Fake news, disinformation, misinformation and malinformation have become of serious concern in the Nigeria media space. Also caught in the web of this information disorder are both the new and conventional media. (Apuke & Omar, 2020; Ojebode, 2018). It has been observed that the prevalence of information disorder in Nigeria can be adduced to lack of fact-checking skills among media handlers. Cable 2019 cited in Raji 2020, however, said the establishment of Dubawa and other fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and in Africa at large, have brought positive results in efforts to address the problem of information disorder. Despite collaboration between fact-checking organisations and media houses on how to address the information disorder in the information ecosystem, many young people and students, including those studying journalism are accused of sharing fake news, disinformation, misinformation and malinformation pieces.
The mixed-method research recently conducted by Ilesanmi (2021) to examine the level of fact- checking competence among journalism lecturers in Ondo State, Nigeria revealed that fact-checking competence among journalism lecturers was very low. Majority of the lecturers use Google to confirm the genuineness of information. Almost all of them do not know how to use other modern fact-checking tools while majority of them still consider normal news gathering skills as modern fact-checking skills.
Ilesanmi (2021) also reported that modern fact-checking skills are not being taught in Nigerian tertiary institutions. Furthermore, it was revealed in his study that years of service of the lecturers have positive association with fact-checking competence. In other words, the more years the lecturers spend in academia, the more their fact-checking competence increases.
Additionally, it was revealed that the majority of journalism lecturers in Nigeria have not had any fact-checking training prior to the research. To worsen this, there was no plan by the institutions to organise future training on fact-checking competence for the lecturers, who are often saddled with the responsibility of training journalists in the country.
The findings of Ilesanmi (2021) have revealed that tertiary institutions in Nigeria are not equipped materially and in terms of personnel to cater for fact-checking requirements that are in demand in modern day journalism practice. The study has shown that journalists are ill-equipped in terms of fact-checking competence because their training years in the tertiary institutions are devoid of the right skills and knowledge needed to combat fake news, misinformation, disinformation and mal-information. In view of this dearth of fact-checking competence among journalism teachers in tertiary institutions in Nigeria, this paper presents strategies that can be adopted to fill this gap
Time to deepen collaboration
There have been concerns on the lacuna between the academia and the industry in Nigeria. Thishas been attributed to several failures in the country, especially in terms of providing solutions to several issues in the country (Atueyi, 2016). Unfortunately, the same gap is observed between Nigerian institutions and departments offering journalism and media studies as courses and in the media industry.
Sequel to this, there is a need for journalism departments and institutions offering fact-checking as a course to collaborate with fact-checking organisations, like Dubawa, to enhance the competence and skills of both journalism lecturers and students. This will go a long way to equip the two groups with the relevant skills needed to verify information and address the inadequacies of the information ecosystem in Nigeria.
This form of collaboration has been reported between Dubawa and news media organisations, tech firms and bloggers to curb the unhindered spread of fake news in Nigeria with attendant positive results (Raji, 2020). With this positive report, such collaboration should be extended to teachers and students of journalism in tertiary institutions in Nigeria, since they create the breeding ground for journalists. According to Gaye (2021), media literacy to detect fake information must not be narrowed or widened. This will empower more people to develop competence in information verification, especially the young adults.
Re-brewing the old wine
In a similar vein, there is no gainsaying that there is a need for training and retraining of journalism teachers. The high level of fact-checking incompetence among them can be attributed to the fact that modern fact-checking is novel and has just began to gain popularity (Daniel & Flamini, 2018; Raji, 2020). The proliferation of fake news can be attributed to the emergence and increase in social media use (Apuke & Omar, 2020).
Therefore, journalism teachers need to be trained and retrained in the use of modern fact-checking tools, such as reverse image search, photo forensics, demonstrator, noise analysis, cheapfakes and deepfakes. Others are TinyEye, Way back Machine, Invid, video verifier and Wikimapia. The teachers in particular can therefore transfer the knowledge to their students. This form of training can only be possible if the institutions collaborate with fact-checking agencies like Dubawa.
More of “Dubawa”
There is a need for the establishment of more fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. This will help to increase information and media competence, expose students and journalists to more opportunities to learn fact-checking skills. Dubawa Fellowship was established “to foster a culture of fact-checking in newsrooms and hopefully encourage newsrooms to have fact-checking desks” (Premium Times, 2019). In a similar vein, Africa Check and Ghanafact and other agencies have been established to enhance media literacy and fact-checking competence in a bid to curb the spread of fake news and misinformation.
In Nigeria, Folarin (2020) noted that fact-checking organisations have made considerate investment in capacity building initiatives for journalists, researchers, and students in the area of building fact-checking, verification skills and promotion of digital and media literacy as a way of flattening the dis-misinformation curve in the country.
Beyond the human process of verification, many organisations are already deploying automated systems to maximize impact and get better results. Therefore, more of these organisations will boost media literacy in the country and consequently reduce the level of information disorder.
Re-Engineering the Curriculum
Just like several studies, Ilesanmi (2021) has provided evidence on the need to update journalism curricula among institutions in Nigeria. Many tertiary institutions offering journalism as a course still teach the basic news writing skills with the belief that they are impacting the students with fact-checking knowledge. As of June 2020, the only real elements of media or news literacy teaching that occur in tertiary institutions in Nigeria was when the few fact-checking organisations visited few schools as outside speakers (Cunliffe-Jones, P et al, 2021).
Ilesanmi (2021) has shown that the lecturers mainly use Google to verify information and this is also found among students as well (Donovan & Rapp, 2020; Wineburg & McGrew, 2017). The students usually accept information on the surface value but rarely confirm the genuineness of information before they share on social media, contributing to the spread of fake news (Brodsky, Brooks & Scimeca, 2021).
Green (2019) asserts that going by the prevalence of many false claims on social media, skills in verification and fact-checking should be a core part of any curriculum for aspiring journalists. He added that these skills need to go beyond simply telling audiences whether the content is true or not and expatiate more on accuracy and trustworthiness
Also, a research on the survey of students’ media literacy skills in Nigerian universities conducted by Woju et al (2019) showed that majority of the students who have acquired rudimentary computer and internet knowledge and skills did not have substantial critical understanding and competence/skills as well as communication abilities required for effective and efficient professional practices in the current digitized platforms. Therefore, updating the journalism curriculum will be an appropriate and timely intervention.
Raising the Bar
With collaboration, retraining and establishment of more fact-checking agencies, it is considered necessary to raise the requirements for employing or recruiting journalism lecturers. It is important for institutions to set fact-checking competence as part of requirements to employ journalism teachers. This will spur upcoming academics in this line to acquire such skills. This will also ensure that journalism educators teaching students are competent and knowledgeable to impact fact-checking knowledge on the students.
Don’t Despise Little Beginning
Taking fact-checking skills as far down as to junior secondary schools will help the students to grow and develop with the skills. Computer operation is taught from nursery schools up to the university level in Nigeria. Cunliffe-Jones et al (2021) had earlier noted that the Nigerian school curriculum, recently approved for junior and senior secondary schools, featured as of June 2020 limited teaching of ICT/computer including use of the Internet and search engines and data processing, but no other elements of broad media literacy. Integrating fact-checking competence into curriculum for early schools will help the spread of wider media literacy in Nigeria.
Worthy of commendation in this regard is Dubawa’s Week For Truth during which trained volunteers took the gospel of media and literacy information as well as basic verification and critical thinking skills to many secondary schools across all five Anglophone West African countries Dubawa operates in – Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and The Gambia.
Conclusion
There is no gainsaying that more efforts still need to be put into improving fact-checking skills and competence among student journalists and their teachers. This paper reviewed the latest research by Ilesanmi (2021) and provided strategies to improve fact-checking skills in Nigerian higher institutions. It is believed that establishment of more fact-checking agencies, collaboration between academia and fact-checking organisations, training and retraining of journalism lecturers as well as taking fact-checking skills to secondary schools will enhance wider spread of media literacy and reduce information disorder in Nigeria.
References
Apuke, O., & Omar, B. (2020). Fake news proliferation in Nigeria: consequences, motivations, and prevention through awareness strategies. Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews, 8(2), 318–327.https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8236
Brodsky, J.E., Brooks, P.J., Scimeca, D. et al. (2021) Improving college students’ fact-checking strategies through lateral reading instruction in a general education civics course. Cogn. Research6, 23 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-021-00291-4
Cunliffe-Jones, P. et al. (2021). The State of Media Literacy In Sub-Saharan Africa 2020 and a Theory of Misinformation Literacy, pp. 5–96, in Misinformation Policy In Sub-Saharan Africa: From Laws and Regulations to Media Literacy. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.16997/book53.a. License: C-BY-NC-ND 4.0
Donovan, A. M., & Rapp, D. N. (2020). Look it up: Online search reduces the problematic effects of exposures to inaccuracies. Memory and Cognition, 48(7), 1128-1145. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01047-z
Ilesanmi, S. (2021). Assessing Fact-checking Competence of Journalism Lecturers in Ondo State Tertiary Institutions, Dubawa, retrieved from https://idac.dubawa.org/assessing-fact-checking-competence-of-journalism-lecturers-in-ondo-state-tertiary-institutions/
McGrew S, Breakstone J., Ortega T., Smith M., and Wineburg S. (2018). Can students evaluate online sources? Learning from assessments of civic online reasoning. Theory & Research in Social Education. 46(2):165–193. doi: 10.1080/00933104.2017.1416320.
Ojebode, A. (2018). Fake news, hate speech and the 2019 general elections: the redemptive role of the Nigerian media. Being the text of the 13th annual public lecture of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN)
Premium Times (2019). “Nigeria’s Foremost Fact-Checking Project, Dubawa, To Host Fellows For Four-Day Training”. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/327573-nigerias-foremost-fact-checking-project-dubawa-to-host-fellows-for-four-day-training.html
Wineburg, S., & McGrew, S. (2017). Lateral reading: Reading less and learning more when evaluating digital information (Stanford History Education Group Working Paper No. 2017-A1). Retrieved March 2, 2021, from https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048994.
Woju, J., O, Chukwu, C., O., Ugwuoke, J., C., Ugwulor-Onyinyechi C., C and Ononuju Nwankiti, C. (2019). A Survey of Student’s Media Literacy Skills in Nigerian Universities. Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 14: 5365-5373. doi: 10.36478/jeasci.2019.5365.5373
Information management is key to democracy. It is a major tool of governance in all societies. It is “the core element that drives the digital society, information is the key to how the digital society adds value and redistributes power” (Park, 2017). The popular maxim stating that “information is power” by Park, established the extent of the influence of information management for political control and influence of public opinion. In an attempt to gain power, politicians around the world including Nigeria place a premium on information management to achieve their cause(s). In the course of doing this, the issue of propaganda became prominent with the use of the same information as a tool to gain prominence. In an attempt to dominate the information flow, politicians manipulate content to achieve a specific agenda. Stakeholders have expressed worry over the spread of false information during the political process. It is in the realization of this goal that different measures are suggested and adopted to address the challenge of political disinformation. One of the measures gaining popularity in Nigeria is fact-checking.
Post 2019 election observers’ and media organisations’ reports in Nigeria documented evidence of election campaigns being heated up by fake news, video documentaries that outline falsehoods aired on television before moving to the social media. Viral tweets saw distrust ahead of the election as misleading descriptions attached to pictures were not taken in Nigeria.
Neither side of Nigeria’s political parties is innocent of political disinformation. The two major Nigeria political parties ran media operations to disseminate misinformation and fake news the moment the ban on political campaigning was lifted. The social media and other news media reported how President Buhari’s Special Adviser posted a video on Twitter which showed his supporters at a big rally when in reality the images were from a religious gathering the year before (the election). A photo of a major road construction was also posted and being cited as an example of the president’s public works. Pictures of the public works were made in Rwanda. He also narrated how a tweet accused Abubakar Atiku of sharing food and money during his campaign. The tweet came with a photo of food packs with money attached and a caption saying: “Keep them in poverty, then give them handouts. Atiku in Sokoto yesterday.” This is evidence of how fake news has become ingrained in Nigeria’s political culture.
Worthy to be noted was a video that went viral, claiming Governor Uzodinma’s Convoy was attacked by unknown gunmen. Nonetheless, “the claim that Governor Hope Uzodinma’s convoy was attacked was false. The video used to paint the false narrative was taken out of its original context. The actual incident took place in Kenya last year (2020) and not in Nigeria” (Jonathan, 2021).
It is evident that much more misleading political disinformation of this nature would have been consumed by electorates unaware of the actual story, if not for verifications reported by fact-checking organizations.
Disinformation and Political Process
Kandel (2020) viewed information disorder as “Distorting facts, manipulating information, sharing information without understanding the consequences, vilifying others’ beliefs and faiths, and running behind propaganda and fake news with or without vested interest in some of the disorders.”
Eventually, more studies around information disorder opened up newer ways to look at the issue. Wardle and Derakhsha (2017) categorized information disorder into three; disinformation, misinformation and malinformation. Their conceptual framework “distinguished messages that are true from those that are false, and messages that are created, produced or distributed by “agents” who intend to do harm from those that are not.”
The effects of political disinformation in Nigeria as observed by Pate (2019) was the escalating herder-farmer communal clashes in parts of the country which was attributed to misinformation, untruth and political propaganda. The farmer-herder conflict was fundamentally a land-use contest but was aggravated recently by a misrepresented information tweet which turned the conflict into a serious security challenge in South-Western Nigeria leading to the loss of lives and properties.
In December, 2020, it was circulated that Fatai Aborede, a politician and farmer was killed by Fulani herdsmen while returning from his farm in Igangan, a community that has cases of killings and kidnappings. The death of Fatai led Agitator Sunday Adeyemo, popularly known as Sunday Igboho to visit the community to evict Salihu Abdulkadir, the Sarkin Fulani, claiming that he was responsible for the killing and kidnapping of members of the community, a claim which was widely condemned. Igboho thereafter moved to Ogun State to evict the Fulanis resulting in attacks and reprisal attacks leading to loss of lives and property.
The conflict in Ogun State was aggravated by a political disinformation tweet of a misrepresented picture of a man holding a burnt baby with a description that the picture was a casualty from the Igangan crisis.
Political disinformation is harmful and injurious to the integrity of patriotic citizens because it turns their personal issues to sensitive national or international issues. Bishop David Oyedepo, the Founder of The Living Faith Church also known as Winners’ Chapel, was involved in an international scene January, 2020 when it was reported by a print media that the United State of America Embassy in Nigeria rejected his application for the renewal of his visa. It was a deliberate attempt to use the religious festive period and the beginning of a new fiscal year to drag the nation into political and religious conflict by creating a picture of misleading application rejection narrative to draw empathy from the Bishop’s faithfuls. It was evident that his broadcast on the “State of the Nation” which always addresses national topical issues, democracy and governance must have figured him out. A timely tweet by the US Embassy in Nigeria saved the situation and an additional statement by the Chairman, Editorial and Media Board of Winners Chapel, Prof. Sheriff Folarin debunked the story.
Similarly, Brennen (2017) affirms the injurious effect of misinformation by saying “once made available on social media platforms, fake news goes viral. Because of the sensation generated by such misinformation, many people became voluntary or involuntary carriers of the information, many of this distorted information often outperform genuine traditional sources of information.” (p. 179). It is no longer news that the Nigerian government accused Twitter for arousing the tension of the EndSARS protest in 2020 which led to the suspension of Twitter operations in Nigeria after it deleted President Buhari’s tweet because it breaches the social media’s organizational policy. This political narrative generated a misleading tweet that went viral, claiming that Twitter is desiring to mend things with the Nigerian government, as soon as the fake tweet goes online. Blogs, one of which was the Nairaland that had more than 3 million followers circulated the tweet without verifying the genuineness and source of the tweet.
Fact-Checking Purveyors of Political Disinformation
However, suggested solutions to potential political disinformation from a number of different perspectives include technological, social, media-centric, educational and regulatory. Stiftung (2020) said “Two main strategies (which have proven successful so far) are currently used at the global level to prevent and combat the spread of fake news (political disinformation) and its use for political manipulation: fact-checking and media literacy.”
Technological development has greatly affected and caused changes in modern ways of communication; these changes have affected societies while the media have also become a force to reckon with because of novel efforts to check disinformation. This is the reason “media literacy is an extremely important concept to understand the functioning and policies of media institutes to ensure that individuals are not exposed to manipulative effects of media production and to be able to analyze media content accurately.” (Akmesa, 2020).
Therefore, to be elected means politicians have to develop the skillful use of media to enable them get their messages across. The need by politicians to ensure the electorates receive and comprehend the content of their political statements, employ the service of experts in social media, marketing, advertising, television and other media fields to convey their messages to voters. Acquiring knowledge of media literacy is critically important and would need to be taught just as management is part of most courses, to enable future voters and leaders to learn to understand the role and influence of the media in the political process.
Technology has made it easy for everyone to create media and the irony is that no one can tell who created what message, why it was created and its credibility. This makes media literacy very tricky. Notwithstanding, media literacy helps the public to think critically, become a smart consumer of information, recognize one’s point of view, and understand the author’s goal.
Fact-Checking as Solution to Political Disinformation
Adhikari (2021) said “fact checking has developed into a profession and a field of its own” and “is the process by which someone verifies whether a piece of information is true or not or better said, whether a piece of information is backed by verifiable facts or not.” and “publishing fact checked information has been shown generally to have a positive effect in terms of correcting inaccurate Information” (Tompkins 2020). Fact checking organizations can now verify pictorial claims and give detailed information like the date, time and where a photograph was taken.
It is salutary that the fact-check profession has developed technologies to verify the authenticity and genuineness of videos. The courts accept videos tendered as evidence; for this reason video clips are being manipulated, doctored and circulated, while also using fact-check technology, to verify video sources are revealed. The video clip circulated on social media by the Nigeria President Adviser on Social Media showing a large crowd at a big rally, which was claimed to be of party supporters, was revealed to be images from a religious gathering in Jigawa State organised a year before the 2019 elections.
Google has developed fact-check tools such as the explorer, markup tool and APIs on its fact-check dedicated site where a user can visit to verify claims from a web about a topic or a person. Apart from sites created by fact-check organisations where a user can submit a claim to be fact-checked, there are various kinds of browsers, plugins and apps for detecting false information.
Credibility of fact-check
To support the credibility of fact-checking, Grabmeier, (2021) said “fact-checking works to reduce false beliefs across the globe.” He made this statement after a study conducted by Wood and Porter (2021) proved that fact-checking worked with little variation in Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa and the United Kingdom, and the positive effects were detectable within two weeks.
Wood (2021) added, “When we started doing Misinformation (information disorder) work about five years ago, it was the consensus that correcting misinformation wasn’t just ineffective, but that it was aggravating the problem and making people more entrenched in their false beliefs.” But “we found no evidence of that in these four countries. What we did find was that fact checking can be a very effective tool against misinformation.”
In the study, 2000 respondents were sampled in each of the four countries, one-half received only the misinformation, while the other half received misinformation followed by the correct version of the information fact checked by the local fact checking organization. The respondents were rated on a scale of 1 to 5 about the degree of their belief in the false information.
When the results of the two groups were compared, the group that received misinformation and fact check produced more accurate belief, while misinformation didn’t always lead to less accurate beliefs. The findings show that fact checks increase factual accuracy by 0.59 points on the five point scale. Misinformation decreased factual accuracy by less than 0.07 on the same scale.
The researchers returned two weeks later to three countries where the study was conducted and asked the sampled population “How much they believed the false statements they evaluated earlier. Results showed that the positive effects of fact checking were still robust two weeks later” (Grabmeier, 2021).
Misinformation can sway opinion; that is why it is necessary to fact-check statements, information or claim, especally the one with political inclinations because opinion can largely inform actions and if actions are based on false information, thereby making wrong decisions inevitable. These decisions can lead to unintended consequences. It is, therefore, to be noted that once political misinformation is on a social media platform, it could negatively impact the opinion of the electorate or could go viral and shape the outcome of an election.
Conclusion
Research has pointed at fact-checking as one of the potential tools to combating the challenges of misinformation. It promotes accountability, challenges political misinformation by revealing the (in)accurate aspects of politicians’ campaign messages aimed at influencing voters’ decisions. The focus on fact-checking as an antidote to political disinformation has exposed the strategies of propaganda adopted by politicians to score cheap political points. This article has shown that manipulated pictures, videos and false claims that had in the past been used by politicians to cause commotion, breakdown of law and order, destruction of lives and properties, and harmed and caused injury to the integrity of patriotic citizens can now be subjected to verification techniques of fact-check to reveal with factual accuracy the intent behind it.
Finally, other approaches of combating political disinformation are now complemented by social, media-centric, regulatory and media literacy solutions. This had led to an increase in the number of fact-checking organisations being established in Nigeria. Dubawa, a fact checking platform, incorporated in 2014, is breaking new grounds in institutionalizing fact checking. Dubawa fact checks and reports on its website in three major Nigerian Languages including Kanuri, has spread its branches to some West African countries. It has run many programmes and collaborated with organizations aimed at developing leagues of fact-checkers who will counter political disinformation at scale.
Baker, F. (2019). The role of media in politics/elections: Helping students understand media’s influence. Retrieved 15/10/21. wwwn frankwbaker.com/nlc/media-politics
Park, S. (2017) Information is Power Retrieved October 22, 2021, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59332-0_8
Pate, U. A et al (2019.) The impact of fake news and the emerging post-truth. political era Nigerian polity: A reviews literature Retrieved on 15th october, 2021. www.ideas.respec.org/a/rfa/smcjnl/v7y2019i1p21-29 html
Protecting ourselves from fake news : Fact checkers and their limitations, Retrieved 15/10/21 www.cits.ucbs.edu/fake-news/potecting-ourselves-fact.
Information disorder is a growing concern in the global information ecosystem. Advances in technologies have liberalised information access and dissemination, enabling anyone with relevant communication facilities to publish varied forms of communication contents to a global audience. Hence, information dissemination to mass and diverse audiences is no longer the exclusive preserve of conventional mass media which have the supportive framework to check information accuracy in an often rigorous editorial process. A major shortcoming of this liberalisation of communication space is the increasing free flow of false information in the public space. This has given rise to fact-checking efforts in an attempt to stem the flow of false information through painstaking verification of public claims, with expectation of greater vigilance among media audiences.
In this study, we examine public awareness of misinformation in the media and the potential impact of fact-checking organisations in combating spread of misinformation. To this end, we developed four key research objectives focusing on the level of audience awareness of misinformation in the public space; their trust in the media; tendencies to verify media information; and perceived influence of fact-checking efforts in the West African sub-region. We adopted the online survey research method using a google form designed questionnaire shared among potential respondents. We adopted a non-probability sampling method to invite potential respondents from Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to fill. A total of 508 respondents participated in the survey and the data generated were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively.
The study finds that respondents rely more on online news portals for information with many experiencing false information in varied forms on their preferred platforms; while rating Facebook and WhatsApp as leading platforms for promotion of false information. Respondents generally reported a high tendency in verifying information. Despite the majority experiencing false information on their preferred media platforms, many still trusted their choice media and the information therein. About 95% claimed they often verify information which they received on social media but less than half agreed to verifying information from social media platforms that have previously misled them. Respondents thus rated social media platforms, blogs, and online news portals, low in trust compared to traditional media. Awareness of fact-checking organisations and utilisation of their services was low among respondents but there was high appreciation of fact-checking activities.
Respondents’ level of trust in mainstream media and fact-checking organisations is encouraging. These are alternative verification platforms that should be equipped and strengthened by stakeholders, including donors, governments, fact-checking organisations and technology companies to help sanitise the public space from information pollution. Although this study notes the positive influence of fact-checking organisations on the ability of the media audience to cope with misinformation, fact-checkers must work harder to improve on this feat.
To download a PDF version of this report, CLICK HERE
Introduction
Communication is central to the survival of human beings and other living organisms in the world and it has played a vital role in human civilisation. Turcilo & Obrenovic (2020) observed that the challenges and manipulative use of communication had also plunged nations into wars. This made communication a catalyst to human existence, illustrated by the popular saying that “man cannot not communicate”. It is with the realisation of this that the society ties development to communication. Extensive research (e.g: Encyclopedia, 2020; Bro, 2013; Neuberger, Nuernbergk & Langenoh, 2019; Örebro, 2002; Stroobant, Van den Bogaert & Raeymaeckers, 2019) has been conducted to establish the connection between communication and other components of the society. The society places a premium on communication in the socialisation process, making all stakeholders to integrate this to the attainment of the mission and vision of organisations around the world. Individuals, family, groups, local, national and international institutions consider information as an integral part of their existence. These stakeholders have invested in efforts to understand the information ecosystem in order to maximise its benefits and prevent challenges that always result from inadequate or poor communication.
