism work. The four core elements are: Its claim must be truthful and accurate; its discipline must be rooted in verification; the practitioners must be independent and be accountable to their readers/viewers/listeners; and it is about accountability with the end goal of public good. 

    Arguing on the same line, Anipah (2020) drew comparison between reporting and fact-checking with accuracy, timeliness, focus of event, and source attributions, as the measuring rods.

    Bannikov and Sokolova, 2018 assert that “fact-check can not be placed in the concept of a standard journalistic dichotomy of news reporting and opinion journalism.” However, they theorised and came up with the concept of “sense establishing journalism” to make the activities of fact checking organisation qualify as media organisation.

    Going by this argument, they further noted that it is “impossible to work with the term ‘fact-check’ without coming to an understanding regarding the term ‘media.’” And the ‘media’ as defined in the Recommendation of the Council of Europe, offers six fundamental criteria that should be met for inclusion as the media — intention to act as media; purpose and underlying objectives of media; editorial control; professional standards; outreach and dissemination; and public expectation.” 

    Bannikov and Sokolova, 2018 developed working principles that will allow the work of fact-checking organisations fit into that of media organisations: 

    “…fact-check as a format makes it unacceptable to refer to anonymous sources, no matter how confident they are. All sources the fact-checker works with must meet the open source criteria. In addition, the principles and methodology of the editorial board must be available to the audience. Selection criteria: the claim/statement must be verifiable and the claim itself has to be factual, concrete, and connected with objective measurable reality. In addition, the journalist must be able to verify claims using only open data and available resources; public resonance (the significance of the claim for society, the impact of the sounded fact on the life of society and its individual members); and retransmission level (the number of citations and references in the media). It is important to note that timeliness (the statute of limitations) is not one of the main criteria, since information distorted in the past can have consequences and become actual in the present.” 

    Bannikov and Sokolova (2018) in their interrogation and attempt to isolate fact-checking from news reporting, however did not consider the role of copy editors who work on news reports and other contents produced through the same journalism process; as part of the role of the copy editor is to ensure the accuracy and validity of information contain in an editorial content. The theorisation of fact-checking as journalistic format by these researchers also did not note that investigative journlaism adopt approches similar to fact-checking. For instance, if two news sources gave conflicting information to a reporter, standard journalism practice does not only required the reporter to quote both of them but go a step further to establish the accuracy of their claims.

    Fact Checking Organisation versus Fact Check Desk

    Having established that fact-checking organisations qualify as media organisations, Stencel (2019) conducted a study to classify fact-checkers. In the findings of the study, the researcher discussed the results:

    According to the report, a bit more than half of fact-checkers are part of a media company (106 of 188, or 56%). That percentage has been dropping over the past few years, mostly because of the changing business landscape for media companies in the United States. In our 2018 census, 87% of the U.S. fact-checkers were connected to a media company (41 out of 47). Now it’s 65% (39 out of 60). In other words, as the number of fact-checkers in the U.S. has grown, fewer of them have ties to those companies. Among fact-checkers in the rest of the world, the media mix remains about half and half (67 out of 128, or 52% — very close to the 54% we saw in 2018).

    The fact-checkers that are not part of a larger media organization include independent, standalone organizations, both for-profit and non-for-profit (the definitions of these legal and economic entities vary greatly from country to country). Some of these fact-checkers are subsidiary projects of bigger organizations that focus on civil society and political accountability. Others are affiliated with think tanks and academic institutions.” (Stencel, 2019).

    Adair and Stencel (2016) said that there is a database of global fact-checking sites by Reporters’ Lab at Duke University’s DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy that developed the parameter for classifying fact-checking organisations. They are expected to regularly publish articles, video or audio reports that verify the accuracy of claims made by prominent public figures and institutions; debunk rumors, hoaxes and other forms of misinformation that spread online; or review the status of political promises made by candidates and political parties.

    The Lab also specifies many attributes in determining which organizations to include. This is whether the site: reviews statements by all parties and sides; examines discrete claims and reaches conclusions; transparently identifies its sources and explains its methods; or discloses its funding and affiliations.

    They also consider whether the project’s primary mission is news and information. That’s clear when fact-checking projects are run by professional journalists, produced by news media organizations, or affiliated academic journalism education programs. Other fact-checkers are typically associated with independent, non-governmental groups and think tanks that conduct non-partisan research and reporting focused on issues such as civic engagement, government transparency and public accountability. (Adair and Stencel, 2016)

    Fact-checking organisations in Nigeria have been investing in capacity building initiatives for journalists, researchers, and students in the area of building fact-checking and verification skills. They are also involved in advocacy to promote digital and media literacy as a way of flattening the dis-misinformation curve in the country. While Dubawa since 2018 has been training journalists and researchers through Fellowship programmes; Africa Check encourages fact checking efforts through awards and other programmes.

    Caroline Anipah who is the Programme Officer of Dubawa-Ghana, a fact checking organisation in Ghana, and doubles as its editor, said that the efforts of fact checking organisations in the world including Africa include: aggressive media literacy, working with tech giants, self-regulation, and establishment of fact-checking departments. (Anipah, 2020)

    Revisiting Gate-Keeping Theory with Fact-Checking Organisations

    Ibraheem  & Garba (2019 p. 156) while citing Oso (2014) noted that the Gate-Keeping theory was first used by Kurt Lewin and the application of the theory was in 1959 by David Manning White in his study on the process of news production. This study launched the tradition of Gate-Keeping research in mass communication.

    According to McQuail (2005), gate-keeping is like a metaphor that explains the process involved in the selection of media contents with particular emphasis on opening and closing the “gates” to determine the type of news reports that find their way into the news channels.

    The emergence of digital technology, especially the internet and social media platforms associated with Web 2.0, has faulted the assumptions of Gate-Keeping Theory. Before the advent of these digital platforms, mainstream media organisations and media practitioners, especially the editors, determined the inflow and outflow of information. The interactive nature of the social media platforms brought about by Web 2.0 has overturned this. Citizen journalists can now create contents and distribute them through these platforms, unlike what was operational in the past. 

    This though further promoted the ideal of freedom of expression, it has also been identified as one of the factors encouraging the spread of fake news, disinformation, misinformation and associated terms. As the negative effect of this bite harder, stakeholders turn to the media organisations to get credible information. This made the role of fact-checking organisation more demanding.

    References

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