The constant evolution of society and its attendant technological advancement have become a recurring decimal. The disruptive nature of digital technology has further exposed the latent power of communication and its adoption for positive and negative purposes. In an attempt to control human minds to achieve specific objectives, the manipulation of information flow has now become the order of the day (Abubakar, 2015). Information pollution has permeated governance, politics, economy, religion, education, health and other sectors of the society.
Contemporary issues around the world today are often accompanied by conspiracy theories. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic and the US 2020 presidential election were tainted with disinformation and misinformation (Adeniran, 2020a; Adeniran, 2020b; Mantas, 2020). Africa, with its peculiar development challenges, has its fair share of issues of information pollution. Many issues in Africa with great impact on the respective countries have been linked to information disorder. Challenges relating to elections, economy, health, governance and other sectors in the continent are difficult to address owing to the state of confusion arising from the avalanche of disinformation and misinformation about these phenomena. (Folarin, 2020; Masters, 2020; Pauwels, 2020; Claire & Hossein, 2017)
Just as many African countries are ravaged by wars and diseases, with the proliferation of arms, information pollution in the continent can be likened to experience with “Weapon of Mass Destruction” and Covid-19 pandemic (Masters, 2020; van der Linden, Roozenbeek & Compton 2020; Teyit English & Tandans Data Science Consulting, 2020 Towers-Clark, 2019; Ireton & Posetti 2018). The widespread disinformation and misinformation cutting across all barriers and without borders has popularised the concept of Infodemic. The World Health Organisation (2020) explained the concept as “an overabundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.”
As the world continues to search for vaccines and potent drugs to prevent and treat Covid-19 disease (Ricard & Thibault, 2020; Saey 2020), stakeholders are also searching for solution on how disinformation and misinformation will not frustrate any success that will be recorded in this respect, as experienced in the outbreak, spread, and management of the novel coronavirus (Teyit English & Tandans Data Science Consulting). This scenario applies to all other aspects of engagements in the society.
Several studies have investigated information disorder around the world. Among these is one by Tayit, an independent fact-checking organisation in Turkey, in conjunction with Tandans Data Science Consulting. The study (Tayit & Tandans, 2020) provides insights into issues around false information. Though Tayit’s study focused on Covid-19 misinformation and potential impact on the information ecosystem in Turkey, it provides the perspectives and clues to interrogate the broader information disorder ecosystem in the African context. Improving media literacy is fast becoming the go-to antidote for combating the pollution within the information ecosystem.
As part of its efforts in improving media literacy to combat the challenges of disinformation and misinformation in the information ecosystem, Dubawa, an indigineous fact-checking organisation, instituted a research-driven project, the Information Disorder Analysis Centre (IDAC) aimed at providing a platform for the dissemination of research findings that dissect issues around information disorder. For six months, the 2020 Dubawa fact-checking research fellows examined issues around the information disorder ecosystem in West Africa.
In furtherance of the fellowship programme, the 2020 Dubawa research fellows embarked on this research project to understand public understanding of misinformation in the public space, and the relevance and utilisation of fact-checking services in combating misinformation. The research fellows were drawn from Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone.
Research Objectives
The study thus sought to understand the West African information ecosystem through the following key objectives that guided the study.
To find out the respondents’ level of awareness on misinformation in public space.
To examine the extent to which audiences verify information from the media in West Africa.
To examine the level to which respondents trust the media.
To assess the perceived influence of fact-checking on audience ability to cope with misinformation.
Method
This study adopts quantitative and qualitative research methods using online surveys with a Google form designed questionnaire shared among potential respondents. The desirability of this approach is underscored by its ability to elicit data from a large number of respondents in an era of social distancing as necessitated by the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic.
This research study targeted smart-phone users in West-African countries where Dubawa currently operates – Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra-Leone. We limited potential participants to smartphone users within the region due to the adoption of the online survey method. The rationale was to reach respondents through smartphones considered to be the most effective means to share the questionnaire, thus limiting physical contacts.
The questionnaire included open and closed-ended questions. The questionnaire link was widely shared online, via e-mails, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram as well as personal WhatsApp contacts and groups. Respondents were invited to click on the link and fill the questionnaire. Participation was voluntary and responses were accepted over a 4-week period from Monday, November 9 to Sunday, December 6, 2020. Over this period, we shared the link repeatedly across the online platforms used. Participation was however low with a total of 508 respondents filling the questionnaire across the three West African countries and beyond.
The data were extracted to a google spreadsheet and exported to Microsoft Excel Sheet and analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. The responses were sorted to separate responses to the close-ended questions from the open-ended questions. Data from the close-ended questions were subsequently analysed using frequency tables and charts. Meanwhile, the open-ended questions, where respondents freely expressed their opinions to specific questions were qualitatively analysed with findings integrated into the discussion section .
The bulk of the 508 respondents that filled the questionnaire were based in Nigeria. Out of these, 87% (n=446) responded from Nigeria, 7% responded from Sierra Leone (n=30), while respondents from Ghana accounted for 5% (n=25), and Diaspora 1% (n=7). Incidentally, the respondents rate is close to the percentage of the population census of the three countries. The approximation of the entire population of the three countries, according to Worldometer, is 247 million with Nigeria accounting for 208 million which represents 84% of the entire population of the three West African countries. This supports the 87% of the respondents coming from Nigeria.
In terms of age and gender, respondents were mostly between 18 and 45 years old. While more younger women aged 29 years and below responded to the survey, more men aged 30 to 45 years responded. By level of education, respondents were highly educated with the majority of them having post-secondary qualifications. The demographic data of respondents are presented in the charts below.
Study Limitations
This study is limited mostly by its adopted method. The adoption of online surveys, non-probability sampling of respondents, and restriction of respondents to smartphone users in the region are key limitations of this study. The online survey was adopted due to the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic to eliminate face to face contacts with respondents. Unfortunately, we could only share the questionnaire among personal contacts and groups on WhatsApp, and other social media platforms. The questionnaire was also repeatedly shared on Dubawa’s social media platforms. Despite repeated efforts in sharing the questionnaire links with thousands of smart-phone users, responses were low, struggling to hit just over 500 respondents after 4 weeks. Those without smartphone access were therefore strategically excluded from the study. This is a major shortcoming considering the sizable number of people without smartphone access in the West African sub-region. These limitations may therefore limit the generalisation of our findings. Despite these limitations, it is hoped that our findings can at least provide a glimpse into public understanding of misinformation in the public space and appreciation of fact-checking efforts. We hereby recommend a more robust study covering all major segments, and reflective of the socio-economic dynamics of the people within the region for future research endeavours.
Results
Level of awareness on misinformation in public space
In this study, we examined public awareness of misinformation in the public space. To achieve this, we asked respondents specific questions relating to their choice of media for news information; whether they encounter false information on such medium; and specific forms of presentation of false information in their preferred media. We then asked them to rate their perceived level of false information on varied media platforms spanning radio, television, newspaper, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, and online news portals. They were requested to rate the platforms on a scale of one to four with four being highest, three as moderate, two as low, and one, being lowest.
Our findings suggest increasing reliance on online news portals for news-related information. One in three respondents (33%) identified online news portals as their prime source of news information. The increasing internet penetration in West Africa (Varrella, 2020) might be driving such a shift in news consumption. Unfortunately, these preferred media choices appear rife with false information with about three in four respondents (72%) confirming presence of false information on such platforms. The false information is often presented in different formats including audio, videos, images, and text. More than six out of ten respondents (64%) confirmed experiencing false information on their preferred media choice in all listed forms.
Facebook, WhatsApp rated as top Platforms for Promotion of False Information
Respondents mostly rated Facebook and WhatsApp as having the highest level of misinformation. Both platforms had an overall rated average of 3.5 on our rated scale of one to four. Online news portals, Twitter, and Instagram had overall moderate average rating recording approximate mean value of 3.0. Traditional news media, newspapers, radio and television were relatively well rated recording overall low rating of 2.0 thus suggesting members of the public still have higher level of confidence in information received from these traditional news media.
We further requested respondents’ view on the seeming abundance of false information in the public space. Many respondents confirmed abundance of false information in the public space relating misinformation (fake news) to “a pandemic” “on the loose” “thriving than real news” as it is reportedly “responsible for lack of trust in the media”, killing “the credibility of the news gathering process”, and with potential to “kill faster than guns”. Many believed that misinformation is not just “a threat to world’s security and democracy” but also “a recipe for unrest…associated with the post-truth age”. Respondents considered factors responsible for misinformation spread to include “lack of professionalism in the mainstream media”, “public’s docility, ignorance and complacency”. Many believed “Social media are more responsible” for promoting misinformation. Respondents thus suggested possible solutions to misinformation menace noting that while “media literacy is essential, social media needs to be regulated without hampering freedom of expression”and “the government needs to do more on fact-checking”.
Extent to which audiences verify information from the media
On verification of information in the media, we asked respondents specific questions on the extent to which they verify information they encounter in the media and how they usually identify false information. We also asked specific questions on whether they have cause to doubt information on social media. We requested them to strongly agree, agree, or otherwise to verify information they encounter on social media, and whether they tend to verify information on social media handles that have previously misled them.
Respondents expressed higher likelihood of verifying information in the media. More than nine in ten respondents confirmed regularly or sometimes verifying information they encounter. The remaining rarely or never did.
To identify false information, majority of respondents, more than eight in ten, (84%) said they often cross checked with other sources. Another 10%, or one in ten respondents said they simply base their judgement on their instincts. Few said they do not bother while others simply considered information in contrast to their beliefs to be fake. Three respondents each expressed variant views. One noted relying on eye-witness accounts, “From comments of everyday people who witnessed the said event”. Another noted her realisation often after exploring the content, “When you open the information e.g. job opportunity you will realise that it has expired”. The third noted evaluating the information source, “Checking the publisher or author of the information”.
Regarding information on social media, 95% of respondents confirmed doubting information they encountered on social media platforms. Three in four respondents (75%) agreed they verify information they come across on social media. Over 10% disagreed, while more than 14 percent were undecided.
Less than half of respondents (44%) agreed to only verifying information from social media platforms that have previously misled them. Over 30 percent of respondents, or about one in three, disagreed on this while one in four respondents (25%) were undecided.
Public Trust in the Media
On the level of public trust in the media, we examined the extent to which members of the public trust their preferred media, and also the information they receive therefrom. Respondents were asked to rate their trust level on a scale of five to one with five being ‘very high’, four as ‘high’, three as ‘average’, two as ‘low’, and one being ‘very low’. We then asked respondents to equally rate their trustworthiness of information on the same scale across various media covering radio, television, newspapers, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, online news portals and blogs.
Respondents appeared to have fair confidence in their choice media and the information they receive from their respective preferred media. Both recorded a relatively high overall average score of 3.7 on our scale of one to five. As earlier observed with respondents’ low rating of false information in the traditional mass media, respondents also fairly rated information they receive on these media. Radio, television, and newspapers recorded a well above average score of 3.7 to 3.9 on respondents’ trust ratings of their disseminated information. Information on Twitter, online news portals, and blogs received overall lesser than average ratings of 2.7 to 2.9. Information on blogs, Facebook, and WhatsApp got a rather low rating of 2.3 to 2.4.
Respondents’ trust ratings of information in the media on a scale of 1-5 (Very High as 5 to Very low as 1)
Information source
V. High (5)
High (4)
Average (3)
Low (2)
V.Low (1)
Total Resp.
Mean Score
Overall Rating
Information on Television?
11
278
102
105
5
501
3.9
High
Information on Radio?
12
260
146
75
5
498
3.8
High
Medium form which respondents mostly source information
82
200
201
16
4
503
3.7
High
Information respondents source from their preferred medium/media?
9
221
182
84
3
499
3.7
High
Information on Newspapers?
24
221
165
87
4
501
3.7
High
Information on Twitter?
128
89
209
25
41
492
2.9
Average
Information on online news portals?
83
95
269
15
35
497
2.9
Average
Information on Instagram?
142
55
229
11
47
484
2.7
Average
Information on blogs?
164
44
196
4
80
488
2.4
Low
Information on Facebook?
202
19
176
8
96
501
2.3
Low
Information on WhatsApp?
180
26
167
9
116
498
2.3
Low
Assessing Potential Influence of Fact-Checking
To examine potential influence of fact-checking organisations and their activities, we examined the level of awareness of fact-checking organisations among respondents. We requested to know whether they usually request fact-checking organisations to verify information they are doubtful of, and how often they do. We also examined their reliance on fact-checking organisations for false information in the media, and requested them to rate the extent to which these organisations have helped in improving our information ecosystem.
More than half of respondents were unaware of any fact-checking organisation. Over 70% (73%) of respondents failed to identify any fact-checking organisation. Dubawa was the most recalled organisation among respondents with about 16% mentioning the organisation. Africa Check had 9% mention while People’s Check had just 4%/ other fact-checking organisations or projects mentioned by respondents included Facebook fact checker, Fact Check Nigeria, FactCheck.org, Round Check, Fact Check Hub, and AFP Fact Check.
On requesting verification from fact-checking organisations, about six in ten respondents (58%) said they did not while four in 10 respondents (42%) said they did. Respondents also expressed less tendency to verify information (they are doubtful of) from fact-checking organisations. A similar percentage of respondents, (57%) said they never or rarely did.
More than half of respondents however confirmed being aware of false information in the media through these fact-checking platforms even though a large percentage (about 40%) were also undecided. Respondents mostly appreciated fact-checking efforts with about seven in ten respondents noting fact-checking has ‘fairly’ or ‘very well’ helped clarify information in the public space. Most respondents, more than six in ten, agreed to have personally benefited from activities of fact-checking organisations.
Discussions
The findings of this study have provided key roadmaps to the elucidation of the broad aim of the study, which is to investigate the information ecosystem in West Africa through the prism of fact-checking in the era of infodemic.
On the level of awareness of misinformation in the public space, participants’ array of definitional approaches to the term “fake news” explains their appreciable level of awareness of information disorder across board. The underpinning themes derived from their responses revolve around the usual narrative that is common to most news audiences. To a larger percentage of the respondents, the term can simply be explained as: unverified information, with a tendency to mislead; information that is untrue, misleading and factually incorrect; or as information that is “manipulated”, “fabricated” or, at best, “false information presented as true”.
The fact that an average respondent made a reference to any of the terms which even experts dealing with information disorder will most likely agree to, shows that their level of awareness and ability to spot fake contents is moderately high. The statistics of respondents (72%) confirming the presence of false information on their preferred media platforms also shows a growing level of awareness of infodemic in the region. This position is in tandem with a report on fake news and disinformation by the independent High-Level Group of Experts (HLEG) commissioned by the European Commission which defines “fake news” as a form of disinformation that thrives on “fabricated information, blended with facts, and practices that go well beyond anything resembling ‘news’ to include some forms of automated accounts used for astroturfing, networks of fake followers, fabricated or manipulated videos, targeted advertising, organized trolling, visual memes’’ (European Union, 2018, p.11; cited in Okoro & Emmanuel, 2019).
Apparently, this growing awareness of information disorder, particularly on social media might have influenced respondents’ doubting of information received on the platform. As reported in this study, while 75% of respondents verified information they received on social media, 95% of them confirmed doubting information on social media platforms. This finding supports a 2013 survey of online news users in the UK which showed that, on average, 25% used social media to find news at least once a week, but that less than 10% trusted that information (Schifferes, et al., 2014).
Reports have fingered social media as an enabler of information disorder in the public space (Ziga, 2018). This apparently influenced the reasons most respondents (95%) claim that they had cause to doubt information on the social media platforms. With diverse but mostly-related opinions, respondents claim that most information shared on social media platforms were influenced by mere instincts, highly polluted and prone to manipulations. For those who have been victims of false contents online, the tendencies are that they become highly sceptical than those who are not, as about “44% agreed that they verify information they received on social media platforms that have previously misled them”.
The growing awareness of the respondents about misinformation is indicative of the ability to move from mere instincts to a more cognitive and critical thinking in their levels of information consumption particularly on social media. This suggests that despite the indispensability of social media platforms, their propensity for being critical of any information is advancing. What factors specifically influence audience propensity for cognitive thinking faculty in their exposure to misinformation? Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2015) explained the psychological motive behind these tendencies, using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures one’s propensity to reflect on intuitions or cognitiveness. In their study, Pennycook et al (2015) observed that news audiences can be controlled by instinct (intuition) or cognitively. While the former most time stick to their instincts even when confronted with false information, the latter deploy cognitive thinking faculty to reflect and be sceptical when exposed to false content online.
Pennycook et al (2015) observed that intuitive individuals may or may not detect the need to think analytically, but they decide nonetheless to go with their gut.
Robson (2020) reacted to this theory and observed that, someone’s tendency to employ their intelligence by thinking things through in a deliberative, analytical fashion is ruled by cognitiveness. Those who do not reflect when confronted with a piece of information are not necessarily bereft of effortful thinking capacity as they are obviously in possession of substantial mental reserves, but they don’t “spend” them. They are simply cognitively miserly. Cognitive miserliness renders us susceptible to many cognitive biases, and it also seems to change the way we consume information (and misinformation).
The finding of this study concerning public trust in the media also corroborates existing literature as the respondents’ low rating of false information in the traditional mass media suggests a sustained level of trust in the mainstream media. Even, the fairly rated information they receive on the mainstream media corroborates an existing study which finds that more than a quarter of respondents trusted newspapers and broadcast media more than social media (Raji, 2020b). Hence, there is more indication that a significant number of the news audiences still maintain their trust in the established news brands rather than social media.
However, the legitimacy and credibility of information in the mainstream media is currently being challenged by the proliferation of fake contents that found their ways into the established news media. This has become a challenge in recent times to news audiences whose yearning for alternative sources of credible information and verification has gained traction with independent fact-checkers who realise there have been cracks. This is the gap fact-checking journalism aims to fill. Cheruiyot, et al, (2018) aver that in an environment where misinformation threatens news organisations, “the process of fact-checking in itself has become an epistemological tool that several actors beyond traditional journalism propose”. Annamarie (2017) also agreed that “fact-checking organisations arise from the need to remedy media failures”. What is the influence of fact-checking organisations on news audiences in West Africa? What has been their influence on the audience ability to cope with misinformation? Are citizens aware of fact-checking organisations in West Africa? What is the rate at which citizens request fact-checking organisations to verify information they are doubtful of, and how often do they engage in this?
The thematic areas gaining attention from the data analysed can be discussed from the angle of nomenclature, utility and request.
From the angle of nomenclature, which is the system of names, data shows most respondents (73%) were unable to identify existing fact-checking organisations in West Africa. This then calls to question the relationship that exists between the organisations and the news audience. The danger then shows that the goals of the existing fact-checking organisations to raise the consciousness of an audience to make informed decisions are still a far cry. The impact of these organisations can only be felt provided the essence of their professional goals resonates with the audience. Cheruiyot et al, (2018) reported that there are two ways fact-checkers aim to achieve their goals: one is to help members of the public to make informed decisions or “to have accurate data based on factual evidence and then the second is to help raise the standard of journalism or to help journalists be better at fact checking and doing their jobs”. The reality of these goals to be impactful on the audience is a function of relationship and the ability to recall the identity of the organisations that are making these commitments.
At the level of utility, evidence shows that the audience have benefited from the activities of these organisations, regardless of whether or not they could recall their names. As the finding indicates, more than half of respondents confirmed being aware of false information in the media through these fact-checking platforms. Could this be attributed to the collaboration between news media and fact-checking organisations that created a synergy in which fact-checks are embedded in the news reports for the audience to consume? Also, in many instances, audiences get exposed to these fact-checks on the organisations’ website or social media handles. However, this study did not examine if this awareness of false information translates into changing the minds of the audience. While research has documented efforts by fact-checking organisations in partnering with local media and journalists to mitigate the spread of false information in the public domain (Raji, 2020a), as well as fact-checking organisations at the frontline of combating information disorder (Folarin, 2020a), the current study has taken a step further in evaluating the level at which news audience make use of fact-checks and other verification efforts of these organisations. Based on this, it then observes that if the partnership between news media and fact-checking organisations is anything to go by, it has influenced news verification, dissemination, and consumption. It shows that the level of media literacy on false information and fact-checks consumption has really resonated with the audience. However, our findings could not establish if the high level of education of the respondents might have influenced their ability to explore fact-checking to cope with a misinformation ecosystem.
At the level of request for verification from fact-checking organisations, finding shows more than half of the population (58%) were not interested in requesting for verification when in doubt, while a little less than half did. This goes to show that many news audiences may not get better informed about the fact of particular issues despite being exposed to fact-checks. The categories of the news audiences sampled in this study can then be summarised along: (i) those who are aware of fact-checkers but cannot recall their names; (ii) those who are aware of false information through fact-checks but rarely request fact-checkers for verification; and (iii) those who hold onto their point of views even when in doubt. In this case, there is a correlation between these categories of news audience and those identified in Janing and Wagner (2020).
According to Janing and Wagner (2020), there are four types of news audiences. These include: (i) the informed (those who know and are confident that they know); the uninformed (those who are aware they do not know and they answer “I don’t know”), the misinformed (those who believe that they know even though they are actually mistaken); the ambiguously informed (those who admit they are guessing, right or wrong and admit they are not sure).
So, the similarity of perspectives that can be drawn from the analysis of categorisations presented by this study and that of Janing and Wagner (2020) is that respondents have different attitudes to fact-checking, its impact and how they think it affects their lives in the whole areas of misinformation ecosystem.
Again, it can also be concluded that the possibility of having an informed audience to emerge in the future is not impossible.
Conclusion
This study found a high level of public awareness on misinformation. The findings suggest an increasing reliance on online news portals for news-related information. However, respondents’ choice of media were not free of misinformation often experienced in varied forms. Our findings show greater levels of confidence in traditional news media. This study further established the prevalence of misinformation on social media platforms and the integrity of these platforms is nose-diving. This throws up the debate on the desirability or otherwise for social media regulations.
The extent to which the respondents verify information is high, as the majority admitted having crosschecked information they received with other sources. The study found a considerable level of media literacy skill with fair appreciation for fact-checking efforts.
Fact-checking is evolving in the West Africa sub-region. The increasing level of disinformation and misinformation underscores the importance of fact-checking in addressing the challenges of information disorder in Africa. Fact-checking organisations and other stakeholders need to increase media literacy and critical skills of the information audiences to improve the quality of information they consume. ‘Stakeholders must not relent in improving the awareness level and discerning minds of the media audience. Credible sources such as the mainstream media and fact-checking organisations must further equip themselves as “alternative and verification platforms”. Some of the models that could be improved on to achieve this include: training more journalists to be fact checkers, establishing fact-checking desks in mainstream media organisations, support research and further encourage professionalism in the media business. The frontline fact-checking organisations in Africa should also spread their tentacles and activities not only to other African countries in which they have not reached, but also cities and rural areas in the country they are presently domiciled.
Though the focus of this study measures the extent of awareness level and extent to which smartphone users verify information in West Africa, there is a need to find out the level of awareness of audiences not captured by this research especially those without internet connections and others in the rural areas.
References
Abubakar, R. (2015). Muslims and the threats of the Media. Lagos; Salsabil Associates
Adeniran, R. (2020a). WhatsApp, Facebook, and blogs lead as sources of covid-19 claims fact-checked on Dubawa. Retrieved December 10, 2020 from https://dubawa.org/whatsapp-facebook-and-blogs-lead-as-sources-of-covid-19-claims-fact-checked-on-dubawa/
Annamarie, V. M. (2017). Fact-checking in the Global South: Facts about nonprofit journalism funding models – a case study. Retrieved November 12, 2020 from https://int.search.tb.ask.com/search/GGmain.jhtml?
Ireton, C. & Posetti, J (2018). Journalism, “Fake News” and disinformation: Handbook for journalism education and training. France: UNESCO. Retrieved December 1, 2020 from https://en.unesco.org/fightfakenews
Mantas, H. (2020). Falsehoods about the 2020 election run rampant on the world stage. Retrieved December 2, 2020 from https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2020/falsehoods-about-the-2020-election-run-rampant-on-the-world-stage/
Örebro, L. L. (2002) Journalists and Politicians: A relationship requiring manoeuvring space, Journalism Studies, 3(1), 21-33, DOI: 10.1080/1461670012010731.
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015). Is the Cognitive Reflection Test a measure of both reflection and intuition? Behavior Research Methods 48(1), DOI: 10.3758/s13428-015-0576-1.
Peter B. (2013). Journalistic communication. Journalism Studies, 14:6, 805-818, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2013.784093.
Saey T. H. (2020). As we wait for a vaccine, here’s a snapshot of potential COVID-19 treatments. Retrieved December 2, 2020 from https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid19-accelerated-vaccines-treatments-drugs
Schifferes, S., Newman, N., Thurman, N., Corney, D. P. A., Goker, A., & Dancausa, C. M. (2014). Identifying and Verifying News through Social Media. Digital Journalism, 2(3), 406-418, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2014.892747
Stroobant, J., Van den Bogaert, S., & Raeymaeckers, K. (2019). When medicine meets media: How health news is co-produced between health and media Professionals. Journalism Studies, 20(13), 1828-1845, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2018.1539344 Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2018.1539344
Teyit English & Tandans Data Science Consulting (2020). Information disorder in times of the covid-19 pandemic: Misinformation, news consumption, and fact-checking in Turkey. Retrieved October 20, 2020 from https://twitter.com/teyit_EN/status/1294993341202006018
van der Linden, S., Roozenbeek, J. & Compton, J. (2020). Inoculating against fake news about COVID-19. Frontiers in Psychology 11, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566790
Raheemat is a lecturer at the School of Communication, Lagos State University, Nigeria. She is a scholar with over 13 years experience in researching media contents across varied platforms. She has research interests in journalism and health communication. She is a 2020 Dubawa research fellow. She was a 2018 Erasmus scholar at the Birmingham City University, UK, and participated at the British Council’s 2019 Researcher Connect Workshop. She holds a doctorate degree (Ph.D.) in Communication Studies (2018) from Lagos State University. Among her most recent works is Making health news: Examining how health influencers drive coverage of maternal and child healthcare issues in Nigerian newspapers, Communication & Society, 33(4), 47-60. Available at https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/communication-and-society/article/view/39350
Rasaki Raji
Rasaki is a senior media content researcher at the International Press Centre (IPC) Lagos, Nigeria, with vast research interests in human rights and media development issues. He coordinated media content research project on 2019 general elections under the component 4b: Support to media of the European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN); media research project on 2015 general election, funded by the UNDP and jointly implemented by the International Press Centre (IPC) and the Nigerian Press council (NPC). He has also consulted for civil groups such as the Institute for Media and Society (IMS), Wole Soyinka Centre for Investigative Journalism (WSCIJ) among others, on media research projects including the Regulators’ Monitoring Project (REMOP). In 2020, he is a research fellow of the Dubawa fact-checking arm of the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) as a fact-checking and accountability researcher.
Jamiu FOLARIN
Jamiu is a lecturer and researcher at the department of Mass Communication, Crescent University, Abeokuta and Ph.D candidate at the Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria. His research thesis is focused on “Critical Analysis of Adoption of Digital Tools in Fact-checking Information on the 2019 Elections”. His research interests include: Media Technology, Information Disorder, Political Communication and Journalism Ethics. Jamiu is a 2020 Dubawa Research Fellow on Fact-checking at the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ). Prior to his academic sojourn, he started his professional career at the first private radio station in Ogun State, Rockcity 101.9 F.M as one of the pioneer staff who built the News and Current Affairs Department. Jamiu is also the Ogun State Coordinator and Community Reporter, Connected Development, Abuja, with a Project tagged: “I Follow The Money” dedicated to tracking the national and international expenses in the area of Education, Health and Environment. He recently co-authored “Appraisal of the Usage of Freedom of Information (FoI) Act in Nigeria” published in the Book 5 series (2020) of the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN).
Philip Acquaye
Philip is a Lecturer and Head of the Department of Mass Communication and Journalism at BlueCrest University College in Accra, Ghana. He is a trained journalist, marketing communication professional and a researcher with 12 years experience working in academia, media and civil society spaces. His research interests include Media Management, Media sustainability, Development Communication and Media ethics. Philip is a 2020 Dubawa Research fellow on Fact-checking in Ghana.
Alie Tarawally is a youth and development activist, researcher and also a graduate from The University of Sierra Leone, Fourah Bay College with a Division One degree in Sociology and History. Alie has worked on OSIWA, CODESRIA and British Academy Award Projects on Youths as well as several other research & consultancy with MEASURE EVALUATION and IMPACT MALARIA. Alie has over four years’ experience working on development policy research across Sierra Leone and has written articles on youths, politics, media and society.
Alie is a Commonwealth 100 0pen Source Leader, a Kectil 1000 Male Promise Leader and a Dubawa 2020 Fellow from Sierra Leone trained to fight against the dangers of information disorder by conducting fact-checks and providing media literacy articles and training in Sierra Leone. Currently, Alie is the Acting National Coordinator for the GRASS ROOTS ACTIONAL FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT- GRAND in Sierra Leone.
To download a PDF version of this report, CLICK HERE
The journalism business has moved from using conventional media like radio, television or print media for information dissemination, thanks to the revolution occasioned by social media. The internet and social media platforms all around the world have enabled media convergence such that anybody with enabling ICT tools can publish or receive information at the same speed of production, especially under the competition of who first breaks the news. This has encouraged the spread of fake news by users of social media and even journalists. While non-journalists could use lack of exposure to requisite training as an alibi, the journalists do not have any excuse since they are expected to have been imbued with the relevant skills in their respective training/educational institutions.
This paradox has, therefore, necessitated the need to investigate the level of fact-checking competence among journalists’ trainers/teachers and the knowledge they impact on their students. Mixed research method, combining census survey with in-depth interview, was adopted to gather data from all the lecturers in the departments of Mass Communication in five tertiary institutions offering journalism courses in Ondo State. 36 lecturers and their Heads of Departments were interviewed. The findings of this study revealed that there was no specific course on fact-checking across the institutions and the level of fact-checking competence is correspondingly very low among the lecturers. This study also revealed that years of service of the lecturers had a positive relationship with their fact-checking competence. In conclusion, the study recommends that journalism lecturers should be trained to develop fact-checking skills while the curricula across institutions in the country should be reviewed to suit current information dispensation.
Introduction
The advent of social media has led to the proliferation of fake news and consequently the world is currently experiencing information disorder. The digital platforms as sources of news and channels of information distribution for journalists have also been abused because they are a free marketplace of ideas.Anybody with a mobile phone or a computer system with internet service can publish any information they so wish on the internet. This has created “infodemic” and it is usually difficult to distinguish between real information and fake ones (Ojebode, 2018).
Also, Dumebi (2020) asserts that mainstream media in Nigeria have been found culpable in disseminating fake news and has contributed to worsening farmers-herders clashes. He cited a story once ran by most mainstream and online media in June 2018 alleging that Danladi Ciroma, a leader of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association said the attacks in Plateau were retributions for the loss of 300 cows with a threat of more if they were not found. However, following protest by Ciroma, only a few of the outlets including Premium Times ran a rebuttal, apologised and took appropriate editorial disciplinary measures to prevent future occurrence.
By fact-checking competence, we refer to the ability to use modern digital tools to verify the authenticity of information. The strategies and tools are Google advanced search, website verification, image verification, video verification, and geolocation, reverse image search, photo forensics, demonstrator, noise analysis, cheapfakes and deepfakes. Others are TinyEye, Way back Machine, Invid, video verifier and Wikimapia (Silas, 2021; Busari, 2020).
Therefore, there is a need to examine the formative and training stages of journalists to understand the extent fact-checking skills are taught in the universities and other institutions that offer journalism courses. In view of this, this study investigates if fact-checking skills are being taught in tertiary institutions in Ondo State and the level of fact-checking competence among journalism lecturers. It also investigates the relationship between the lecturers’ qualification and years of service and fact-checking competence.
Methodology
This study adopted mixed method research design to select journalism teachers in tertiary institutions in Ondo State in Nigeria. The institutions selected are four universities and one polytechnic offering journalism as a course toward professional certification. Mixed method design involves the collection and analysis of data by combination of both qualitative and qualitative methods. Census survey and interview were combined to collect data from the population of study. Unlike the sample survey that takes a subset of the population for investigation and generalises its findings for the entire members, all the journalism lecturers in the five institutions were sampled (Lavrakas, 2008).This research method is appropriate for this study because it details information about the entire population without any doubt about confidence level. On the other hand, an in-depth interview was conducted with the Heads of Departments (HODs) of journalism courses across the five institutions. This method gives room for the interviewees to be detailed in giving responses to the questions asked in relation to the objectives of this study to achieve better understanding (Liang, 2013). The combination of these two methods allows the collection of rich data that gives better insight into the problem being investigated as well as allows the researcher to arrive at an informed conclusion. A self-constructed questionnaire was administered on the lecturers while an interview guide was used to conduct the interview with the HODs.
Results
Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Respondents
The demographic variables analysed are age, gender, academic qualification, years of service and specialization of the respondents. The respondents between 31 and 50 years old (52.8%) dominate this study, followed by 22.2% below the age of 30. The two genders are significantly represented in this study but the males are more, being 55.6% of total respondents. In terms of qualifications, half of the lecturers are Master Degree holders, with just 8.3% having Ph.D degree certificates. Also, more than half of the lecturers (55.6%) have no more than 5 years teaching experience, thus constituting the majority of respondents. This means that most of the respondents are newly employed teachers. Lastly, there are more broadcast specialists among the lecturers than other specialisations. The demographic results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Respondents
Variables
Frequency
Percentage
Age (years)18-3031-4041-5051-60
81972
22.252.819.45.6
GenderMaleFemale
2016
55.644.4
Academic qualificationProfPh.DMScBSc
131814
2.88.350.038.9
Years of experience<56-1011-1516-2021-25
206712
55.616.719.42.85.6
Major specificationBroadcastPrintPublic relationsAdvertisingOthers
1411821
2.938.232.423.52.9
Source: Field survey, 2021
Teaching of fact-checking competence and skills in tertiary institutions
As presented in Table 2, almost all the respondents (94.1%) said they have heard of fact-checking while 5.9% said otherwise. This indicates a very high level of fact-checking awareness among the lecturers. The table also reveals that most of the lecturers, 61.1%, said their departments offer fact-checking courses to students while the least of them (38.9%) said their departments do not offer fact-checking courses to students. Furthermore, 69.4% of the lecturers said fact–checking competence is part of their course outlines while a minority of the respondents (30.6%) said fact–checking competence is not part of their course outlines. This reveals that fact-checking competence and skills, to a larger extent, are being taught in tertiary institutions in Ondo State.
Table 2: Fact-checking competence or skills taught in tertiary institutions
Variables
Decision
Frequency
Percentage
Have you heard of fact-checking?
YesNo
342
94.15.9
Does your department offer fact-checking courses to students?
YesNo
2214
61.138.9
Is fact–checking competence part of any of your courses outlines?
YesNo
2511
69.430.6
Source: Field survey, 2021
From responses of the lecturers, it can be inferred that fact-checking skills and competence are taught to a high extent among tertiary institutions in the state. This is corroborated by the Heads of Journalism departments during the interviews. Four of the HODs claim that fact-checking skills are being taught across courses. One of them said:
We do not have a specific course that specifically creates understanding of the information ecosystem, but in every course being taught in journalism or mass communication, we talk about credibility which is very important to the information ecosystem. We also teach them the complexities of the traditional and new media
However, it was only one of them that stated emphatically that fact-checking skills are not being taught in the department. He said:
No, but in the near future, through this unbundling, a course may be designed to meet that specific need but as it is now, information passed to the student comes from news writing and reporting, advanced reporting, specialized writing and all other aspects of news writing.
Whatcan be inferred from the responses of the lecturers and their HODs is that they take fact-checking skills as any attempt to verify the genuineness of information. They do not consider any specific competence as fact-checking competence. This explains why the majority of them believe that their departments offer fact-checking skills as courses.
Level of fact-checking competence among journalism lecturers
Table 3 reveals that 44.4% of the lecturers use Google if they need to confirm any information, 33.3% said they check credible news sources, 22.6% ask professional contacts while none of the respondents have any other choice aside the ones stated. The table also reveals that a high percentage of the respondents (77.8%) said they are proficient in checking the genuineness of information online, while only 5.6% are less proficient. The implication of this is that the majority of the lecturers claim to be proficient in fact-checking.
Table 4.3 Level of fact-checking competence of journalism lecturers
Variables
Decision
Frequency
Percentage
If you need to confirm any information, how do you do that?
Check GoogleCheck credible news sourcesAsk professional contactsOthers
161280
44.433.322.60
How skilled are you in checking the genuineness of information online?
Very ProficientProficientLess ProficientNot at all
62820
16.777.85.60
Source:- Field survey, 2021
The proficiency claim by the lecturers is corroborated by their HODs during the in-depth interview. They all claim that journalism lecturers are expected to develop fact-checking competence because that is what mass communication is all about. One of the HODs said:
Every academic knows that news is based on facts, and these facts are not based on opinions and therefore it’s a basic tenet in the academic world and indeed the curriculum that opinions should not be paraded as facts.
Another departmental head made a similar assertion, saying, “Our lecturers teach this across all courses of the communication field.” Another claims that “Part of what we use to tell our students about fact-checking is to double check and leave out when in doubt. Our lecturers are well knowledgeable on this and constantly pass this across to their students.”
Level of competence in using fact-checking tools
Table 4a shows the level of fact-checking competence among the lecturers in using fact-checking tools. From the data, it is revealed that the lecturers are not very competent in using any of these fact-checking tools, despite 77% of them claiming to be competent in using the tools. Another major indication of low competence among the lecturers is the fact that most of them (44.4%) use Google to check genuineness of information while over 30% confirm information by checking credible news sources.
Table 4b further shows that only 5.8% of the respondents use Tineye as another fact-checking tool apart from the ones provided. It also reveals that a large percentage of the lecturers (84.8%) said they have not undergone any fact-checking training recently. Among those that have undergone fact-checking training recently, only 2.9% sponsored themselves while 11.8% were not sponsored by anyone. In addition, 84.8% of the lecturers are not learning fact-checking tools while only 2.9% each are learning Google, Image verification and Video verification while 5.9% are learning Invid.
Table 4a. Level of competence in using fact-checking tools
Digital Tools
Highly competentF (%)
CompetentF (%)
Less competentF (%)
Not at allF (%)
Standard deviation
Mean(X̄)
Rank
Wikimapia
4 12.9
10 32.3
17 54.8
0.71992
2.5806
1st
Clone dictator
4 11.1
12 38.7
13 41.9
2 6.5
0.8072
2.5803
2nd
Error level analysis
3 8.3
14 45.2
11 35.5
3 9.7
0.8099
2.5484
3rd
Google Earth
4 12.9
8 25.8
19 61.3
0.7244
2.5161
4th
Noise analysis
3 9.7
13 41.9
12 38.7
3 9.7
0.8112
2.5161
5th
Invid
4 12.9
6 19.4
20 64.5
1 3.2
0.7648
2.4194
6th
Photo forensics
2 6.5
11 35.5
16 51.6
2 6.5
0.7199
2.4149
7th
Image magnifier
2 5.6
11 35.5
16 51.6
2 6.5
0.7199
2.4149
8th
Demonstrator
2 5.6
11 33.3
15 45.5
5 15.2
0.8095
2.3030
9th
Google map
2 5.6
8 26.7
16 53.3
4 13.3
0.78492
2.2667
10th
Website verification
1 2.8
8 25.0
18 56.3
5 15.6
0.7233
2.1563
11th
YouTube data viewer
1 3.1
3 9.4
25 78.1
3 9.4
0.5644
2.0625
12th
Reverse image search
2 5.6
2 5.6
24 66.7
5 13.9
0.6840
2.0303
13th
Locating broadcast messages
1 2.8
2 5.6
22 71.0
6 19.4
0.6291
1.9355
14th
Grand mean
2.33
Note: Decision Rule if mean is ≤ 1.49 =Not at all; 1.5 to 2.49 = Not Very Competent; 2.5 to 3.49 = Not Competent; 3.5 to 4.49 = Competent; 4.5 to 5 = Very Competent
Table 4b. Training on using fact-checking tools
Variable
Response
Frequency
Percentage
Fact-checking tool that you can use but not listed
Tineye
2
5.8
Have you undergone any fact-checking training recently?
Yes No
6 29
17.1 82.9
If yes, who sponsored it?
Myself None
2 4
5.6 11.8
Is there any fact-checking tool you are currently learning the usage?
Yes No
5 30
14.3 85.7
If yes, which one?
GoogleImage verificationInvidVideo verification
1121
2.82.85.62.8
Source: Field survey, 2021
The findings presented in table 4b are corroborated by the HODs during the in-depth interview sessions. Only one of the HODs said the department organized a training on fact-checking. He said:
In 2017 and 2021, the department organised a fact-checking seminar which was conducted by reputable fact checking institutions in Nigeria. This, we wish to continue to do, because we believe that information in the public domain should be correct and journalists should be ethical.
Another HOD said lecturers are being trained as they progress in their career. However, the other HODs revealed that there is no training currently being organized for the lecturers. One of them said, “That’s a very new area. We are looking for lecturers, who will specifically deal with certain areas. That is what we are concentrating on. The NUC will soon be coming, and we are doing everything in our power to make sure that we secure something.” His counterpart from another University simply answered, “There are no plans in the immediate future. But, with the collapse of mass communication, it will be included in the new curriculum.”
From the various results obtained, it can be inferred that fact-checking skills among journalism lecturers in Ondo State is very low. Majority of the lecturers are not trained on gaining the skills and there is no assurance that the majority of them will be trained to develop the skills any time soon.
Relationship between academic qualification, years in service and fact-checking competence
As depicted in Table 5, there was no significant relationship between academic qualification (p= 0.634>0.05) and fact-checking competence of journalism lecturers while a significant relationship is reported years of experience and (p= 0.015<0.05) and fact-checking competence of journalism lecturers in the state. This implies that the more experience the lecturers have in journalism teaching, the better they become in fact-checking competence. This may be due to the fact that lecturers undergo certain training as they move up the teaching ladder, and receive more exposure to fact-checking training in the process. As reported in this study, the majority of the journalism lecturers surveyed (55.6%) in the state have between 1 and 5 years of experience and only 4 (10.1%) of them have PhD certificates.
Table 6 Correlation between academic qualification and years in service and fact-checking competence
Variable
r-value
P-Value
Remark
Academic qualification
-0.092
0.634
Not significant
Years of experience
-0.446
0.015
Significant
Level of significance at 0.05
Discussion
The demographic results of the respondents show that the majority of journalism lecturers in Ondo State have not more than 5 years teaching experience and only 4 of them have PhD certificates with half of them having Master Degree certificates. This might have negative implications on the competence of the teachers.
Findings of this study have shown that there is no specific course or course outline to teach the use of fact-checking tools across the tertiary institutions in Ondo State. What the journalism departments teach can be likened to news credibility skills. The departments do not consider fact-checking skills as specific skills different from what is required for straight news stories. This explains why the majority of the lecturers surveyed believe that their departments offer fact-checking skills as courses. According to Silas (2020), fact checking competence entails skills on advance web search i.e. Google search, Website verification, Image verification, Video verification and geolocation, among others. However, the lack of specific course on fact-checking skills can be attributed to the fact that fact-checking is a new development and has continued to gain popularity in recent times owing to the debilitating effects of fake news in society and currently seems to be a research expenditure outside the academia in Ondo State (Daniel, 2018; Raji, 2020a).
Also, this study found that fact-checking competence among journalism lecturers in the state is very low. Majority of the lecturers verify information by checking Google and checking credible news sources. This study also found that the majority of the lecturers are not trained on fact-checking competence. This might be understandable because fact-checking is just gaining popularity due to the proliferation of fake news as enhanced by social media. The very low level of fact-checking skills among the lecturers can be attributed to why many of the students only check information on the web through Google-search (Donovan & Rapp, 2020) and despite being the major users of the social media platforms, they lack fact-checking skills (Wineburg & McGrew, 2017; McGrew et al., 2018). Parts of the reasons attributed to this lack of fact-checking skills among Nigerian university students are inadequate curriculum, poor quality of lecturers and teaching methods (Woju et al, 2019). Therefore, if the lecturers teaching the students have very low fact-checking competence, then the finding that the majority of university students in Nigeria lack fact-checking skills becomes logical.
Lastly, this study reports that the academic qualification of journalism lecturers has no significant relationship with their fact-checking competence. However, it was found that ‘years of service’ in the profession have a positive influence on fact-checking competence. This is an indication that the more years the lecturers spend in the profession, the better competent they become in fact-checking for information genuineness. Lecturers are exposed to training, refresher courses, conferences and research as they practice. This might be responsible for the influence of years of service on fact-checking competence among them. With this finding, there is a need for more training for lecturers on fat-checking competence that is not limited to journalists alone. As Gaye (2020) claims, media literacy to detect fake information must not be narrowed: it must not be limited to only the journalists but also extended to tertiary institutions dedicated to training or certifying professional journalists.
Conclusion
The relevance of fact-checking skills among journalists and journalism lecturers cannot be overemphasised with the barrage of fake news in the ecosystem. This is why this study was conducted to investigate if tertiary institutions in Nigeria offer fact-checking skills and the level of competence among journalism lecturers. The findings of this study have shown that the use of fact-checking tools is yet to be a major course in journalism departments. Unsurprisingly, a very large percentage of journalism lecturers do not possess fact-checking skills. In view of these findings, it is important for journalism departments across tertiary institutions in the country to integrate fact-checking courses into journalism curriculum.. This will help the would-be professional journalists (students) to develop the competence before going into the labour market. Similarly, it is recommended that each institution that offers journalism and mass communication related courses should organise continuous training for the lecturers, who will in turn pass down the knowledge to the students. Fact-checking may be a new development in the information ecosystem but the introduction of contemporary fact-checking skills in school curriculum is desirable and vital in today’s world.
References
Busari, K. (2021). Fact-checking: the steps; A paper presented during the training of 2021 Kwame Karikari Research Fellows in Abuja organised by Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in June 2021.
Donovan, A. M., and Rapp, D. N. (2020). Look it up: Online search reduces the problematic effects of exposures to inaccuracies. Memory and Cognition, 48(7), 1128-1145. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01047-z
Dumebi, O. (2020). Alternative News and Misinterpretations: Fake News and Its Spread in Nigeria, Fake News Is Bad News – Hoaxes, Half-truths and the Nature of Today’s Journalism, Ján Višňovský and Jana Radošinská, IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.94571. Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/73946
Lavrakas, P.J. (2008). Encyclopedia of survey research methods. Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks.
Liang, Z. (2013). Knowledge and influencing factors of employee retention. Thesis, retrieved from http://trap.ncirl.ie/I’d/eprint/909
McGrew S, Breakstone J., Ortega T., Smith M., and Wineburg S. (2018). Can students evaluate online sources? Learning from assessments of civic online reasoning. Theory & Research in Social Education. 46(2):165–193. doi: 10.1080/00933104.2017.1416320.
Ojebode, A. (2018). Fake news, hate speech and the 2019 general elections: the redemptive role of the Nigerian media. Being the text of the 13th annual public lecture of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN).
Silas, J. (2021). Digital Tools For Fact Checking; A paper presented during the training of 2021 Kwame Karikari Research Fellows in Abuja organised by Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in June 2021.
Woju, J., O, Chukwu, C., O., Ugwuoke, J., C., Ugwulor-Onyinyechi C., C and Ononuju Nwankiti, C. (2019). A Survey of Student’s Media Literacy Skills in Nigerian Universities. Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 14: 5365-5373. doi: 10.36478/jeasci.2019.5365.5373
The pace at which misinformation, disinformation and fake news spread in the world has necessitated the need for fact checking skill and competence, especially for journalists and journalism students and interns. Also, acquisition of this skill will help verification of consumed information. This paper presents a discussion on fake news and dearth of fact-checking skills among journalism students in Nigeria. It also establishes distinction among related concepts to fake news and provides recommendations on how to improve students’ fact-checking skills.
Introduction
Information disorder birthed by the democratisation of access to media content production and dissemination is one of the threats to stability of society in the 21st century. The effects of misinformation are far reaching for the government and the governed. Despite the increasing trend of fact checking and growing conversations in the ecosystem, misinformation, disinformation and fake news continue to grow in leaps and bounds. Fake news is as old as man (Silas, 2021).
Fake news is a combination of two words – fake and news. To be “fake” means not true, false or untrue while news refers to information about events, people or any occurrence reported in the media. In view of this, fake news is any piece of information that is not true or genuine, released or published in expectation to be conceived as being true (Apuke & Omar, 2020).
One major factor for the exponential spread of fake information is social media. With the proliferation of the social media platforms across every nook and cranny of the world, misinformation and fake information have spread like wildfire. According to Apuke and Omar (2020), social media is responsible for the unprecedented rise in information disorder. This is a result of the popularity, ease of use, accessibility and ubiquity of the media among the audiences. A study by Raji (2020a) revealed that social media is the major source of misinformation. The study also revealed that fake news is not only initiated by individuals but also by government corporations, the presidency, government officials, and politicians inclusive.
Fake news or misinformation is capable of inciting violence, can lead to break down of law and order, destruction of the economy, and other forms of social disintegration (Ojebode, 2018). An ill-informed society is prone to economic under-development and social fragility which are part of the trappings of a failed state with far reaching implications on democracy and good governance. Both educated and non-educated Nigerians engage in spreading fake news.
Although there is no empirical research to know the roles of mainstream media in spreading fake news, it is evident that fake news and disinformation have been prominent topics in public and academic debate in relation to the past U.S. presidential election. (Yariv, Boomgaarden, Strömbäck, Vliegenthart, Damstra, and Lindgren (2020).
Also, Dumebi, (2020) asserts that mainstream media in Nigeria have been found culpable in disseminating fake news and has contributed to worsening farmers-herders clashes. He cited a story once ran by most mainstream and online media in June 2018 alleging that Danladi Ciroma, a leader of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association said, the attacks in Plateau were retribution for the loss of 300 cows with a threat of more if they were not found. However, following protest by Ciroma, only a few of the outlets including Premium Times ran a rebuttal, apologised and took appropriate editorial disciplinary measures to prevent future occurrence.
It is observed that many Nigerian journalists encounter the challenges of information verification and fake news detection, as loads of fake information are shared on a daily basis by individuals, political elites and members of other groups. Therefore, there is a need for journalists and media practitioners to develop fact-checking competence and skill to be able to tackle the menace of fake news (Raji, 2020b).
This necessitated the introduction of media literacy, especially on social media platforms and establishment of fact–checking organisations like Dubawa, Africa Check, and Ghanafact to help with the detection of fake information. For instance, the aim of the Dubawa Fellowship “is to foster a culture of fact-checking in newsrooms and hopefully encourage newsrooms to have fact-checking desks” (Premium Times, 2019). Dubawa, as well as other fact-checking organisations have been collaborating in Nigeria to train and help journalists to develop media literacy skills.
Despite these efforts, fake news and misinformation are still major concerns in Nigeria. It is b that universities and tertiary institutions offering media and journalism studies in the country seldom teach fact-checking skills to students. Hence, it becomes problematic for young journalists leaving schools and those already in practice to screen information for authenticity.
Fake News: Setting the record straight
Understanding what fact checking means and its relationship with media literacy cannot be done without explaining concepts like information ecosystem, misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and fake news. Information ecosystem is used to describe how local communities exist and evolve within particular information and communication systems. It is dynamic and transcends traditional audience research on media access and consumption according to needs and peculiarities of any society. Therefore, an information system refers to the communication structure that exists in a population, relating to how information is produced, spread, retrieved, used and disposed of. (UNCHR, 2015)
Misinformation is described as “false information that is spread, without the intent to mislead”. Misinformation now spreads fast due to advancement in information technology (Folarin, 2020). The key word in this definition is “intent”. The person that spreads misinformation is not aware of the inaccuracy of the information being spread. Disinformation, on the other hand,is false information that is deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country. The difference between disinformation and misinformation is that the former is deliberately publicised to harm a target. Malinformation is referred to as the process of sharing genuine information to harm a person, social group, organization or country. This can be in the form of revealing information to bring the target to disrepute and public condemnation Anipah (2020).
However, Fake news has a long history and could mean different things, depending on the context. According to Wang (2020), the concept of fake news, though still ambiguous, is an evolving field of research drawing significant attention from academics and mass media practitioners. The advent of the internet and social media have considerably changed media reportage and perception, therefore, understanding trends on fake news entail considering the unique social undercurrents birthed by new media technologies.
Pate, A., Gambo, D., and Ibrahim, M. (2019) aver that fake news is a complex concept. In his submission, Ojebode (2018) argues that despite numerous definitions given to the concept, it is “a report of an event that was conjured by the imagination of an individual or group of individuals, hence, it did not happen. That is, fake news is the formulation of false information, shared to the public as if being real but untrue. It is simply a falsified piece of information published to make the people believe it is real.
Wei, Lim and Ling (2018) refer to fake news as an oxymoron because it contains two contradictory words – fake and news. News is supposed to be a factual reportage of events while “fake” implies that the information is not genuine. Therefore, fake news is not rumour within the house or among a close group. With the inclusion of “news”, it became a reported event or information via the mass or social media. In view of this, any report disseminated to the public, which is false, or not a proper representation of actual events but presented as true is fake news (Ojebode, 2018). Fake news thrives across all platforms ranging from audio, images, video as well as textual documents (Philip, Lisa-Maria, and Nayana 2021).
Fact-Checking: Skills and Tools
Fact checking began as part of a process to be sure of the appropriateness of facts in news articles before they are published as an integral part of the journalistic profession. Fact-checking is a procedure of authenticating the accuracy of information. In journalism, this happens internally before publication as well as externally via articles appraising the accuracy of publicly available information (Graves & Amazeen, 2019). According to Anipah (2020), fact-checking (in the context of information disorder) is the process of determining the truthfulness and accuracy of official, published information such as politicians’ statements and news reports. The concept today now entails verification of claims on health, politics, governance to mention a few. She further explained that from 44 in 2014, practicing organisations have increased to 290 by June 2020 across 83 counties and regulated by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), formed in 2015 to drive standards among the global fact-checking community.
In Africa, since AfricaCheck.org pioneered fact checking in 2014, many more have sprung up including Dubawa.org [Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and recently Gambia]; Agence France Presse (AFP) Fack-Check, Ghanafact.org; Fact-checkGhana.com while many newsrooms have begun to have fact checking desks in addition to partnerships with existing platforms.
Sylvie, Philippe, Julien, Ioana, and Xavier (2018) listed some steps involved in fact checking to include extract claims from some discourse, search for the facts the claims are based on, assess accuracy of claims especially for those backing facts and ensure there is a context for claims there is no forward settlement. They also explained that while technology could make fact checking easier and faster, its efficiency could be undermined by psychological or cultural barriers. However, fact-checking has continued to gain traction to help guarantee truth and is seen as a modern aspect of accountability journalism.
Fact-checking is a new development and has continued to gain popularity in recent times owing to the debilitating effects of fake news in society (Daniel, 2018; Raji, 2020a). Fact-checking is defined as the process of authenticating the accuracy of a piece of information before it is put in the public domain (Graves & Amazeen, 2019). Although it is considered research expenditure outside the academia, programmes, such as fellowships and workshops have been established to train local researchers and journalists in fact-checking competence to detect and discard fake information (Raji, 2020a).
Since fact-checking cannot happen on its own, tech experts have continued to introduce tools and resources to facilitate this process using scientific, non-scientific methodologies and even automation. Alan Greenblatt (2016).
An online tech platform, Investintech.com listed some fact checking tools to include Snopes.com which specializesin debunking the urban legends and misinformation on the Internet; FindExif.com that helps to knowif an image is original or wrapped in fake location tags, backdated or hiding something; InVId, a Chrome plugin that helps to verify and debunk videos; Reverse Image Search (TinEye), another dedicated reverse image search engine that can be used to see if the image has been taken from somewhere online;Hoaxy, an online tool that helps to “visualize the spread of claims and fact checking; Wolfram|Alpha, a computational search engine, which performs calculations on the spot, makes comparisons, and provides localized data and twXplorer, a tool thatgives researchers more powerful capabilities than Twitter’s search functionalities. On this tool, search for an item begins once you are logged in.
Silas (2020) posited that fact checking competence entails skills on advanced web search i.e. Google search, website verification, Image verification, video verification and geolocation.
According to Georgia State University Library, fact checking resources include FactCheck.org, a nonpartisan, nonprofit “consumer advocate” for voters that aims to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics, Snopes.com: A website dedicated to fact checking urban legends, rumors, and misinformation, Politifact: which rates the accuracy of claims by elected officials and others who speak up in American politics and Allsides: which believes that “Unbiased news does not exist and therefore provide balanced news and civil discourse as well as Hoax-Slayer: focused on debunking email and internet hoaxes and scams.
In a study among professional fact-checkers, Graves (2017) found that information fact-checking requires five steps, which are: “choosing claims to check, contacting the speaker, tracing false claims, dealing with experts, and showing your work” (p. 524). Similarly, Gaye (2021) identifies six criteria for information literacy, which he tagged the “the six Cs of misinformation literacy.” They are the context of information, which creates the information, content of the information, circulation, consumption and consequences of the information. He argues that gaining knowledge in the six areas helps to identify and discard fake news. Busari (2020) identifies some stages of fact-checking in Dubawa. They are sourcing, researching, editing and writing.
Some of the strategies used for fact checking, as identified by Silas (2021), are Google advanced search, website verification, image verification, video verification, and geolocation. There are certain tools used for fact-checking and some of them are reverse image search, photo forensics, demonstrator, noise analysis, cheapfakes and deepfakes. Others are TinyEye, Way back Machine, Invid, video verifier and Wikimapia (Silas, 2021; Busari, 2021). The fact-checking tools and strategies identified by Silas (2021) and Busari (2021) will be adapted for this study.
Beyond the human process of verification, many organisations are already deploying automated systems to maximize impact and get better results. According to Harrison (2020) Argentine fact-checking network Chequeado launched its automated fact-checking bot, Chequeabot in 2018, which deploys transcripts from media organizations to help detect claims for fact-checkers. Harrison who works with the International Fact-Checking Network also reported that British fact-checking organization Full Fact, which has collaborated with Chequado on a number of automated fact-checking projects, has been researching this technology since 2015. According to him, apart from detection, Full Fact has deployed automation to monitor the frequency of a false claim and appropriate response.
The Dearth of Fact-Checking Skills in Academia
Folarin (2020) noted that Fact-checking organisations in Nigeria have made considerate investment in capacity building initiatives for journalists, researchers, and students in the area of building fact-checking, verification skills and promotion digital and media literacy as a way of flattening the dis-misinformation curve in the country. Every nation across the globe, whether developing and developed, has been making efforts to step up media literacy in line with the global advocacy and conversation but how far depends on a number of parameters and indices.
Young adults are the major users of the internet and they use at least one social media platform or another (Pew Research Centre, 2019). Within this age range are tertiary institution students in the Nigerian academic system. Despite their heavy reliance on and use of the internet, the majority of them lack media literacy and fact-checking skills (McGrew et al., 2018). It is reported that the majority of students only rely on Google search results to verify information but rarely make an attempt to check information sources, verify claims about people and organisations and in general scrutinise information using fact-checking tools (Donovan & Rapp, 2020; Wineburg & McGrew, 2017).
What students assess when verifying internet information are web pages, how ideas are presented, references, website logo and how useful the information they are getting is (McGrew et al., 2018). All these do not translate to fact–checking. These are like the basics, not real fact-checking information for authenticity. There are many websites and internet pages that clone information and other sites, present false images, videos and texts in the most convincing way that one hardly differentiate between them and genuine information.
Unfortunately, the Nigerian school curriculum, recently approved for junior and senior secondary schools, featured as of June 2020 limited teaching of ICT/computer including use of the Internet and search engines and data processing, but no other elements of broad media literacy. The absence of any elements of news or misinformation literacy from schools continued despite the efforts of a series of initiatives since 2004 aimed at promoting media literacy in schools and the formation of the African Centre for Media and Information Literacy (Cunliffe-Jones, et al, 2021).
In 2017, there was a fresh attempt to push Media and Information Literacy, MIL into the school curriculum in Nigeria with the establishment of the Media and Information Literacy Coalition of Nigeria (MILCON), supported by UNESCO. MILCON was in 2020 in discussions with the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council on the development of an MIL curriculum for schools in Nigeria. If or when a curriculum is agreed, it would then need to be approved by the education ministry. This is normally a lengthy process. As of June 2020, the only real elements of media or news literacy teaching that occur did so when the few fact-checking organisations come into a handful of schools as outside speakers (Cunliffe-Jones, et al, 2021).
Also, Dubawa, a fact-checking and verification project of the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ), initiated a programme known as Week for Truth to recruit volunteers for a nationwide outreach to educate students/youth corp members on media and information literacy, basic fact-checking and critical thinking skills.
A research on the survey of student’s media literacy skills in Nigerian universities conducted by Joseph, Christiana, Joel, Chinyere, and Chukwuemeka (2019) showed that majority of the students who have acquired rudimentary computer and internet knowledge and skills did not have substantial critical understanding competence/skills as well as communication abilities required for effective and efficient professional practices in the current digitized platforms. The research further revealed that poor funding, lack of appropriate facilities, inadequate curriculum, incessant strike, poor quality of lecturers and teaching methods are the major factors militating against undergraduate’s media literacy acquisition.
Although journalism students are to be trained to develop fact-checking competence and be able to evaluate information for authenticity and credibility (Hodgin & Kahne 2018), it has also been established that many of them could not identify fake information. (Tejedor, Portalés-Oliva, Carniel-Bugs, and Cervi, 2021). Could this be attributed to lack of facilities in the schools, inadequate skilled fact-checking teachers/lecturers, lack of refresher courses and fact-checking skills among lecturers? As long as these debilitating factors persist, journalism students will not only join the bulk of unskilled journalists in the country, but also join the bandwagon of fake news and misinformation peddlers.
Conclusion
The dearth of fact-checking skills among youths, students and journalism students/interns spell doom for days ahead. This is because they constitute the largest group of social media and internet users and these ICT tools are majorly used to spread fake information. Therefore, it is important to enhance fact-checking capabilities of this youthful population by providing adequate fact-checking training for them. This can be done through developing their lateral reading skills. Lateral reading helps the students to access, scrutinise, examine, produce and use media information (Hobbs, 2017).
Importantly, there is no way students will be trained to develop fact-checking skills if their teachers/lecturers lack the said skills. If the young journalists that are being churned out into the society every year are to acquire the skills, their lecturers must also be trained. Similarly, there is a need to re-evaluate the curriculum for journalism and media studies in Nigeria to align with current development in the media world.
There should be collaboration between fact-checking organisations, like Dubawa and schools in the country. The collaboration between Dubawa and journalists across media organisations should be replicated for journalism and media students across tertiary institutions in the country. Training, workshops, fellowships and other forms of engagement with the students should be facilitated.
Allcott, H., and Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211-236. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23089
Anipah, C. (2020). The Information Disorder Ecosystem. A paper presented at the Virtual Dubawa Fellowship Training Programme by Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) for the 2020 Dubawa Fellows in Nigeria and Ghana, held between 18th to 23rd July, 2020.
Apuke, O., and Omar, B. (2020). Fake news proliferation in Nigeria: consequences, motivations, and prevention through awareness strategies. Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews, 8(2), 318–327. https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8236
Browne et al (2018) “Editors’ Introduction: Critical Media Literacy – Who Needs It?,” Irish Communication Review: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Busari, K. (2021). Fact-checking: the steps; A paper presented during the training of 2021 Kwame Karikari Research Fellows in Abuja organised by Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in June 2021.
Cunliffe-Jones, P. et al. (2021). The State of Media Literacy In Sub-Saharan Africa 2020 and a Theory of Misinformation Literacy, pp. 5–96, in Misinformation Policy In Sub-Saharan Africa: From Laws and Regulations to Media Literacy. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.16997/book53.a. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
Donovan, A. M., & Rapp, D. N. (2020). Look it up: Online search reduces the problematic effects of exposures to inaccuracies. Memory and Cognition, 48(7), 1128-1145. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01047-z
Dumebi, O. (2020). Alternative News and Misinterpretations: Fake News and Its Spread in Nigeria, Fake News Is Bad News – Hoaxes, Half-truths and the Nature of Today’s Journalism, Ján Višňovský and Jana Radošinská, IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.94571. Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/73946
EUR-Lex (2018). Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018. EUR-Lex. Access to European Law. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj (accessed 9 july 2021).
Hobbs R. Measuring the digital and media literacy competencies of children and teens. In: Blumberg FC, Brooks PJ, editors. Cognitive development in digital contexts. Elsevier; 2017. pp. 253–274.
Joseph, W., Christiana, C., Joel, U., Chinyere, U-O., and Chukwuemeka N. (2019). A Survey of Student’s Media Literacy Skills in Nigerian Universities. Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 14: 5365-5373. DOI:10.36478/jeasci.2019.5365.5373
Livingstone, S., Van, E., Thumim, N. (2005). Adult media literacy: A review of the research literature on behalf of Ofcom. Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science. https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/5283/1/aml.pdf
Mason, L. E., Krutka, D., & Stoddard, J. (2018). Media Literacy, Democracy, and the Challenge of Fake News. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 10(2), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.23860/JMLE-2018-10-2-1
McGrew S, Breakstone J., Ortega T., Smith M., and Wineburg S. (2018). Can students evaluate online sources? Learning from assessments of civic online reasoning. Theory & Research in Social Education. 46(2):165–193. doi: 10.1080/00933104.2017.1416320.
Ojebode, A. (2018). Fake news, hate speech and the 2019 general elections: the redemptive role of the Nigerian media. Being the text of the 13th annual public lecture of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN)
Pate, A., Gambo, D., and Ibrahim, M. (2019). The Impact of Fake News and the Emerging Post-Truth Political Era on Nigerian Polity: A Review of Literature, Studies in Media and Communication 7(1); June 2019, 21-29, https://doi.org/10.11114/smc.v7i1.4238
Silas, J. (2021). Digital Tools For Fact Checking; A paper presented during during the training of 2021 Kwame Karikari Research Fellows in Abuja organised by Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in June 2021.
Sylvie C., Philippe L., Julien L., Ioana M., and Xavier T. (2018) A Content Management Perspective on Fact-Checking. The Web Conference 2018 – alternate paper tracks ”Journalism, Misinformation and Fact Checking”, Apr 2018, Lyon, France. Pp.1-10 <https://www2018.thewebconf.org/program/misinfoweb/>. <hal-01722666>
Tejedor, S., Portalés-Oliva, M., Carniel-Bugs, R., and Cervi, L. (2021). Journalism Students and Information Consumption in the Era of Fake News. Media and Communication, 9(1), 338-350. doi:https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v9i1.3516
UNESCO, (2018) Journalism, fake news & disinformation: handbook for journalism education and training
Wang, C.-C. (2020). Fake News and Related Concepts: Definitions and Recent Research Development. Contemporary Management Research, 16(3), 145-174. https://doi.org/10.7903/cmr.20677
Yariv, T., Boomgaarden G., Strömbäck J., Vliegenthart, R., Damstra, A., and Lindgren, E. (2020). Causes and consequences of mainstream media dissemination of fake news: literature review and synthesis, Annals of the International Communication Association, 44:2, 157-173, DOI: 10.1080/23808985.2020.1759443
This study is aimed at finding out the knowledge attitudes and practices of audiences, in this instance, tertiary education students about the phenomenon of information disorder. Research and strategies of combating Information Disorder have focused on how organisations are verifying the authenticity of news and stories and the public’s attitude to particular types of information disorder in a particular country as can be found in studies by Ahmed and Eldakar (2021); Pherson, Ranta and Cannon (2021). This study, however, tries to find answers to questions such as what selected audiences know about information disorder; will the audience be able to identify information disorder; does the audience have the capacity to independently verify whether a piece of information is authentic or not among others. This study is important because the individual or audiences who either create, share or consume mis/disinformation play a major role in the communication act that involves dis/misinformation. According to Edson et al. (2018) the “fakeness” or otherwise of a news or information was dependent on what the audiences did with the news or whether the audience perceives the fake as real. Without the audience perceiving the information as news, fake news remains a work of fiction. However, when the audiences mistake it as real the fake news is able to play with journalism’s legitimacy. The audience is even more important particularly in the context of social media where information is exchanged and meanings are negotiated. All these mean that even if someone created disinformation, it was only if this disinformation was shared by another person that it got into the public domain and became “fake news”. Without anyone sharing that information, there was no way the public would be deceived or misled by it.
This article compares preliminary responses about knowledge, attitudes and practices from both undergraduate and postgraduate students of the University of Cape Coast and the University of Education, Winneba, Ghana.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
GENDER, INSTITUTION AND ACADEMIC LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS
Eight responses have been received so farout of an estimated 200. Out of the eight responses there are two males and six females. Five of the respondents were from the University of Cape Coast while the remaining three were from the University of Education, Winneba.. Seven out of the eight respondents were postgraduate students reading for a Master’s degree.
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INFORMATION DISORDER
Knowledge
The responses of respondents on questions about their level of knowledge on information disorder, revealed that majority, that is, 7 (87.5%) out of the 8 respondents have heard of information disorder, and only half of all the respondents (50%) have a high level of confidence in their ability to identify mis/disinformation. The remaining half (50%) were neutral in their assessment of their level of confidence in identifying mis/disinformation. This suggests half of the respondents cannot tell, if they would be able to identify mis/disinformation or not. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1
Meaning/Definition of Information Disorder
Figure 2: Definition of Information Disorder
In order to ascertain their knowledge about what constituted information disorder, respondents were asked to select among various options about the definition of information disorder. As presented in Figure 2 above, six (75%) respondents identified information that is false, but which the person who disseminates it thinks it’s true, as what constituted information disorder and another six responses identified mis/disinformation to include photos, videos or quotes taken out of context. Information that is false and knowingly disseminated by an individual deliberately with the intention to deceive people, and information that contains claims without providing sources, were identified by 5 (62.5%) respondents each as what constitutes information disorder. Four (50%) respondents identified information that is referenced to ‘experts’ who lack valid credentials as information disorder and three (37.5%) respondents each identified information created to inspire emotions such as hate or fear with little evidence as what constituted information disorder. Three (37.5%) respondents also identified all the options as illustrations of information disorder. Lastly, two (25%) respondents each suggested that information designed to stun situations referred to in the stories, and information that is based on reality, but used to inflict harm on a person, organisation or country as definitions of misinformation. There was no respondent who indicated that they did not have an idea about what the meaning of information disorder was.
Indicators of Information Disorder
Figure 3: Indicators of Information Disorder
Respondents were asked to identify the indicators of information disorder, after having stated their definitions of the phenomenon. It was found that six out of the eight (75%) respondents indicated that the source or website of the information is the number one indicator of whether a piece of news is credible or not. The account from which the information is shared ranked second with 4 (50%) respondents stating it as an indicator of information disorder. The number of times a post is shared and whether a post contains a picture or not were also selected by two (25%) respondents each as indicators of information disorder. One person indicated that the number of comments a story has could be an indicator of information disorder. Only one respondent stated that none of the options given could be an indicator of information disorder. The findings are illustrated in Figure 3.
Frequency of Disinformation
Figure 4: Frequency of Disinformation
Figure 4, providing results on frequency of disinformation shows that half (50%) of the respondents indicated that they encounter disinformation very frequently, while 3 (37.5%) encounter it frequently and only one rarely comes across it. This shows that disinformation is something that people have to deal with most of the time.
Major Sources, Platforms and Content of Disinformation
Figure 5
Politicians, Political parties and political parties (50%) have been identified as the major source of misinformation, followed by celebrities (25%), with journalists and religious personalities 12.5% each coming in third position. Figure 5, provides these results.
Most of the disinformation is encountered on Facebook (62.5%), while the rest were on Twitter, WhatsApp and other media platforms.
Figure 6
The major subject of disinformation that respondents came across (in Figure 7) was on politics (87.5) and messages that promised people gifts and free items (12.5%).
Figure 7
Knowledge About Fact-Checking Institutions and Criminality of sharing mis/disinformation
Five (62.5%) out of the 8 respondents indicated that they were aware of the fact that some institutions were working on combating misinformation.
In identifying the institutions or organisations that were combating misinformation three responses (50%) identified Factcheck Ghana, two (33.3%) each for Dubawa, FactCheck.org and AFP fact checking, and one (16.7%) each for Media Foundation for West Africa, and Multimedia Group Limited. One respondent also stated that none of the listed institutions was involved in any activities in combating information disorder. The details are contained in Figure 8.
Figure 8:Knowledge about Fact-Checking Institutions
With the exception of one respondent, almost all respondents (87.5%) indicated that they were aware that it was criminal to share information that was not credible. This is presented in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Manipulation of Photos and Videos
Figure 10
Figure 10 shows that three- fourth, that is, 75% of the respondents know that it is possible to check whether a video or photo has been manipulated, while two (25%) respondents do not know.
Respondents were asked to identify ways of checking a manipulated photo. This was a multiple response question which allowed respondents to select more than one answer. Findings, as presented in Figure 11, indicates that Four respondents (50%) were able to identify that checking if the information in the caption or article matches the photo, looking at the picture closely to see if there is anything odd about it (e.g. warped, blurred), running a reverse image search and checking the metadata of the picture all constituted ways of checking for manipulation of pictures. Similarly, four (50%) of respondents identified looking at the picture closely to see if there is anything odd about it (e.g. warped, blurred) as a way of scheming for manipulation. Checking if the information in the caption or article matches the photo and running a reverse image search both received 3 (37.5%) responses each and checking the metadata of the picture was selected by two (25%) respondents as the way of verifying if a picture was manipulated. Only one respondent indicated that none of the procedures mentioned could be used to check a picture’s authenticity.
Figure 11
Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 12, respondents identified ways of checking if a video was manipulated. Similar to the responses on manipulation of photos, half (50%) of respondents identified that all the options, that is, using specialist software such as InVID, reverse image search of a screenshot from the video using Google or TinEye, by checking the location of the video by using Google Earth or Wikimapia, checking out the video’s metadata using tools such as ExifTool, and checking the time the video was filmed using Suncalc are all ways of verifying if a video was manipulated. Three respondents each stated that reverse image search of a screenshot from the video using Google or TinEye, by checking the location of the video by using Google Earth or Wikimapia, and checking the time the video was filmed using Suncalc constitute ways of authenticating videos. Using specialist software such as InVID, and checking out the video’s metadata using tools such as ExifTool were mentioned twice (25%) as the ways of verifying the authenticity of videos. Only two respondents indicated that they had no idea about the tools used to check if a video is manipulated.
Figure 12: Ways of Checking Manipulated Videos
ATTITUDE TOWARDS INFORMATION DISORDER
Minimization of Information Disorder
With respect to the attitudes of respondents towards information disorder, respondents were asked to state whether they thought information disorder can be minimised or not. Figure 13 shows that the majority (75%) indicated that it could be minimised while two (25%) respondents indicated that it is likely that it could be minimised.
Figure 13
Verification of Information Before Sharing
Figure 14
As to whether respondents verify or authenticate their information photos and videos before sharing, it was found that the majority (75%) do not always verify but only do so sometimes. Only 2 (25%) indicate that they consistently verify the information, photos and videos they share. Figure 14 provides these findings
Sharing of Misinformation
All the respondents (100%) have stated that they would not share information, videos or photos that are manipulated. This is a good indication that people are willing to deal positively with misinformation when they recognize it. The details can be seen in Figure 15.
Figure 15
PRACTICES OF INFORMATION DISORDER
Dealing with False Information
Figure 16
As can be seen in Figure 16, a large number of respondents (n=5, 62.5%) stated that they would ignore any information that they suspect not to be credible while the remaining 37.5% (n=3) stated that they would proceed to verify the authenticity of any information they suspect not to be credible.
Use of Tools and Techniques to Verify Photos and Videos
Figure 17 shows that half of the respondents (n=4, 50%) are neutral about their ability to use tools and techniques to verify the authenticity of information, photographs and videos, while 25% each of the respondents indicated that they would agree and disagree respectively that they will be able to use tools and techniques to verify the authenticity of videos and photos.
Figure 17
Action on False Information or Disinformation
Figure 18: Action on Disinformation
From Figure 18, seven out of the eight respondents (87.5%) stated that when they verify a suspicious information to be false, they would desist from sharing such information, while six respondents out of the eight (75%) stated that they would desist from sharing, but also alert their friends and those sharing the information that it was false. Three respondents (37.5%) say they would just alert their friends and people sharing the information that it is false while one respondent indicates that s/he would counter the misinformation with evidence that it is false.
Use of Social Media Tools to Report Misinformation
Figure 19
Over one third (n=3, 37.5%) of the respondents stated that they used social media tools on social network sites to report misinformation as shown in Figure 19. Another 37.5% stated that they do not use the social media tools to report misinformation while the remaining 25% (n=2) were not aware of any social media tools.
Following of Fact-Checking Pages on Social Networking Sites
Results from Figure 19 show that close to two thirds (62.5%) of the 8 respondents have indicated that in order to prevent dissemination of mis/disinformation, they follow fact-checking credible news sources on social media while 37.5% stated that they do no such thing.
Figure 20
CONCLUSION
The preliminary findings about the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices from respondents on Information Disorder show that people have knowledge about the phenomenon and generally have a positive attitude towards fighting it. Their practices have also shown that they are and will be willing to contribute to efforts aimed at eradicating or minimizing it. Considering the fact that the respondents are few, no major conclusions can be drawn from the findings so far.
The findings from the full study would bring to bear various dimensions such as how knowledge, attitudes and practices differ among genders and give a clearer understanding of the issues related to the phenomenon of Information Disorder.
REFERENCES
Ahmed Shehata & Metwaly Eldakar (2021): An Exploration of Egyptian Facebook Users’ Perceptions and Behavior of COVID-19 Misinformation, Science & Technology Libraries, DOI: 10.1080/0194262X.2021.1925203
Randolph H. Pherson, Penelope Mort Ranta & Casey Cannon (2021) Strategies for Combating the Scourge of Digital Disinformation, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 34:2, 316-341, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2020.1789425
Running a Research Fellowship Program with Dubawa on Misinformation/Disinformation and its influence on Voters’ Electoral Decision has been both interesting and revealing. In the course of the research, the literature review section unearthed that the spread of misinformation to gain votes, popularity, and acceptance is not peculiar to the Nigerian electoral process alone but a global phenomenon with each, a distinct narrative.
In fact, the World 2019 electoral integrity report revealed that the quality of media campaigns is challenged by the influx of misinformation and disinformation. Further, emphasizing that Information disorder is now growing into a global phenomenon. Revealingly, the document cited an intelligence report of how misinformation from Russia meddled with the 2016 US elections and how foreign influenced-misinformation also interfered with the Brexit referendum campaign in Europe.
While reviewing literature for this research, I read several articles online, international observation reports, and fact check copies on elections conducted in Israel, Korea, Singapore, Myanmar, Ecuador, Dutch, Iran, Iraq, America, Nigeria, and Taiwan. In all, these countries had experienced one form of electoral Dis/misinformation or incident.
DIS/MISINFORMATION: HIGHLIGHTING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Takashi Imamuna, the Washington DC General Manager of Marubeni Group Magazine, published in its January 2017 edition a shooting incident that occurred at a pizza shop on Sunday, December 4, 2016, in Northwest Washington DC. A month before the shooting incident, there were false tweets hashtag “#pizzagate” claiming that the pizza shop was a pedophile sex ring involving Democratic Presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s announcement to resume an investigation into the issue of the use of private e-mail by Hillary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State and the large volume of tweets that followed the announcement stating that newly discovered emails related to a pedophile sex ring linked to Mr. John Podesta, the head of the Clinton campaign, escalated the email controversy. And this culminated in the appearance of the 28-year-old man b
This story by Marubeni Group Magazine is one of the nineteen real events caused by fake news in the United States of America.
The 2020 US election was the subject of hundreds of false and misleading claims in the build-up to the 2020 election. Samantha et al observed that “Misinformation centered on mail-in-voting: the destruction and discarding of real ballots and the discovery of fake ones. Such misinformation typically took the form of misleading photos or de-contextualized video clips of crumpled mail allegedly found in dumpsters or abandoned trucks” (2021, p. 49).
Noteworthy of the American election experience is the process by which votes were cast in the 2020 election which was significantly influenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic, a situation also commented on by Samantha et al: “By September, nearly 200,000 Americans had already died from COVID-19. In order to prevent COVID-19 transmission at crowded polling places and to accommodate citizens who preferred not to come to the polls, a number of states opted to expand the qualifications for absentee ballots or to alter the vote-by-mail process. For example, dozens of states significantly increased the use of ballot drop boxes” (2021, p. 51).
Additional US misinformation cases
Dungan (2020) narrated how in early September, a salon worker in Glendale, California, found multiple bags of unopened mails in a dumpster and took video footage with her cell phone even though there was no evidence that any ballots were among the discarded mails. Samantha et al further remarked that: “Politically motivated actors began using the above techniques of falsely assigning intent, exaggerating impact, and strategic amplification to falsely frame this situation in such a way as to undermine trust in mail-in voting” (2021, p. 54).
In late September, another incident of discarded mail in Greenville, Wisconsin was used to sow doubt in mail-in voting. “However, as in Glendale, California, strategic partisan actors distorted the significance of this event, through selective amplification, exaggerating impact, and falsely assigning deliberate intent to purported Biden-supporting USPS workers” (Samantha et al., 2021, p. 56).
Also, on September 25, according to the same authors, it was tweeted that over 1,000 ballots had been discovered in a dumpster in Sonoma, California. The tweet further sowed distrust in mail-in voting citing: “Elijah Schaffer, a conservative influencer and verified Twitter user, allegedly received photos of the mail-dumping incident. He posted the photos on Twitter, and other influencers ensured its rapid spread across conservative social media” (2021, p. 57).
These experiences not only aroused controversies but also heated doubts and issues around the electoral process.
TAIWAN’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
In Taiwan, another part of the world, Wang acknowledged and commented about election-related misinformation, saying: “Misinformation was rampant during Taiwan’s 2018 elections to the extent that Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau issued a report before the election, highlighting unequivocal evidence that the Chinese government was leveraging online content farms to stoke division in Taiwanese society. The Bureau cited data collected by a task force monitoring the spread of fake news and found several stories aiming to exacerbate hysteria and division in Taiwan. These stories included overblown accounts of live-fire People’s Liberation Army drills in the Taiwan Strait; a claim that China intended to reclaim Taiwan by 2020; and an article falsely suggesting that Taiwan’s bananas were riddled with pesticides” (2018, p. 68).
The most influential misinformation news item before the Taiwan 2018 local election was President Tsai’s Rainstorm incident: “The false version of the news before the 2018 election claimed that President Tsai Ing-wen rode military armored vehicle to visit victims in a huge rainstorm in August, 2018 commanded the soldiers to be armored to protect her safety, stood smilingly on the vehicle and did not step into the water to visit the victims whereas the correct version of the news was that the military vehicle was not armed with any weapon, Tsai stepped into the water in rainboots to visit the victims, smiling to residents who waved to her” (Wang, 2018, p. 94).
Another prominent misinformation news before the 2018 election was the Kansai International Airport evacuation incident during Typhoon Jebi in October 2018, about which Wang said Kansai narrative claimed Taiwanese travelers who identified themselves as Chinese were allowed to get on the evacuation bus when China’s consulate in Osaka was evacuating Chinese citizens from the airport while Taiwan’s representative office in Osaka did not provide any help to Taiwan’s traveling citizens: “The truth was no evacuation buses were allowed to enter the airport pick-up area. The buses sent by the Chinese Consulate picked people up from Izumisano, which was 11.6 km from the airport.” (Wang, 2018, p. 94).
Wang further stressed other misinformation incidents like the Weeping Northern Floating Youth, a cabbage farmer named Wax Brother who knelt and wailed in front of Han Gao Yu in a rally, and Li Ronggui’s account of the Taiping Island incidents which proved that spread of misinformation in that part of the world is a phenomenon.
ISRAEL MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
On misinformation narratives in Israeli national election, Barel, O. (2021) wrote, “The fierce political competition, which requires politicians to sharpen their positions and slander their rivals, inflames passion and makes the political discourse between supporters and opponents particularly contentious.” (Barel, 2021, p. 49).
Israeli influential misinformation incident was the claim by right-wing Im Tirtzus’ organization that the oversight app used by election transparency observers is not functioning. This claim was debunked by the Israeli Central Election Working Committee. However, Landau in her article “How a Netanyahu-Likud is importing Trump’s ‘Stolen Election Campaign” revealed that Im Tirtzu has ties to the Likud Party.
SOUTH KOREA MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
In analyzing the South Korean 2017 Presidential Election experience, Seon–gyn Go of the Naseda University and Mi–ran Lee of the Global Research Network, in a research conducted for Asian Journal for Public Opinion (2020) wrote, “The writers of fake news during the Korean presidential Election often create and distribute fake news as a means to tie together people who are close.” Their research further revealed that Hong Joon-pyo, the candidate from Liberty Korea Party, lied the most among the presidential candidates because 31 of the 47 statements he made were rated false or almost false.
IRAQ’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
Aws al-Saadi, the founder of Tech 4Peace Collective, on France24 issued on 28/05/2021 at 04:30 GMT said, “Iraq has become a virtual battleground for fake news both in politics and between major international players vying for influence in the tinderbox country.” His statement was further confirmed to be true by UN envoy, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, who said, “Media outlets and social networks in Iraq were spreading misinformation and even conspiracy theories that create false but accepted perceptions about October 10th parliamentary votes.”
IRAN’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
Iran, a neighboring country of Iraq, had its fair share of electoral misinformation campaigns. Reality Check and BBC Monitoring (16 June) explained in its article, “Iran’s presidential election: Four claims fact-checked include” that Abdolnaser Hemmati, a former Central Bank governor and Mohsen Mehralizadeh a former vice president claimed that Mr. Raisi had added to the extensive list of blocked websites and social media apps and still targets more newspapers and journalists. But Mr. Raisi debunked the claims stating that no website or newspaper had been blocked or shut down since he became judiciary chief, in March 2019.
NIGERIA’S MISINFORMATION EXPERIENCE
The scramble for votes and acceptability by party presidential candidates in Nigeria’s 2019 election witnessed the use of online social platforms in a distorting way–campaigning without transparency, creating false impression of mass support. For instance, actors including those affiliated with the two major parties—Peoples Democratic Party and All Progressives Congress posted and distributed false information online which includes the use of paid advertising online to gain votes.
The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute in its Nigeria International Election Observation Report of June 2019 observed that social media profiles of legitimate Civil Society Organizations, observation groups, and media outlets were cloned or hacked and were used to spread misinformation to the public.
In her article “Analysis: How Nigerian politicians, supporters use fake news as campaign strategy” published as a headline news by premiumtimesng.com on February 10, 2019. Queen Esther Iroanusi highlighted the underlisted misinformation instances.
One influential misinformation incident she wrote about was a tweet before the 2019 election of a Campaign organization’s spokesman who tweeted a picture of a tree grown in a rail track to discredit past administrations. A fact check run later showed that the picture was from far away Middle East.
To further prove misinformation incidents in the pre-2019 presidential election in Nigeria, she cited the story of a Special Adviser to a state official in her bid to gain popularity and votes for her party, tweeting a picture of food packs with N500 notes attached to each of them before the election, claiming that the picture is from campaign rally of an opposition presidential candidate. When a check was run, it was discovered that the picture was a foundation philanthropic gesture to the less privileged in Lagos which had been online since February 2017.
Pictures were also manipulated to carry false impressions of international support in favour of political candidates. Queen Esther Iroanusi in her article also cited how the picture of US President Donald Trump was posted to suggest Trump’s endorsement of an opposition candidate for the Nigeria 2019 election. A check on the picture shows that it was fabricated. The original picture was first used on September 3, 2015, when Trump was campaigning as Republican Presidential Candidate for the US presidential elections.
Other misinformation tweets and publications were reports that the incumbent President was dead, and a clone was running his office; video clips accusing the opposition presidential candidate of brokering a deal with Boko Haram members in exchange for land and oil were also circulated and many other narratives.
References
Bandel, N. (2019) Israel Election Panel: Likud-linked NGO Spreading Fake News About Poll Oversight. Retrieved August 27, 2021 from https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-israel-election-panel-right-wing-ngo-spreading-fake-news-about-poll-oversight-1.9646318
Barel, O. (2021) Why Are Israeli Elections Extremely Sensitive to Fake News?
Bradner, E. (2016, October 28) Hillary Clinton’s email Controversy, Explained. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/03/politics/hillary-clinton-email-controversy-explained-2016/index.html
Comey, J. (2016, October28)Full Text: FBI Letter Announcing New Clinton Review. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-text-fbi-letter-announcing-new-clinton-review-230463
Dungan, K. (2020) California Mail Dumb in a Salon Parking Lot Caught on Surveillance Video. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://www.kiro7.com/news/trending/california-mail-dump-salon-parking-lot-caught-surveillance-video/GBASQBJ3UFHDRAIMKZZSHTJYZM/
European Commission. March 2018. Final report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation. Brussels: EC. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expertgroup-fake-news-and-online-disinformation
Imamaru, T. (2017, January). A Tweeted lie Triggers an Incident (2017, January). Retrieved August 2, 2021, from https://www.marubeni.com/en/research/potomac/backnumber/19.html
Iran’s Presidential Election: Four Claims Fact Checked (2021, June 16) https://www.bbc.com/news/57485108
Iroanusi, Q. E. “ANALYSIS: How Nigerian politicians, supporters use fake news as campaign strategy” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/311532-analysis-how-nigerian-politicians-supporters-use-fake-news-as-campaign-strategy.html
Mi-ran, (2020) & Seon-gyu, (2020) Analysis of Fake News in the 2017 Korean Presidential Election. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.koreanscience.or.kr/article/jako202022449681023.pdf
Misinformation Thrives in Iraq’s Virtual Battlegrounds (28/05/2021-04:30) Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210528-misinformation-thrives-in-iraq-s-virtual-battlegrounds
Reinl, J. (2021, August 25) Fake News Problematic as Iraqis Prepare for Major Vote. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2021/08/25/fake-news-problematic-as-iraqis-prepare-for-major-vote/
Samantha et al., (2021) The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election. Retrieved August 15, 2021, from https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf
Wang, T. (2018) Does Fake News Matter to Election Outcomes? Retrieved August 2, 2021, from https://www.ajpor.org/article/12985-does-fake-news-matter-to-election-outcomes-the-case-study-of-taiwan-s-2018-local-elections
With 48 million tweets from 5 million users in 10 days (October 5th to 14th, 2020), protesters flooded the digital public sphere with hashtag #EndSARS.
The incident that propelled the #EndSARS protests was the alleged killing of an unarmed Nigerian by the operatives of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in October, 2020. The call for the second wave of the protest started on social media with a claim through viral video of protesters converging on Lekki tollgate in Lagos State, the epicentre of the #EndSARS protests. This study, therefore, examines the veracity of claims made on #EndSARS protests as fact-checked by four fact-checking organisations in Nigeria, and tools used to verify the claims.
The scrutiny of fact checks on claims around #EndSARS protests in Nigeria, through content analysis of manifest contents (n=45) on the websites of four fact-checking organisations, revealed the extent of misinformation during and after the protests. Going by the analysis of the fact-check contents published by Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check, it confirms massive spread of misinformation during the protests in October, 2020.
The majority of the claims on #EndSARS fact-checked by Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check were rated ‘False’. This confirms the severity of misinformation on the #EndSARS protests. This indicated that the false claims on #EndSARS protests went viral (one of the factors that partly determines whether a claim would be fact-check is virality). It is however expected that the fact-checks to dispel them should also receive some levels of virality.
The fact-checking tools and procedures used by the fact-checking organisations to verify the claims on #EndSARS protests include: Cross Referencing, Reverse Image Search, InVID, TinEye and Google Chrome extension. Deploying these tools aided the fact-checking organisations to come up with verdicts on the claims.
Africa Check, Dubawa, and other fact-checking organisations in Nigeria need to do more by collaborating with stakeholders in public and private sectors to flatten the curve of misinformation and digital illiteracy in the country.
Dramatically, while fact checkers in Nigeria are preparing to address the challenge of dis- and misinformation following apprehensions over the second wave of Covid-19, pieces of disinformation on the second wave of #EndSARS protests are already going viral.
This was because a video shot during the October #EndSARS protests was depicted as a new one emanating from Lekki tollgate in December 2020 as heralding the second wave of the protests in Lagos State. The Police Public Relations Officers (PPRO) in Lagos and Ogun States had to issue statements with the PRO in Lagos State describing the video as “baseless and mischievous” and his counterpart in Ogun State threatening that the police will disrupt the new #EndSARS protests if staged in the state.
How valid are these narratives as promoted by the two sides? What are the digital and fact-checking tools deployed by fact checkers to verify claims on #EndSARS protests?
This study therefore examines the veracity of claims made on #EndSARS protests as fact-checked by four fact-checking organisations in Nigeria (Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check), and tools used to verify the claims.
Research Objectives
To find out the fact-checking tools used to verify the claims on #EndSARS protests published by Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check.
To find out the dominant verdict in the fact-checked claims on #EndSARS protests published by the selected fact-checking organisations.
Methodology
The methodology adopted is the same as contained in the first part of this study: “Analysis of Claims on #EndSARS Protest in Nigeria: Images most manipulated content, Twitter as major platform”. The second part of this study’s content analysed fact checks (n=45) published by four fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. It analysed the tools adopted by the organisations to verify claims on #EndSARS protests. In order to achieve this, the researcher read through the content of the fact checks to identify the tools and code them accordingly. It also analysed the verdicts/ratings of the claims on the protests published between 1st to 31st October, 2020 by the selected fact-checking organisations. The researcher had to read through the rating formats of Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check in order to understand how these organisations rate claims. This afforded the researcher to classify and code ratings of claims on #EndSARS protests by the fact checkers.
Findings
The data for this study was generated from the content analysis of claims on #EndSARS protests as published by fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. This part focused on the fact-checking tools and procedures adopted, as well as the verdicts on the claims fact-checked by the selected fact-checking organisations. The data were analysed quantitatively and supported by other secondary data. The findings of the analysis are presented below:
Fact-checking tools deployed to verify claims
The fact-checking organisations gave preference to cross referencing in verifying claims on #EndSARS protests. Cross referencing according to Raheemat Adeniran “entails cross-checking the claims with publicly available information.” These, in reference to fact-check contents analysed, include interviews, web/keywords searches, review and analysis of official social media handles/pages or documents, among others. This fact-checking procedure accounted for about 45% of tools adopted to fact-check claims on the #EndSARS protests. This supports the finding of the study conducted by Raheemat Adeniran which identified it as the most commonly reported fact-checking procedure.
Table 8: Distribution of Fact-Checking Tools used to verify claims on #EndSARS protest.
Fact-checking Tools
Africa Check
AFP
Dubawa
People’s Check
Cumulative
Reverse Image Search
4 (40%)
3 (60%)
8 (30%)
2 (22%)
17 (38%)
InVID
–
1 (20%)
5 (24%)
–
6 (13%)
Cross Referencing
5 (50%)
1 (20%)
7 (33%)
7 (78%)
20 (45%)
Google Chrome
1 (10%)
–
–
–
1 (2%)
TinEye
–
–
–
1 (5%)
1 (2%)
Total
10 (100%)
5 (100%)
21 (100%)
9 (100%)
45 (100%)
As a result of the fact that images were the most manipulated contents of the claims fact-checked as revealed by the first part of this study, Reverse Image Search as a fact-checking tool accounted for 38% (n=45) of tools used to verify claims on #EndSARS protests by fact-checking organisations. InVID used in verifying videos accounted for 13%. Other fact-checking tools used are TinEye and Google Chrome extension. While analysing the fact-checking tools used, it was observed that the fact-checking organisations used multiple tools to fact-check a claim aside the cross referencing. For instance, the use of InVID is also complemented with the Google Reverse Image Search to verify claims in the video on #EndSARS protests. This is always done after keyframe analysis of the videos.
The findings of this study indicated that fact checkers in the selected organisations are digitally savvy, going by the adoption of different tools to verify claims mostly made online on #EndSARS protests. They are skilled enough to be able to debunk the claims and expose the manipulation of contents by purveyors of disinformation. To what extent are other journalists equipped to carry out this verification exercise? Are the media literacy efforts of stakeholders, filling the gap to equip media audiences to verify claims, achieving target objectives? Raji Rasaki in a study examines how diffusion of innovation comes to play in instilling the culture of fact-checking by journalists and newsrooms in Nigeria. Africa Check and Dubawa who are pioneer fact-checking organisations in Nigeria need to do more by collaborating with stakeholders in public and private sector to flatten the curve of mis- and disinformation and digital illiteracy in the country.
‘False’ as most occuring verdict
‘False’ is the dominant verdict in the fact-check of claims on #EndSARS protests published by the selected fact-checking organisations. All the 10 verdicts of Africa Check of claims on #EndSARS protests came out ‘False’, while four out of five verdicts of AFP was ‘False’ with the other one rated as ‘Not Accurate’. Similarly, People’s Check has all its verdicts as ‘False’ except one tagged ‘False and Misleading. For Dubawa, out of the 21 verdicts, 14 came with the conclusion of ‘False’, five tagged as ‘misleading’ with one verdict as ‘Insufficient Evidence’. Two of the fact-checks were not classified with an explanation that the videos and pictures that depict that Buhari is dead were ‘doctored’ (Dubawa) and “Not Accurate” (AFP Hub). The finding of this study that identified ‘Fasle’ as the dominant verdict, is in line with the submission of experts that misinformation dominates the EndSARS protest in Nigeria.
Table 9: Ratings/Verdicts on Claims of Analysed Fact-Checks
Ratings/Verdicts
Africa Check
AFP
Dubawa
People’s Check
Cumulative
False
10 (100%)
4 (80%)
14 (67%)
8 (89%)
36 (80%)
True
–
–
–
–
–
Misleading
–
–
5 (23%)
–
5 (11%)
Insufficient Evidence
–
–
1 (5%)
–
1 (2%)
Multiple Verdicts
–
–
–
1 (11%)
1 (2%)
Unclassified
–
1 (20%)
1 (5%)
–
2 (5%)
Total
10 (100%)
5 (100%)
21 (100%)
9 (100%)
45 (100%)
The contents of the fact-checks published by Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check indicated that the false claims on #EndSARS protests went viral. However, it is expected that the fact checks to dispel them should also receive some level of virality. The study on Fact-Checking Ecosystem and another on Infodemics on Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria had raised this question. International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) in its October newsletter on the Knight fellowship programme in Nigeria had noted how a fact check in video format on #EndSARS protests posted by Dubawa on Facebook was viewed over 30,000 times. It was not clear whether fact-checks on #EndSARS protest published by the fact-checking organisations went viral just as the dis and misinformation on the subject matter.
Are there ethical issues with the use of bots to spread fact-check contents, given the technological sophistication in the spread of dis-misinformation and the challenges of information disorder? This has to be addressed by stakeholders as it was not clear whether those who spread dis-misinformation and those exposed to them had the opportunity of reading or viewing the fact checks on the claims. In order to win the information war, tech companies need to give fact check contents the virality it deserved. For instance, Twitter can support the fact-checking efforts by allowing a special emoji and hashtags for fact-check contents posted on its platform. Facebook should expand its collaborations with fact-checking organisations to allow their posts enjoy free sponsorship. Generally, social media platforms should allow the algorithms on their platforms to automate virality for fact-check contents produced especially by the organisations who are signatories to the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).
Conclusion
The scrutiny of fact checks on claims around #EndSARS protests in Nigeria, through content analysis of manifest contents (n=45) on the website of four fact-checking organisations, revealed the extent of dis/misinformation during and after the protests. Going by the analysis of the fact-check contents published by Africa Check, AFP Hub, Dubawa and People’s Check, it confirms massive spread of misinformation during the protest in October, 2020.
This indicated that the false claims on #EndSARS protests went viral (one of the factors that partly determine whether a claim would be fact-checked is virality). It is, however, expected that the fact-checks to dispel them should also receive some levels of virality. If Twitter can launch Emoji in support of #EndSARS protests, why not unveil a dedicated one for fact-check contents of fact-checking organisations?
The fact-checking tools and procedures used by the fact-checking organisations to verify the claims on #EndSARS protests include: Cross Referencing, Reverse Image Search, InVID, TinEye and Google Chrome extension. Deploying these tools aided the fact-checking organisations to come up with verdicts on the claims. Africa Check, Dubawa, and other fact-checking organisations in Nigeria need to do more by collaborating with stakeholders in the public and private sectors in order to flatten the curve of information and digital illiteracy in the country. Such collaboration will strengthen the culture of fact checking.
This research is conducted for the Dubawa Fellowship programme (2020), and is supported by the Heinrich Boll Stiftung Foundation, to amplify the culture of truth and contribute to literature around information disorder.
In the event of elections around the world in 2020 and challenges posed by political dis and misinformation, stakeholders have raised concerns about the implication of this period for the political process. Multiple approaches have been adopted by stakeholders to address these challenges in the digital public space that is seen as a catalyst to the spread of false information and political propaganda. Facebook is one of the tech companies that provide platforms for dissemination of political messages and has sustained collaboration with fact-checking organisations to flag and label contents on Facebook platforms as a way of bringing sanity to the digital public sphere. Following concerns raised by stakeholders about the negative use of Facebook by politicians on one hand, and of the need, on the other hand, to promote principles of “free marketplace of ideas,” Facebook has been changing its policy to satisfy the two opposing demands. This study therefore undertook an assessment of Facebook policy on fact-checking politicians and reflected on whether this policy has influence on the editorial contents of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria (Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP Hub) which are all signatories to the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).
The study reviewed the Facebook policies of fact-checking politicians in relation to literature on the same subject and reference to two of the five IFCN principles related to the policy. Assuming that it is the responsibility of the media to make the government accountable as enshrined in the constitution, the study sought to understand the influence of Facebook policy on fact-checking politicians onthe editorials of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria? One of the questions that arose from the assessment of Facebook policy is whether fact-checking claims of politicians and political ads amount to “censoring or stifling political discourse”? While reflecting on the above concerns of stakeholders, the study concluded that Facebook finds itself in an ethical dilemma. It also submitted that in view of the available evidence, the Facebook policy on fact-checking politicians has no noticeable influence on the editorial contents of the fact-checking organisations, despite Facebook funding of some fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. The two IFCN principles that serve as yardstick to reach this conclusion are: “Commitment to Non-partisanship and Fairness” and “Commitment to Transparency of Funding and Organisation.”
The study also observed and recommended as follows:
The changes in Facebook policy on fact-checking political claims and ads on its platform was an attempt to maintain a balance between entrenching free speech and bringing sanity to the digital public space often weaponised for political gains.
That the exceptions given to politicians and political ads in respect of fact-checking could be termed discriminatory, as similar opportunity is not available to other users of Facebook. Without prejudice to the ethical decision adopted by Facebook, it is instructive to have a general policy that will be binding on all users of Facebook, irrespective of their political, religious, economic, and social status.
There is also a need for international discourse on the challenges occasioned by the ethical dilemma of Facebook and information disorder in the world. The United Nations and IFCN have a role to play to provide the leadership for this engagement. The call for a UN charter on political disinformation and other variants of information pollution is not out of place. This Charter, if enacted, is expected to put to rest the debate over desirability for legal framework or voluntary intervention to address the challenge of dis and misinformation especially on the digital public space.
This is the time that Facebook and other tech companies need to invest more on Media, especially Information and Digital Literacy, to empower social media users to develop defence mechanisms against all forms of disinformation on their platforms.
In addition, the IFCN should sustain its efforts at ensuring that fact-checking organisations across the world are guided by its five code of principles in order to continue to sustain integrity in the fact-checking landscape.
There is a need to further investigate the severity of political dis and misinformation on the political process and measure the extent to which the interventions of the tech companies have reduced the negative effect of information disorder in the political system.
Further studies should also explore content analysis of political ads on Facebook and other social media platforms to understand the severity of political disinformation on these platforms.
Introduction
Freedom of expression is a founding principle for Facebook in its mission to give people opportunities to express themselves. This objective has been at the heart of everything we do. “We are champions of free speech and defend it in the face of attempts to restrict it. Censoring or stifling political discourse would be at odds with what we are about. That’s why I want to be really clear today – we do not submit speech by politicians to our independent fact-checkers, and we generally allow it on the platform even when it would otherwise breach our normal content rules.
It’s not new that politicians say nasty things about each other – that wasn’t invented by Facebook. What is new is that now they can reach people with far greater speed and at a far greater scale. That’s why we draw the line at any speech which can lead to real world violence and harm” (Clegg 2019).
The relationship between political and information power is as old as humanity. There have always been arguments that there can never be political power without influencing public opinion. There are also assertions that information power can have greater impact than political power. Or better still, there cannot be political power without tools to control the minds or influence the masses. The media have been identified as potent tools for achieving political power.
Former American President, Thomas Jefferson, considered the power of the media as more influential than political power:
… Since the basis of democracy was the opinion of the people, the very first objective was to keep it right. If it were left for me to decide whether we should have a government without the press or the press without the government, I should not hesitate a moment to choose the latter (Cited in Akinfeleye, 2005, p. 4).
In the same vein, Jim Morrison acknowledged the latent power of the media when he asserted: “Whoever controls the media, controls the mind.” And in reference to this, Abubakar (2015) further emphasised: “Little wonder why most influential people and institutions in the world cannot do without the media. In fact, it’s often believed that nobody or ideology can either fight the media or do without the media.” It is with the realisation of this that political leaders give greater preference to information management in their quest for political power. There has been extensive research by communication researchers on political propaganda. In fact, one of the factors that influenced the growth of mass media research, according to Esiri & Onwubere (n.d) is the extensive use of propaganda during the first World War.
This development made political players use propaganda as a tool to achieve their goal. This has therefore become part of the political process in the world. The advancement in technology has further fortified political information flow with different tactics and strategies for influencing public opinion. However, the avalanche of dis and misinformation especially in the digital public sphere has remained a source of concern to stakeholders in the information ecosystem. The more innovative technologies are developed, the more these digital tools are adopted and deployed to weaponise the information system to achieve specific agenda.
Political communication further received a boost with the advent of the internet, providing political players with access to a wide range of audiences. It became a veritable instrument to disseminate political information to an heterogeneous and dispersed audience. For example, the internet provides the platform through which politicians reach the electorate. It also offers an opportunity for the government to communicate with the masses. That is why Badmus, Okaiyeto & Mustapha (2020) asserted that the internet engendered pro-democracy potentials through platform accessibility, openness and freedom.
The popularity of using social media platforms during the electoral process is now being embraced in many countries of the world. Since 2016 when the adoption of these platforms during the US election received attention from politicians and researchers, the platforms have gained considerable acceptance around the world. Researchers have interrogated the extent of usage of these platforms during the political process. They have also raised questions of whether the engagement on the platforms influences elections’ results. All these are on the background of widespread adoption of the platforms.
In Nigeria, the government has repeatedly complained about the danger of information disorder to the country’s socio-political and economic stability, and thereafter muted the idea of regulations of social media by taking steps to criminalise the spread of dis and misinformation on the digital public sphere through enacting of laws. This includes a proposal in a bill before the National Assembly awarding the death sentence to anyone convicted of spreading disinformation on social media. The bill was short lived, following criticisms and allegations that the political class and players are heavy users of the social media platforms for the spread of disinformation, and that, therefore, any reform should start with the government which equates “hate speech” with “fake news.” This is also against the backdrop that politicians used political disinformation extensively during elections. The preliminary report of CDD on the 2020 Edo State Governorship election in Nigeria provides evidence of use of political disinformation by political parties and their candidates during the electoral process (CDD, 2020). The avalanche of dis and misinformation during the #EndSARS protest has further given voice to advocates of regulation of social media. The Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Muhammed, recently reiterated the need for the National Assembly to revive the proposed social media regulations (Baiyewu, 2020).
Tech companies especially Google, Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter are seen as wielding political power and influence owing to the enormous power of these platforms in reaching the desired political audience. From the alleged Russia influence in the 2016 United States’ presidential election to the controversy surrounding Cambridge Analytica, tech companies featured prominently in arguments concerning contribution of tech companies to the process of election manipulation.
There have been continuous accusations that the social media platforms weaponised political dis and misinformation by giving platforms to purveyors of disinformation to spread their messages. This has led to advocacy for reforms including legal and voluntary measures to address this challenge. As pressure is mounted on tech companies to be socially responsible, some of them came up with strategies to discourage and reduce the spread of dis and misinformation on their platforms. For example, WhatsApp configured its messaging platform to indicate “forwarded” messages and limited forwarding to five. Twitter also developed Algorithm to flag manipulated pictures and videos. Also, governments of countries in the world have adopted different approaches to regulate social media including banning, filtering contents, criminalising spread of dis and misinformation on the internet among others.
One of the approaches adopted by Facebook is the collaboration with fact-checking organisations around the world to check the spread of dis and misinformation. This includes claims by Politically Exposed Persons made on the platform of this tech company. Facebook got into partnership with fact-checking organisations to prevent the use of its platform for the spread of false information. However, the tech company in 2019, amended its fact-checking principes by excluding statements or claims of politicians as part of what can be fact-checked on its platform. Also in September, 2020, Facebook also updates its Terms of Service to remove and restrict access to users’ content.
In Nigeria, Facebook has partnered with Africa Check, Dubawa, and AFP to flag misinformation on its platform. What is the implication of the new Facebook policy framework on the editorials of these fact-checking organisations in Nigeria?
Overview of Fact-Checking on Facebook
In its bid to fight the spread of misinformation on Facebook, the tech company works with independent, third-party fact-checking organizations who are certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) to review and assess their contents. The focus of this fact-checking program is to identify and address viral misinformation, particularly clear hoaxes that have no basis in fact. Fact-checking partners prioritize provably false claims, especially those that are timely or trending and important to the average person (Facebook, 2020a).
How the program works
The Facebook programme includes several key steps (Facebook, 2020a):
Identifying false news: We identify potential misinformation using signals, like feedback from people on Facebook, and surface the content to fact-checkers. Fact-checkers may also identify content to review on their own.
Reviewing content: Fact-checkers will review content, check its facts, and rate its accuracy. This happens independently of Facebook, and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating videos and images, and more.
Clearly labeling misinformation and informing users about it: We apply a label to content that’s been reviewed by fact-checking partners, so people can read additional context. We also notify people before they try to share this content, and people who have shared it in the past.
Ensuring that fewer people see misinformation: Once a fact-checker rates a piece of content as False, Altered or Partly False, it will appear lower in News Feed, be filtered out of Explore on Instagram, and be featured less prominently in Feed and Stories. This significantly reduces the number of people who see it. We also reject ads with content that has been rated by fact-checkers.
Taking action against repeat offenders: Pages and websites that repeatedly share misinformation rated False or Altered will have some restrictions, including having their distribution reduced. They may also have their ability to monetize and advertise removed, and their ability to register as a news Page removed for a given time period.
Why Facebook Collaborates with Fact-checking organisations
As a response to allegations that Facebook is encouraging purveyors of disinformation to spread their messages through its platform, the tech company announced partnership with fact-checking organisations in the world to flag dis and misinformation on its platforms as a way of addressing challenges of information disorder. Facebook said its “global fact-checking program is a key piece of our strategy to reduce the spread of misinformation on Facebook, and we now have more than 50 partners fact-checking in over 40 languages around the world” (Goldshlager 2020).
The collaboration includes fact-checking claims made by public officials including politicians. With the partnership, Facebook users and fact-checkers are equipped with tools to identify potential messages on the platform that are false or manipulated – text, pictures, audio or video. The collaboration enables fact checkers to flag disinformation and Facebook either remove the contents or limit the extent of its spread. This details of this is contained in its post tiled: “Facebook’s Approach to Misinformation: Partnering with Third-Party Fact-Checkers,” (Facebook, 2020b)
How does Facebook select its fact-checking partners?
Facebook’s independent third-party fact-checkers are all certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). The IFCN, a subsidiary of the journalism research organization Poynter Institute, is dedicated to bringing together fact-checkers worldwide (Facebook, 2020b).
Facebook identified countries in which it collaborated with third-party fact-checking organisations. According to the map as contained on the Facebook website, Nigeria is one of the countries identified, with Africa Check, AFP Hub and Dubawa as fact-checking organisations mapped to review and rate the accuracy of contents on Facebook. The tech company explained that the fact-checking programme or approach to integrity on Facebook, “is one part of the three-part approach we take to addressing problematic content across the Facebook family of apps.” (Facebook, 2020c).
As a way of addressing the problematic content on its platform, Facebook had on 11th August, 2020 announced “two new ratings to provide our fact-checking partners with more latitude to better reflect their research, and to help ensure that people who come across these posts have more precise information to judge what to read, trust, and share.” According to Goldshlager & Berman (2020) the first rating, called “Altered,” is designed specifically for videos and images that have been manipulated in ways that could mislead people. The second rating, called “Missing Context,” is designed for content that may mislead without additional context. Facebook further explains that it will apply the strongest warning labels to content rated either “False” or “Altered” as itmakes up the worst of the worst kind of misinformation. It added it will reduce the distribution of content rated “Partly False” because it includes some factual inaccuracies.
Prelude to the Policy of fact-checking politicians
Studies have been conducted with findings that technological advancement such as the internet and social media overtly or covertly empowered the purveyors of dis/misinformation. Ogbuoshi, Oyeleke & Folorunsho (2019, p. 67) subscribed to this view when they submitted that “fake news is currently trending as a result of the liberty and luxuries of technological inventions.” Technological tools and platforms such as social media according to Wardle (2019 p. 6) have become potent instruments in the hands of purveyors of disinformation.
Ibraheem & Garba 2019; Ogbuoshi, Oyeleke & Folorunsho 2019; ACSPN, 2018 had interrogated the issues related to political processes with emphasis on the extent to which hate campaigns fuelled by dis/misinformation are used during electoral process in Nigeria.
For instance, Ogbuoshi, Oyeleke & Folorunsho (2019, p. 47) explained the extent to which this phenomenon has eaten deep in the fabric of Nigeria and its implication to the corporate existence of the country:
Today, the Nigerian polity is so heated up that from all political divides. There has been a resort to hate campaigns and speeches. There are no arguments as to how politicians have resorted to divisive comments, insinuations and innuendoes. Not only has these hate speeches pitched the North against the South, but individual hatred has attained an all-time height in Nigeria.
Newman (2019) predicted that “spread of false, misleading and extreme content will continue to undermine democracies around the world with polarising elections in India, Indonesia and Europe likely flashpoints.” While announcing new ratings for fact-checking partners on 11th August, 2020, Facebook observed that the challenges of COVID-19 and elections around the world, made it “realize how important it is for people to understand what they’re seeing when they’re using our services and then judge its worth.” (Goldshlager & Berman 2020).
In response to this, tech companies such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter are collaborating with Fact-Checking organisations to spell out policies to combat dis/misinformation on their platforms (Ochelle 2018, News Agency of Nigeria 2019, Stencel 2019).
Facebook has come out to deny political interference in the politics of nations across the world, following the controversies generated from its relationship with Cambridge Analytica and alleged Russia influence in the US elections. Nick Clegg, the vice president of Facebook, in 2019 said “the company had ‘made mistakes in 2016’ adding that Russia had attempted to use “Facebook to interfere with the US presidential election.” He however noted that the company had taken steps to prevent it happening again (BBC, 2019).
As a way of further enhancing the integrity of its platform, Facebook developed tools to assist fact-checkers and other stakeholders to aid verification of contents on its platform. For example, it developed “CrowdTangle”, a public insights tool that makes it easy to follow, analyze, and report on what’s happening across social media. Facebook acquired CrowdTangle in November, 2016, made the tool free, and expanded access from 300 media partners to more than 10,000. Starting in 2019, CrowdTangle added research, academic and fact-checking partners, and built tools to help these partners study how public content spreads across Facebook and Instagram (Miles, 2020).
Similarly, Facebook has also taken other measures to address challenges posed by dis and misinformation on its platforms. These include: cracking down on fake accounts – the main source of fake news and malicious content; bringing in independent fact-checkers to verify content; recruiting an army of people – now about 30,000 – and investing hugely in artificial intelligence systems to take down harmful content. The vice president of Facebook’s global affairs and communications, Nick Clegg, said the efforts are bringing results as a Stanford report found that interactions with fake news on Facebook was down by two-thirds since 2016. He added that the company launched an initiative called the Deepfake Detection Challenge to work in the Partnership with AI companies to find ways to detect new forms of manipulated content (video) and take necessary action on them:
Crucially, we have also tightened our rules on political ads….People who want to run these ads now need to submit ID and information about their organization. We label the ads and let you know who’s paid for them. And we put these ads in a library for seven years so that anyone can see them (Clegg 2019).
Meanwhile as fact-checkers spring to action debunking claims made on Facebook throughout the world especially during political processes, such as elections, politicians and other public officials are put on the spotlights. The aftermath of this is the fighting back of the politicians by accusing the platform and fact-checkers of partisanship. Some countries also threatened to ban social media platforms after some of the claims of public officials were fact-checked. Tech companies came under pressure from politicians as the fact-checking activities suffocate and reduce the influence of political disinformation. For instance, President Donald Trump has proposed regulation to social media platforms in the US following flagging of some of his social media posts. The US Justice Department had on 23 September, 2020 “unveiled a legislative proposal that seeks to reform a legal immunity for internet companies. This follows President Trump’s bid earlier this year to crack down on technology giants providing internet and social media platforms.” (Odih, 2020)
In addition, critics have petitioned the International Fact Checking Network (IFCN) with allegations of bias against fact-checking organisations. For instance, IFCN in a statement on 11th September, 2019 announced that “one of its verified signatories is being accused of violating IFCN’s Code of Principles on its first commitment to non-partisanship in one of the fact-checks it has published.” In Nigeria, for instance, a fact checker with Africa Check reported that he came under accusation from politically exposed persons in the country with allegations that he tagged politicians and public officials liars by fact-checking their claims (Folarin, 2020).
Social Media Reform, Control & the Zig-Zag Perception of “Fake News”
Resulting from the above, some countries have responded to the fact-checking efforts by initiating policies to frustrate the activities of fact-checkers. Folarin (2020) in a study identified political interference as one of the challenges confronting media organisations on the frontline of combating information disorder in Nigeria. Apart from reports of allegations submitted to IFCN, political office holders have also called out media organisations who debunk their claims.
In Nigeria, the government has been criticised for coming up with proposed laws tagged “Anti Social Media Bill” by civil society organisations, to regulate the social media in the country. Observers have also shown concerns about the mixture of “Hate Speeches” and “Fake News” as a way of combating information disorder by the government. David Ajikobi, the Editor of Africa Check, believes that putting “Fake News” in the same bracket with “Hate Speech” will be counter productive. Mr Dapo Olorunyomi, the founder of Premium Times, had identified the wrong label and perceptions of variance in the information disorder as a challenge to addressing the problem. Olorunyomi who is an editorial member of IFCN, termed this phenomenon “zig-zag” approach to addressing the challenge of information disorder. He observed that the power of Algorithm has a lot of influence on information management. He also expressed worry that the government makes mistakes by saying that the issue of misinformation is a media industry issue requiring efforts by journalists to advance regulations and policies to address. He added that issues around “Colonisation of Algorithm” could be resolved through “Accountability of the Algorithm”(Olorunyomi, 2020).
Daily Tracker (2020) reported that the Federal Government of Nigeria proposed to spend 336 billion Naira for special enlightenment campaign on government policies and programmes; testimonial series to gauge the impact of government policies on the citizenry and to tackle hate speech and fake news amid criticisms from rights groups that it is a ruse to stifle free speech.
In July 2018, the Federal Government launched a national campaign against “fake news”, with the Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed saying: “The biggest challenge facing Nigeria today is fake news and misinformation. Based on that, we dedicated an entire National Council on Information’s meeting to that issue,” (Baiyewu, 2020). And recently, following challenges of dis and misinformation on social media platforms during the #EndSARS Protest in October 2020 with allegations that the mainstream and online media are not immune from the spread of manipulated contents, the National Broadcasting Commission imposed millions of Naira sanctions on some traditional media for alleged infractions to the NBC codes (Premium Times, 2020).
The above statement of problem summarises political interference in the fact-checking ecosystem and the extension of this is already evident in conduct of tech companies.
Place of Accountability Journalism & Fact-Checking in the Face of Facebook Policy
“The code of principles of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) at Poynter is a series of commitment organizations abide by to promote excellence in fact-checking. We believe nonpartisan and transparent fact-checking can be a powerful instrument of accountability journalism” (IFCN, 2020a).
According to IFCN’s code of principles, the activities of fact-checking organisations around the world is not only to verify the claims of public officials and institutions but also to make them accountable to the masses. If this is the case, then, will the policy of Facebook frustrate this effort in Nigeria’s fact-checking ecosystem? Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) gives the media institution the constitutional responsibility to make the government accountable to the people. Olorunyomi (2020) referred to “accountability media” as including the duty of the media to hold the government accountable at all times.” He submitted that at the heart of the accountability matrix is the investigative principle, adding that the three critical questions to consider while envisioning accountability journalism are:how are contents produced?, how are they distributed?, and how is the media financed?
Assuming it is the responsibility of the media to make the government accountable as enshrined in the constitution, what influence will the Facebook policy on fact-checking politicians have onthe editorials of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria?
Reflection on IFCN Principles with Facebook Policy of Fact-Checking Politicians
Poynter set up the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) to bring fact-checking organisations across the world together under a platform as a way of promoting professionalism and in a bid to achieve the objectives of setting up these organisations.
Fact checking organisations around the world are encouraged to be signatory to the IFCN code of principles and they are expected to be committed to the principles. It expected the organisations to “regularly publish non-partisan reports on the accuracy of statements by public figures and prominent institutions and other widely circulated claims related to public interest issues.” The five principles the signatory organizations are expected to be committed to are: A commitment to Non-partisanship and Fairness, A commitment to Standards and Transparency of Sources, A commitment to Transparency of Funding and Organisation, A commitment to Standards and Transparency of Methodology, and A commitment to Open and Honest Corrections Policy (IFCN, 2020b).
Political Factor & Need for Sanity on Platforms Influence Setting IFCN Code
The IFCN website documented circumstances that led to developing guidelines for the operations of fact checking organisations in the world. First, it was a response to an attempt by “political campaigns and partisan groups” to determine the yardstick to “distinguish reliable fact-checking”. The second factor was the resolve of the technological companies to bring sanity to digital public space through their platforms. This was a response to the allegation that the companies encourage and provide the platform for the spread of dis and misinformation (IFCN, 2020). This was well noted under the heading: “The code and the platforms” on the IFCN website and is presented below (IFCN, 2020c):
In the months before the US presidential election in 2016, fact-checkers from around the world began to discuss the need to adopt a code of principles. It was during the third global fact-checking summit, held in Buenos Aires in November 2016, that such idea emerged for the first time. The objective was to come with a set of guidelines that could help distinguish reliable fact-checking at a time when political campaigns and partisan groups tried to claim the term.
On November 12, 2016, Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, wrote in a post that it was “extremely unlikely hoaxes changed the outcome” of the election “in one direction or the other.” 20 fact-checkers from around the world responded with an open letter suggesting that Zuckerberg start a conversation that could “underpin a more accurate news ecosystem on its news feed.” Soon after Zuckerberg’s letter, technology companies launched their own efforts and projects to fight misinformation, and a year after that exchange, representatives from the main social media platforms testified in the American Senate after the possibility that viral misinformation had an actual influence in the presidential election.
Facebook will not fact-check politicians
In its September 25, 2019 news on its website, BBC reported Facebook’s announcement that politicians would be exempted from its fact-checking scheme which is designed to reduce the spread of fake news and misinformation.” The tech company said “it will treat all posts by politicians as ‘newsworthy content’ that should ‘be seen and heard’, (as)it did not want to be the ‘referee’ in political debates or prevent politicians’ posts from reaching their intended audience (BBC, 2019).
Speaking at the Atlantic Festival in Washington DC in 2019, Facebook’s vice president of global affairs and communications, Nick Clegg, “set out the measures that Facebook is taking to prevent outside interference in elections and Facebook’s attitude towards political speech on the platform.” (Clegg 2019). The Facebook VP explains the policy:
Now, elections. It is no secret that Facebook made mistakes in 2016, and that Russia tried to use Facebook to interfere with the election by spreading division and misinformation. But we’ve learned the lessons of 2016. Facebook has spent the three years since building its defenses to stop that happening again. We have had this policy on the books for over a year now, posted publicly on our site under our eligibility guidelines. This means that we will not send organic content or ads from politicians to our third-party fact-checking partners for review. However, when a politician shares previously debunked content including links, videos and photos, we plan to demote that content, display related information from fact-checkers, and reject its inclusion in advertisements.
“Today, I announced that from now on we will treat speech from politicians as newsworthy content that should, as a general rule, be seen and heard.”, Nick Clegg further declared that “Facebook would let politicians post content that breaks its rules on topics such as hate speech, as long as they did not pose a significant “risk of harm”.
He, however, outlines exceptions to the policy: “Broadly speaking they are two-fold: where speech endangers people; and where we take money, which is why we have more stringent rules on advertising than we do for ordinary speech and rhetoric.”
One of the questions arising from the assessment of Facebook policy is whether fact-checking claims of politicians amount to “censoring or stifling political discourse and how would fact-checking organisations make public officials accountable if claims made by politicians on Facebook could not be fact-checked especially when it geared towards spreading disinformation?
This is how the VP of Facebook responded to these concerns:
I know some people will say we should go further. That we are wrong to allow politicians to use our platform to say nasty things or make false claims. But imagine the reverse. Would it be acceptable to society at large to have a private company in effect become a self-appointed referee for everything that politicians say? I don’t believe it would be. In open democracies, voters rightly believe that, as a general rule, they should be able to judge what politicians say themselves (Clegg 2019).
While making clarifications on the eligibility of content to be fact-checked on its platform, Facebook maintained that opinion is “generally not eligible for fact-checking because we don’t want to interfere with individual expression.” It further explained that the only exception is that op-ed and editorial may be fact-checked if the “content is presented as opinion but is based on underlying false information – even if it’s an op-eds or editorials – it’s still eligible to be fact-checked.” arguing that “presenting something as opinion isn’t meant to give a free pass to content that spreads false information.” (Goldshlager & Berman 2020) .
Relating this approach to the policy of Facebook on fact-checking politicians, Poynter quoted Summer Chen, editor-in-chief of Taiwan Fact-Check Center, saying: “My understanding (until today) was that we could not fact-check politicians’ opinions even if they brought false information. We surely would have liked to have flagged some.” Poynter however was quick to add in its report that a “spokesperson for Facebook clarified that statements from politicians are still exempt from the third-party fact-checking program.” (Tardáguila & Mantas, 2020).
In Nigeria, when Adedeji Adekunle of Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism was asked about this issue, he responded on Twitter thus: “I believe as long as factual assertions are being made, they can be checked. We don’t fact-check ‘statements of mere opinion without factual basis’ that doesn’t mean opinion pieces or columns. They shouldn’t use their platforms to misinform.”
Despite the policy of Facebook not to fact-check political ads and statements of politicians posted on its platform, Timberg & Ba Tran (2020) reported in the Washington Post that fact-checkers who are involved in Facebook’s third-party fact-checking programme ruled that “claims in Trump ads are false” but such findings or label related to it was not reflected on Facebook (Timberg & Ba Tran 2020).
In response to this policy, fact checkers offered suggestions on how Facebook can handle potential misinformation ahead of the 2020 US elections in November. Mantas (2020) in a news story posted on Poynter articulates the views of stakeholders who support the Facebook policy of labelling political ads and those with reservations.
Facebook later made changes to the policy by emphasising the exceptions it earlier placed on its decision not to fact-check claims made by politicians and political ads. The CEO of Facebook in a post on 3rd September, 2020 said that the tech company would start labelling “content that seeks to delegitimize the outcome of the election or discuss the legitimacy of voting methods,” as he expressed worry that “with our nation so divided and election results potentially taking days or even weeks to be finalized, there could be an increased risk of civil unrest across the country.”
“Today, we’re announcing additional steps we’re taking at Facebook to encourage voting, connect people with authoritative information, and fight misinformation.”, Zuckerberg declared.
Some of the steps announced by the CEO of Facebook to combat misinformation before, during and after electoral processes are: Blocking new political ads during the final week of the campaign; Working with election officials to remove misinformation about voting; Limiting forwarding on Messenger to reduce the risk of misinformation and harmful content going viral; Partnering with Reuters and the National Election Pool to provide authoritative information about election results; and Attaching an informational label to content that seeks to delegitimize the outcome of the election or discuss the legitimacy of voting methods.
Zuckerberg concluded by promising not to “make further changes to our election-related policies between now and the official declaration of the result,” as a way of ensuring that there are “clear and consistent rules.”
The Week Magazine’s report stated that Facebook had decided to effect changes in its policy on political ads when the tech company’s “stock dropped more than eight percent, erasing roughly $50 billion from its market valuation, after Unilever, the European company behind brands such as Ben&Jerry’s and Dove, announced it would boycott Facebook ads through the end of the year over the amount of hate speech and divisive rhetoric on its platform.” (The Week, 2020).
Reflecting on the complexity of Facebook policies on fact-checking politicians, the age-long debate about ethics in journalism comes to mind. First, Facebook finds itself in an ethical dilemma of whether to encourage freedom of expression by allowing politicians to have the freedom to express themselves on Facebook or prevent the platform from being used for spreading dis and misinformation. That is, Facebook wishes not to censor politicians and at the same time wants to bring sanity to its platform for providing a platform for purveyors of political disinformation. The second issue raised by this development is whether to protect the Facebook community from being exposed to information pollution or allow questionable contents to pass with the belief that the users are capable of differentiating between facts and fictions.
That is why Oso, Olatunji, Odunlami & Adesina (2020) observed: “Interrogating the concepts of media freedom and governance in the context of a digital space may not be as simple as it seems, especially when one considers the inconclusivesivess of the variables for conceptualizing and measuring media or press freedom.” Many interventions to resolve related ethical issues have both advantages and disadvantages. Should Facebook tilt towards the Teleological approach (consequential – the end justifies the means) or deontological principles (non-consequential – let justice be done though the heavens fall) in addressing the ethical dilemma? Will public interest be the yardstick to determine the correctness of fact-checking politicians or should it adopt a relativists approach?
Facebook Policy & compliance to IFCN Principles by Fact-Checking Organisations in Nigeria
IFCN sets five guiding principles for the operations of fact-checking organisations in the world. As of October 2020, there are 106 Fact-checking organisations who are signatories to the IFCN code of principles. 83 are active, 13 are under renewal while there are 16 expired signatories. (IFCN, 2020d). Out of about seven fact-checking organisations in Nigeria, only three (Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP) are signatories to the IFCN code of principles.
The two IFCN principles that are directly related to the issue are:
A commitment to Non-Partisanship and Fairness – Signatory organizations fact-check claims using the same standard for every fact check. They do not concentrate their fact-checking on any one-side. They follow the same process for every fact check and let the evidence dictate the conclusions. Signatories do not advocate or take policy positions on the issues they fact-check.
A commitment to Transparency of Funding and Organisation – Signatory organizations are transparent about their funding sources. If they accept funding from other organizations, they ensure that funders have no influence over the conclusions the fact-checkers reach in their reports. Signatory organizations detail the professional background of all key figures in the organization and explain the organizational structure and legal status. Signatories clearly indicate a way for readers to communicate with them.
How are the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria faring in respect to these principles in relation to the background that Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP are signatories to the IFCN code of principles and at the same time entered into collaboration with Facebook? By IFCN’s standard, these organisations adhere to these principles and this may be why they remain members. Formal report has not been recorded for the violation of the principle of Non-partisanship and Fairness. For instance, Dubawa is explicit in its “Independence Policy” that states:
While Dubawa acknowledges the right of every individual to contest for an elective position as well as support any candidate of their choice running for an elective position, it is our opinion that the independence of the platform may be called to question if team members are partisan. To this end, any team member who wants to contest elections or support/sponsor a candidate in any form either by active campaigning or donating to a campaign fund; shall resign his/her position on the team.
Concerning the second principle regarding fact-checking organisations’ commitment to ensure “Transparency of Funding and Organisations,” Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP declare on their websites that they have partnership with Facebook and that their funders do not have influence on their editorial contents. For instance, Africa Check stated this in clear terms under its “principles”:
We are transparent about our funding sources. If we accept funding from other organisations, we ensure that funders have no influence over the conclusions we reach in our reports. We detail the professional background of all key figures in our organisation and explain our organisational structure and legal status. We clearly indicate a way for readers to communicate with us.
With the above assessment, will it then be correct to submit that fact-checking organisations are not influenced by their funders on the type of contents they fact-check? In view of the above evidence, there is no noticeable influence of Facebook policy of fact-checking politicians on the editorials of fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. Due to limitations in the methodology adopted to arrive at this conclusion, there is a need for more elaborate research to provide additional empirical data and evidence to support this finding or reject the hypothesis. Adeniran (2020) has raised the question whether donor funding may have some influence on the fact-checking process.
Conclusion
This study assessed Facebook policy of fact-checking politicians in Nigeria and reflected on whether this policy affects the editorial independence of fact-checking organisations, such as Africa Check, Dubawa and AFP Hub in Nigeria. The overview of the policy viz-a-viz the debate for and against it generated a series of questions and concerns.
One of the questions that arose from the assessment of Facebook policy is whether fact-checking claims of politicians and political ads amount to “censoring or stifling political discourse”? The study concluded that Facebook finds itself in an ethical dilemma. It also submitted that in view of the available evidence, Facebook’s policy on fact-checking politicians has no noticeable influence on the editorial contents of the fact-checking organisations, despite Facebook’s funding of some the fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. The two IFCN principles that serve as yardstick to reach this conclusion are: “A commitment to Non-partisanship and Fairness” and “A commitment to Transparency of Funding and Organisation”.
The changes in Facebook policy on fact-checking political claims and ads on its platform reflect an attempt to maintain a balance between entrenching free speech and bringing sanity to the digital public space weaponised for political and related wars.
Meanwhile, the exceptions given to politicians and political ads in respect of fact-checking could be termed discriminatory, as similar opportunity is not available to other users of Facebook. That is, if the contents of general users of Facebook could be fact-checked, why the exemption to politicians? If there are assertions that political disinformation breed other forms of dis- and misinformation, why should purveyors of such be accorded immunity? Without prejudice to the ethical decision adopted by Facebook, it is instructive to have a general policy that is binding on all users of Facebook irrespective of their political, religious, economic, and social orientations.
The study also recognizes the need for international perspectives on the challenges created by the ethical dilemma of Facebook and information disorder in the world. For example, there should be a role for the United Nations and IFCN in providing appropriate leadership for this engagement. The call for a UN Charter on political disinformation and other variants of information pollution is not out of place. In view of this, the recommendation of Dr Kola Adesina of Crescent University calling on the UN to draft a Charter may be ripe for consideration, as suggested by Edema (2020) to “address the anti-social potentials of social media across the world while protecting individual’s rights to freedom of expression.” One of the key points that should be sacrosanct in the Charter is to allow signatories to IFCN code of principles to determine what is termed dis-misinformation and other labels in the information disorder. This is because related terms have come under heavy abuse by political actors and other interests. This Charter, if enacted, is expected to put to rest the debate over desirability for legal framework or voluntary approach at addressing the challenge of dis and misinformation in the digital public space.
Many stakeholders seem to be favourably disposed to the voluntary approach as attempts by governments in different countries to regulate the social media have not been able to address the problem of information disorder. This is the time that Facebook and other tech companies need to invest more resources in Information and Digital Literacy to empower social media users to develop defence mechanisms against all forms of disinformation on their platforms.
In addition, the IFCN should sustain its efforts at ensuring that fact-checking organisations across the world are guided by its five code of principles in order to continue entrenching integrity in the fact-checking landscape.
On the basis of the above, there is a need to further investigate the severity of political dis and misinformation on the political process and measure the extent to which the intervention of tech companies on reducing negative effects of information disorder in the political system. The hypothesis raised here is that political dis and misinformation is at the top of all other variables when it comes to severity of information disorder. To understand the severity of political disinformation on these platforms, there is a need for further studies to explore content analysis of political ads on Facebook and other social media platforms.
This research is conducted for the Dubawa Fellowship programme (2020), and is supported by the Heinrich Boll Stiftung Foundation, to amplify the culture of truth and contribute to literature around information disorder.
References
Abubakar R. (2015). Muslims and the Threats of the Media. Lagos; Salsabil Associates
ACSPN (2018). Understanding Nigerian Media and Elections through Research: Analysis of the 2015 Presidential Election Campaign Messages, Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria; Canada University Press, Concord, Ontario, Canada.
Akinfeleye, R. (2005). Journalistic Integrity in Political and Economic Reporting, Paper Presented at the Nigerian Press Council National Workshop on Reporting Politics and the Economy, Ajah-Epe, Lagos, Nigeria
Badmus I. R., Okaiyeto S. A. & Mustapha L. K.(2020). Maximising the Potentials of Online Civic Forums for E-Governance in Nigeria. In Oso L., Olatunji W. O., Odunlami D. & Adesina K (Eds.). Media Freedom, National Interest and Good Governance. Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) Book Series 5. Canada University Press, Canada.
Ibraheem I. A. & Garba K. A. (2019). Undermining the Freedom of Expression: the case of Fake News in Nigeria. In Owens-Ibie N., Oji M. & Ogwezi J (Eds.). Fake News and Hate Speech: Narratives of Political Instability. Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) Book Series 4. Canada University Press, Canada.
Ogbuoshi L. I., Oyeleke A. S. & Folorunsho O. M. (2019). Opinion Leaders Perspectives on Hate Speech, and Fake News Reportingand Nigeria’s Political Stability. In Owens-Ibie N, Oji M. & Ogwezi J. (Eds.). Fake News and Hate Speech: Narratives of Political Instability. Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) Book Series 4. Canada University Press, Canada.
Olorunyomi D. (2020). Flattening the Misinformation Curve in the Digital Age. Comments at the 7th Annual and 1st Virtual Conference of the Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) ON Communicating Identities and Nationhood: Promoting Inclusive Democracy through Access to Information and Knowledge Societies, from September 2-3, 2020
Oso L, Olatunji R., Odunlami D. & Adesina K. (2020). Overview of Media Freedom and Governance in the Digital Age. In Oso L., Olatunji W. O., Odunlami D. & Adesina K (Eds.). Media Freedom, National Interest and Good Governance. Association of Communication Scholars & Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN) Book Series 5. Canada University Press, Canada.
Concerns have been raised over the capacity of fact-checkers to contain a barrage of fake contents going viral on a daily basis. In a bid to live up to their billings, independent fact-checkers have partnered with various stakeholders in the information disorder ecosystem. One of these is the newsrooms.
The aim of this partnership is to amplify the culture of truth and accountability in public discourse in the country. But is this partnership growing? What is the evidence of growth? Can this be measured? Are there impacts on both parties? What is the thematic focus of their fact-checking efforts? And who makes the most suspicious claims they fact-check?
To answer these questions, this study relies on mapping the fact-checks published within a period of six-years; that is from March 2015 to September, 2020 (in the online platforms) of a selected print media. With 177 data analysed, the study makes very significant contributions to the research questions.
One, findings show a steady progression of newsrooms’ uptake of fact-checking, ranging from a paltry 1.7% (n=2) in 2015 to 44.5% (n=52) in 2020.
Two, as 23.1% (n=27) fact-checks were sourced externally, the impact of the partnership is shown in a symbiosis that promotes the publication of syndicated contents from independent fact-checkers.
Three, this study finds that Nigerian news media is responding to the fact-checking landscape, having shown that the majority of contents (77%; n=90) published within the period were internal fact-checks.
Four, regarding sources of suspicious claims being fact-checked, the study corroborates existing research which affirms social media platforms as the major sources of fake and suspicious claims in the public space (35.9%; n=42), while media sources remain minimal (4.3%; N=5). It also reveals the culpability of government agencies, including the presidency, government officials, and politicians for spreading suspicious claims (50.4%; n=59).
Lastly, as this study captures only the growth of fact-checking in the news media, its scope is lacking in audience perspective to fact-checking consumption. It therefore recommends future research in audience interest in fact-checks, examining how audiences consume fact checks– what medium is most useful and in what format? Does fact checking make a difference in the audience’s news consumption habits?
Introduction
Existing literature has captured evidence of partnership between fact-checking organisations and newsrooms in Nigeria and part of the fallout of this partnership is the favourable impact of fact-checking training recorded on the output of the Nigerian journalists (Raji, 2020). Fact-Checking organisations in Nigeria have been involved in partnership with technology companies, such as face book’s ‘third party fact-checking programme’ to assess the accuracy of news and other contents online (Cable, 2019).
This partnership often takes the form of fellowship programmes with newsrooms to promote the culture of truth, accountability in newsrooms, and wider reach for fact-checked contents in the public space. In one of such proposed fact-checking fellowship programme organised by Dubawa Nigeria and supported by Heinrich Boll Stiftung, a German foundation that works with civil societies and other democratic stakeholders, Chibueze Ebii, the Communication Manager in Nigeria said: “the aim of the fellowship is to foster a culture of fact-checking in newsrooms and hopefully encourage newsrooms to have fact-checking desks” (Premium Times, 2019).
Ananny (2020) has highlighted similar partnerships to include the one by ProPublica’s numerous partnerships with other news organizations and collaboration with audiences on everything from fighting hate speech to explaining election processes;
The study also reveals the technology-focused partnerships which involved Facebook’s Instant Articles, Snap-Chat’s Discover, Google’s Accelerated Mobile Pages, Twitter’s Amplify, and Amazon’s discounted access for subscribers to The Washington Post.
A similar one was with Tech and Check Cooperative’s project which aims at bringing together universities, the Internet Archive, and Google for automated, real-time fact-checking on the U.S. State of the Union address.
Again, there was First Draft’s CrossCheck Newsroom project that convenes technology companies (Google and Facebook are partners), international news organizations, and online metrics and analytics companies to fight the circulation of misinformation(Ananny, 2018).
Given the above background, and having established the fact that relationships exist between independent fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria, there is a need to examine the growth prospects of such relationships. There is little or no debate on whether information disorder has become endemic and efforts to catch up with its trendy pace need a multiple end-prong. So, the symbiotic relationship among stakeholders in the misinformation eco-system must be developed, sustained, and nourished. Based on the fore-going, this study seeks to provide answers to the following relevant questions:
What is the evidence of growing partnership between newsrooms and fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and how do we measure this growth?
How does the partnership impact on the fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria?
How are the newsrooms responding to the fact-checking landscape in Nigeria and to what prospects?
What exactly has been the thematic focus of fact-checking efforts of newsrooms and independent fact-checkers in Nigeria?
Whose claims do news media and fact-checkers verify?
To answer these questions, this study leverages on a set of goals. These include to:
examine evidence of growing partnership between newsrooms and fact-checking organisations in Nigeria and how this growth can be measured.
examine how the selected news media support other fact-checking organisations to fight information disorder by promoting shared-contents externally sourced on their platforms.
evaluate fact-checking efforts of the news media and fact-checking organisations around three major thematic areas, including (i) Politics/Elections ii) Financial/Economic matters, and (iii) Health.
investigate the personalities and institutions behind major claims which fact-checkers and news media verify.
Justifying the Partnership
The need for partnership in the first place has been explained by various sources. Some of these include the fact that media and communication institutions are generally believed to be weak. There are also reservations about whether it is professionally ethical for fellow journalists to fact-check reports from other media organisations even when such reports were laced with unverified claims.
Journalists also faced the challenges of verifying claims made by employers, organisations’ advertisers (Raji, 2020) and other interested parties including ownership interest, government control among others. Some of these constitute various challenges newsrooms encounter which require collaboration with independent outfits in order to navigate the changing nature of the media landscape and challenges posed to it by fake contents.
Given these challenges, fact-checkers are looking at bigger pictures in their partnership with newsrooms, knowing the available mutual benefits. One of these is equipping newsrooms to deliver on their mandates without necessarily being hit by undue influence under any guise. Another is creating wider reach for fact-check contents in terms of content-sharing.
Claire Wardle, co-founder at the First Draft, said it is imperative for newsrooms to collaborate to tackle mis/disinformation as no one can do it alone. “We don’t think it makes sense for newsrooms to be competitive when it comes to helping audiences navigate information disorder. It doesn’t make sense to have 25 newsrooms all debunking the same meme” (Daniel Green, 2019).
With the level of trending fake contents and hoaxes, even media houses are vulnerable to misinformation as they are already battling content credibility issues. Partnership in terms of training, skills and capacity building for newsrooms to be able to spot and debunk hoaxes should be paramount. Justifying the need to collaborate to achieve a common cause, Wardle said:
Given the widespread nature of false claims on social media…skills in verification and fact-checking should be a core part of any curriculum for aspiring journalists…These skills need to go beyond simply telling audiences whether the content is true or not; it is also about accuracy and trustworthiness (Daniel Green, 2019).
Also justifying partnership between Fact-Checkers and newsrooms, Ananny (2018, quoting Lucas Graves…) says fact-checkers: practice journalism in the networked mode. They linked promiscuously to outside news sources, encourage other reporters to cite their work, and strike distributions deal with major media organisations. Fact-checkers have achieved a high profile in media-political networks
This reminds us that verification or fact-checking is a conscious aspect of journalism to identify and amplify the truth of the fact. Legacy media has exposed itself to erosion of confidence as its audience no longer feel the impact. There is a need to remedy this situation. As journalists themselves are sometimes unclear about what role fact-checking can or should play in their work (Ananny, 2018), that is why fact-checking organisations must take it upon themselves to channel the course of partnership and collaboration in form of training, fellowship, encouraging newsrooms to cite their fact-checks and also engage in internal fact-checking of claims that have strong impact on public discourse.
In measuring partnership from other land, Ananny’s (2018) review of partnership between Facebook and a selected fact-checking organisations shows similar measuring methodology with this current study in terms of mapping published fact-checks. For instance, Ananny made a reference to how Politifact used the number of fact-checks it did while partnering with Facebook’s third party arrangement:
PolitiFact has used it to check about 2,000 URLs since the partnership began— which is a lot, considering the outlet has published about 15,000 fact checks in its entire 10-year history. To cover that much ground in one a year with this Facebook tool is a sign of success.
Fact-Checking Organisations in Focus
There are currently six fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. These include Africa-Check, Dubawa Nigeria, AFP Nigeria, Peoples’Check Nigeria, FactHub Check Nigeria, Round-Check Nigeria and Cross-Check Nigeria (Folarin, 2020). These organisations came into existence in Nigeria between 2016 and 2020, the period this study captures.
There is little or no debate that the setting up of these organisations in Nigeria coincides with the period the term “fake news” assumes a different dimension in the World. The term “fake news” was named Collins’ Word of the Year 2017. As its usage rose by 365% since 2016 (Independent, 2017), the timing is also significant in how their setup coincides with the period the term “fake news” contributes to the undermining of society’s trust in news reporting.
The period (particularly as related to the 2016 presidential election in America), highlighted a tension among journalists as they were often caught between two odds: that is, trying to figure out how to call out and contextualise the lies and misleading statements of office holders, and having to defend their own work against politicians and fellow media producers who called fact-checks or undesirable stories “fake news” (Ananny, 2017).
This was the period during which the mistrust in the public space rose to the level at which there was a strong impression that journalists and politicians were liars. Ananny concludes that the period was “a watershed moment for intersections between technology and politics, journalists’ and fact-checkers’ relationships to verification and accountability reporting, and popular understandings of political truth.”
As noted earlier, the collaboration between fact-checkers and the media often takes the form of networked model where fact-checkers “linked promiscuously to outside news sources, encourage other reporters to cite their work, and strike distributions deals with major media organisations.” This is the focus of this study.
Research Approach
This study adopts a quantitative research approach which seeks to leverage on the content analysis of the fact-checks published mainly on the websites of the selected news media within a period of six years: March 2015-September, 2020.
For ease of tracking the fact-checks, the study restricted the fact-checks search to only the online versions of the newspapers under review, using specific Keywords search such as “fact check, Nigeria”, “fact-checking”, “Cross-Check Nigeria, “Dubawa Nigeria”, “fact-checks in The Punch,” “fact-checks in The Guardian Nigeria,” “fact-checks in Nigerian Tribune”, “fact-checks in Daily Trust”, “fact-checks in Sahara Reporters”, “fact-checks in The Cable”, “fact-checks in Premium Times”.
Exploring google search engine with these keywords, a total of 132 fact-checks were tracked. For ease of inputting, sorting and analysing the data, a database was built, using google spreadsheet (see the link: Mapping Take-Up of Fact-Checking in the Nigerian Newsrooms); and to clean up the data, the identification of the relevant fact-checking articles in the selected media were determined by fulfilling certain parameters. By these criteria:
We included articles identified primarily as fact-checking reports that check and verify factual statements and claims with the aim of establishing the truthfulness, correctness or authenticity of the assertion based on verifiable facts (n=117);
We excluded fact-checks that were published on the newspapers’ social media platforms (n=6);
We excluded contents similar to fact-checking items published for the purpose of correcting editorial errors (n=4);
We also excluded fact-checks used or referenced in news format, features or opinions (n=5);
A total of 117 fact-checks were analysed for this study.
Meanwhile, the variables used for data collection were (i) yearly publication of fact-checks (ii) number of fact-checks published per news medium (iii) Quantity of contents shared by the news media iv) Sources of claims fact-checked, and (v) Thematic focus of the fact-checks.
Target Population
The target population for this study was taken to be all newsrooms in Nigeria: Mainstream, Digital and online platforms that have partnered with fact-checking organisations earlier identified in Folarin (2020) in terms of training, fellowship, contents sharing, among others. For instance, 45 newsrooms participated in a fact-checking training with FirstDraft in 2018 and collaborated to do election related fact-checks during the Nigerian 2019 general elections (firstdraft.org, 2018).
Sample Group
The sample group was of selected newsrooms with the proviso that:
They are national in scope with wide readership;
They are digital newsrooms with clear editorial independence and also with wide readership;
Each of the newspapers has published at least eight fact-checks on its website within the period under review.
These include: Daily Trust, The Punch, Nigerian Tribune and The Guardian representing mainstream print media;
The Cable, Sahara Reporters and Premium Times representing online media.
Justifying the period under review (2015-2020)
The period being reviewed in this study is quite significant based on a number of reasons:
During the period, Africa Check, being the first fact-checking organization in Africa set up an office in Lagos Nigeria in 2016 and even witnessed its major growth between 2015-2016 (Anim Van Wyk, 2020);
Dubawa, the first Nigerian independent fact-checking outfit was established in 2018 (Daily Trust, 2018);
Based on the preliminary checks done for this study, Africa-Check’s content had appeared in Nigeria’s newspapers within the period, particularly in 2015, even before it set up its office in Lagos; hence, the decision to track activities from 2015 (Researchers preliminary check on google search, 2020);
The period also witnessed series of collaborations between newsrooms and independent fact-checkers in Nigeria through fellowship programme (Daily Trust, 2020), and fact-checking training by the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Reporting through Dubawa fact-checking project (Premium Times, May 2018) as well as by CrossCheck, Nigeria’s outlet supervised by the International Centre for Investigative Reporting in December, 2018 (Ricchiardi, 2018).
Results to the five research questions that guided this study are presented below.
Findings/ Results/Discussion
Q.1. What is the evidence of growing partnership between newsrooms and fact-checking organisations in Nigeria? How do we measure this growth?
Table 1.Total distribution for the period (2015-2020)
Year
Fact-checks
%
2015
2
1.7%
2016
8
6.8%
2017
9
7.7%
2018
12
10.3%
2019
34
29%
2020
52
44.5%
Total
117
100%
Table (1) above shows a total of 117 fact-checks published by selected newspapers between March 2015 and September 2020. From a paltry of only 2 fact-checks (1.7%) in 2015 through 8 (6.8%) in 2016, to 9 (7.7%) in 2017. The number grew in 2018 to 12 fact-checks (10.3) with a rapid flight of 34 fact-checks (29%) in 2019 and 52 fact-checks (44.5%) in 2020.
The volume of fact-checks published by newsrooms within the period shows evidence of growing partnership between the parties. Judging from table (1) above, there was a seamless upward progression in the volume of fact-checks published by the newsrooms from 2015 to 2020. Common reasoning for the yearly progression cannot be far-fetched from series of collaboration between independent fact-checkers and newsrooms. For instance, the 2018 collaborative efforts between sixteen newsrooms in Nigeria and First-Draft, spearheaded by the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) under the CrossCheck Nigeria Project, in preparation for Nigeria’s 2019 general election (Jacob Granger, 2018) apparently promoted the surge in fact-checks recorded from just 10% in 2018 to 29% in 2019.
Measuring the growth
The surge in fact-check reports published over time is very significant in measuring the growing partnership between both parties. Probable reasons for the surge could be traced to a number of developments taking place over years. One of these include the amount of claims available for fact-checkers to verify in the pre-election period through the election proper and post-election. For instance, in the 2019 election, WhatsApp reportedly promised to grant API access to First Draft, an effort that would enable “the entire team to have access to the back-end data on one dashboard coming into that single phone number” (Jacob Granger, 2018).
Also, the sharp increase in the fact-checks published from 29% in 2019 to 44.5% in 2020 shows some level of dynamism in the pattern of collaboration recorded. This sharp increase would not be far removed from the efforts of the media and independent fact-checkers in Nigerian to double their strategies to counter massive mis/disinformation that greeted the outbreak of COVID 19, a global pandemic that shook the World in 2020. The year witnessed more collaborations even from information stakeholders in the health sector, as seen in the case of National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) partnering with media and independent fact-checkers to stem the tide of information disorder amidst the global tension (Premium Times, 2020).
Another milestone that likely helped newsrooms increase fact-checks in 2020 can be traced to new tools being developed by fact-checking organisations to help newsrooms have access to information. An instance of this was a technology, InfoFinder, from Africa-Check which “allows journalists, policymakers, researchers and the public to search for information within a carefully selected collection of more than 250 facts from Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa” (Africa-Check, 2020).
Q.2. How are the newsrooms responding to the fact-checking landscape in Nigeria?
Table 2: Distribution of fact-checks across newsrooms
Media
Fact-checks
%
The Guardian
29
24.8%
The Punch
14
12%
Daily Trust
9
7.7%
Nigerian Tribune
12
10.3%
The Cable
15
12.8%
Premium Times
30
25.6%
Sahara Reporters
8
6.8%
Total
117
100%
The table above shows the distribution of fact-checks across the newspapers under review. Findings show Premium Times published the highest with 30 fact-checks (25.6%); followed by The Guardian with 29 (24.8%); The Cable, 15 fact-checks (12.8%); The Punch, 14 (12%); Nigerian Tribune, 12 (10.3%); Daily Trust 9 (7.7%). Sahara Reporters published the lowest with 8 (at 6.8%).
Statistics in Table (2) show the significant level of fact-checkers available within the newsrooms under review. This is evidence that the culture of fact-checking is gradually taking root within the media landscape. While the scope of this study did not extend to verifying the availability of physical fact-checking desks in the newsrooms being reviewed, the fact that the news media are beginning to have dedicated sections on their platforms for published fact-checks shows a significant dimensions in the patterns of their responses to the need to explore fact-checking journalism. This is where fact-checking journalism is helping the news media fulfill its social responsibilities of informing, educating and holding politicians accountable.
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (2018) gave a background to the fore-going. Before the digital revolution, checks and balances existed in the newsroom. Journalists and editors had time, they weren’t constantly rushing to the next story. And often, they had a fact-checker. Someone whose sole job it was to verify the information being reported. Fact-checkers and copy editors were once the first line of defense against misinformation. Yet, in the great newsroom purges of the last decade, fact-checkers have become a luxury most newsrooms cannot afford. This was the beginning of mistrust and credibility issue in the news media.
However, the perspective offered by Laura Dattaro (2018) in the Columbia Journalism Review corroborates the position of this study that fact-checking journalism comes handy in the face of mistrust and content-credibility issue in the media:
The mistrust arising from this inconsistency points to the larger role of fact-checking, beyond ensuring accuracy and helping to avoid lawsuits. Journalists trade on reliability, to their readers, to their sources, and to thepublic that they serve. An independent fact-checking process provides another layer of assurance to all parties that a story best represents the truth…
Q 3. How does the partnership impact on the fact-checkers and newsrooms in Nigeria?
Table 3: Content-sharing between Newsrooms and Fact-Checking Organisations
Africa-Check
Dubawa
Internal Fact-Check
CDD
Cross-
Others
Total
Check
The Guardian
1
0
26
0
0
2
29
The Punch
4
0
10
0
0
O
14
Daily Trust
1
0
7
0
1
0
9
Nigerian Tribune
0
0
11
0
0
1
12
The Cable
0
0
11
4
0
0
15
Premium Times
3
5
21
0
0
1
30
Sahara Reporters
1
0
4
0
0
3
8
Total
10
5
90
4
1
7
117
Table (3) above shows that the greatest percentage of fact-checks (76.9%; n=90) published by Nigerian newsrooms between the period was a product of internal fact-checking efforts. In terms of content-sharing, 8.55% (n=10) of the published contents was from Africa-Check, followed by that of Dubawa which form 4.3% (n=5). The Cable shared 4 contents from CDD, representing (3.4%). Others form 6% of the total content items.
Statistics in tables (3) above aim at providing answers to the question on the impact of the collaborative efforts of both parties in stemming the scourge of mis/disinformation. The idea of large scale fact-checking is at the heart of partnership. While fact-checkers are assured of a wider audience for their contents, the trust-base of the newsrooms is also growing among their audience. By this, both partners succeed in tracking and controlling the spread of misinformation.
Similarly, the impact of the partnership on both parties can be understood in terms of the content-sharing model adopted by both parties. This has been the norm often practised by fact-checkers to promote wider reach of their contents. As revealed by an Africa Check editor, Anim Van Wyk (2020), besides fact-checking, “Africa Check syndicates its content to other news organisations to republish free of charge, provided proper attribution is given.” This revelation copiously played out in the media being reviewed.
For instance, 10.3% of fact-checks in The Guardian were shared from external sources (from Africa Check and others). In The Punch, 28.6% of its contents was from Africa Check; Daily Trust shared 22.22% of its content from Africa Check and CrossCheck. In the Nigerian Tribune, it was 8.3%; in The Cable, 26.7% came from Centre from Democracy and Development (CDD); while 30% of the fact-checks in Premium Times was shared from Africa Check, Dubawa and others, Sahara Reporters had 50% of its fact-checks from Africa Check and others.
The significance of this content-sharing of fact-lists can be appreciated from the extent at which news media audiences can easily come in contact with verified and debunked claims and compared with what has gone viral on social media. This is in consonance with the perspective of the Centre for Technology and Society (2018) we can easily turn to reputable news media that produce fact-check reports on a regular basis. They can be used to monitor or verify statements made by politicians who, knowing such tools exist, are constrained from making false claims and are pressured to make statements more cautiously.
Q4. What exactly has been the thematic focus of fact-checking efforts of newsrooms and independent fact-checkers in Nigeria?
Table 4: Distribution of Thematic Focus of Fact-Checks as Published during the Period
Year
Election/Politics
Economy/Governance
Health
Total
2020
4
17
31
52
2019
10
22
2
34
2018
2
8
2
12
2017
0
9
0
9
2016
0
8
0
8
2015
1
0
1
2
Total
17
65
36
117
There have been questions raised regarding the specific thematic area to which news media and fact-checkers deploy verification tools. To answer the question, this study consciously categorised all fact-checks tracked in consonance with the thematic areas common to Dubawa and Africa Check as the most vibrant independent fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. As cited on Dubawa’s and Africa Check’s websites , these areas include: (i) Health (ii) Economy, and (iii) Politics/Election(https://dubawa.org/about-us/our-fact-check-process/https://africacheck.org).
As statistics above indicated, more than half of the total fact-checks (55.5%; n=65) focus on economic and financial themes. These include issues around financial market, budgetary and fiscal allocations. While 30% (n=36) border on Health issues, 14.5% (n=17) focus on Political and Electoral matters. These include discussions around political parties, election campaigns/manifestos and voting. As shown in table (5), news media paid more attention to Economic and Governance issues during the period under review than Politics and Health issues. The reasons for this may not be far-fetched.
First, none of these fact-checking organisations existed in Nigeria in 2015 until 2016 when so much noise about politics and election was already over. The only area news media could have focused on was economy and governance, following the assumption of president Buhari in office in 2015.
Second, the finding which shows Health issues as the second most fact-checked is in agreement with existing literature (Amobi, 2019) which affirms that Africa Check verifies claims on the key areas of health and development, and given that Africa-Check, in particular, often syndicates its contents in the news media (Van Myk, 2020) has a considerable attention paid to health issues being the pivotal element that gave birth to the organisation in the first place. Again, the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 and its attendant mis/disinformation warfare in Nigeria raised the bar of fact-checking collaboration and content sharing on Health related issues in the news media.
Third, the number of fact-checks on politics/elections, as the third most fact-checked issues, were published only in 2019 and a pocket of occasions in 2020 during the Nigerian general and States’ elections following a couple of fact-checking training, fellowship and collaboration on joint project such as CrossCheck Nigeria project which targeted tackling information disorder during the elections.
Q 5. Whose Claims did News Media and Fact-Checkers Verify?
Table 5: Sources of Claims Fact-Checked
Social Media Users
Media
Politicians
Nigeria’s Presidency
Govt. Officials
Others
Total
42
5
15
18
26
11
117
35.9%
4.3%
12.8%
15.38%
22.22%
9.4%
100%
As seen in the above table, social media users constitute the highest number of sources of claims (35.9%; n=42) subjected to verification by fact-checkers during the period. Following closely were Government Officials (22.22%; n=26). Nigeria’s Presidency came third among sources of claims being fact-checked (15.38%; n=18). Politicians came less with 15 claims (12.8%) and the Media came the least among known sources of claims (4.3%; n=5). Others include 11 contents (9.4%).
Going by the statistics on claims made by “social media users” (35.9%; n=42), this study corroborates a recent study by Adeniran (2020) that “misinformation on potential cure, official policies and pronouncements…are frequently shared on social media platforms in Nigeria”. However, contrary to Adeniran’s assertion that “most information rated false were found to have targeted government entities both locally and beyond”, this study observed that government officials themselves were deep-necked in spreading suspicious claims in the public space.
When taking into proper context, and sum up the number of claims recorded against ‘Nigeria’s Presidency”, “Government Officials” and “Politicians,” that is, (26+18+15=59), this finding suggests that “Governments officials” and “Politicians” constitute major personalities and institutions with suspicious claims (50.4%; n=59) in the public space.
Conclusion
This study is another major contribution to the existing research interrogating impacts of fact-checkers’ work on the media, institutions, news audience, and politicians (Adeniran, 2020, Raji, 2020, Folarin 2020, Anim, 2020, Africa Check, Chequeado & Full Fact, 2020, Bob Wekessa, 2017).
Mapping the fact-checks that were published in the selected media within a period of six-years, that is from March 2015 to September, 2020, findings show a steady progression of newsrooms’ uptake of fact-checking, ranging from a paltry of 1.7% (n=2) in 2015 to 44.5% (n=52) in 2020.
This shows evidence of growing partnership between newsrooms and fact-checking organisations in Nigeria. It is in furtherance of the impact of this partnership that this study examines how newsrooms were responding to fact-checking landscape and what exactly has been the thematic focus of the newsrooms’ fact-checking efforts so far.
The study also made spirited efforts at contributing to questions being raised over the culpability and otherwise of personalities, institutions and platforms in the dissemination of fake and suspicious claims in the public space. In examining this, the study corroborates Adeniran (2020) that social media platforms remain the major sources of fake and suspicious claims (35.9%; n=42), while media sources remain minimal (4.3%; N=5).
However, contrary to Adeniran (2020) that most information rated false by fact-checkers were targeted at official entities to undermine government efforts, this study finds that government agencies, including the Presidency, government officials and politicians spread suspicious claims.
Another parameter suggesting a growing partnership is evident in how newsrooms published syndicated fact-checks from independent fact-checkers. The fallout of this is underscored in a symbiotic relationship where both parties align on a common goal of tackling disinformation. This study posits that the outcome of such collaborative effort simply means a shared-benefit which promotes wider-reach for independent fact-checks and causes a surge in the news media audience trust-base.
Interestingly, this study reveals another significant contribution in terms of uptake of fact-checking in the Nigerian newsrooms. Contrary to a study by Bob Wekesa et al (2017) which shows that, within a period of five years, that is from 2012-2017, “the South African media is mainly reliant on external sources for fact-checking, primarily Africa Check”, this study shows that majority of fact-checks (77%; n=90) published in a period of six years, from 2015 to 2020 in the Nigerian media were sourced internally.
Finally, this study finds that the majority of fact-checks published within the period focused on Governance and Economy followed by Health issues and less politics. The low number of fact-checks recorded on politics could be due to the fact that only one general election has taken place within the period. Overall, Nigerian media has proven, with this renewed collaboration, fact-checking journalism has the potential to restore audience confidence in the legacy news media. This is in line with the theory of change embraced by Dubawa Nigeria which is about providing factual information and building capacity of newsrooms to fact-check (Egwu, 2019). It is an effective effort to rebuild and restore lost confidence in the news media.
On the flipside, the weak side of the fact-checking efforts of the newsrooms is observed in a number of fact-checks across the media that were either duplicated, repeated, or dubiously edited by other mediums and published without clear attributions.
Recommendations
This research study explores only a quantitative approach to generate large data and conduct content analysis of fact-checks published on the newspapers’ online platforms. However, there is a need for a qualitative approach such as in-depth interviews with news editors and reporters in order to elicit perspectives on the analysed data.
Similarly, while this study stresses the prospect of fact-checking journalism to restore trust in the legacy media, it proposes further studies to examine the sustained impact of fact-checking on the perceived reputation, trust and dependability of legacy media.
Further, fact-checkers need to expand their efforts in broadcast journalism to meet the majority of audience members where they are, rather than requiring them to embrace news media to access well-researched fact-checks. This is the position by Riley (2019). Using broadcast journalism to fight misinformation has its huge benefit as less than half of the World’s population has internet access. In countries without reliable internet, radio, and TV are the best way to give audiences factual content.
Lastly, as this study only captures the growth of fact-checking in the news media, it is lacking in audience perspective to fact-checking consumption. On this note, research in audience interest in fact-checking journalism would be beneficial for media houses. How do audiences consume fact checks – what medium is most useful and what format? Does fact checking make a difference in their news consumption habits?
This research is conducted for the Dubawa Fellowship programme (2020), and is supported by Heinrich Boll Stiftung Foundation, to amplify the culture of truth and contribute to the literature around information disorder.
Centre for Information Technology and Society (2018). “Protecting Ourselves from Fake News: Fact-Checkers and their Limitations”. https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/protecting-ourselves-fact
Gordon & Betty More Foundation (2018). “Perspective: Just the Facts, Seeking the Truth in today’s media Landscape”. https://www.moore.org/article-detail?newsUrlName=perspective-just-the-facts-seeking-the-truth-in-today%27s-media-landscape
Granger, J. (2018). “Crosscheck Nigeria Targets WhatsApp As A Hotspot For Fake News.” https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/crosscheck-nigeria-target-whatsapp-as-a-hotspot-for-fake-news/s2/a731438/
Premium Times (2020). “NCDC Partners With Dubawa And Africa Check To Debunk Misinformation On Coronavirus.” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/385271-ncdc-partners-with-dubawa-and-africa-check-to-debunk-misinformation-on-coronavirus.html
Raji, R. (2020). “Impact of Fact-Checking on the Nigerian Journalists to Mitigate Spread of Dis/Misinformation”. https://dubawa.org/impact-of-fact-checking-training-on-the-nigerian-journalists-to-mitigate-the-spread-of-mis-disinformation/
Ricchiardi, S. (2018). “Fact-checking around the world: Inside Nigeria’s CrossCheck”. International Centre for Journalists: USA. ijnet.org/en/story/factchecking.
Premium Times (2019). “Nigeria’s Foremost Fact-Checking Project, Dubawa, To Host Fellows For Four-Day Training”. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/327573-nigerias-foremost-fact-checking-project-dubawa-to-host-fellows-for-four-day-training.html
Wekesa, Bob, Blessing Vava, and Hlabangani Mtshali. (2017) ‘Getting the Story Straight: The Take up of Fact-Checking Journalism in South African Newsrooms over the Past Five Years’. State of the Newsroom 2017: Fakers & Makers. Wits Journalism, 2018 journalism.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/WITS-STATE-OF-THE NEWSROOM_March_2018.pdf
